Summary:
images attached to maniphest tasks and mentioned in remarkup anywhere now invoke a lightbox control that lets the user page through all the images.
lightbox includes a download button, next / prev buttons, and if we're not at the tippy toppy of hte page an "X" or close button.
we also respond to left, right, and esc for navigating.
next time we should get non-images working in here...!
Test Plan:
played with maniphest - looks good
made comments with images. looks good.
made sure multiple image comments worked.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
CC: aran, Korvin, chad
Maniphest Tasks: T1896
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D3705
Summary: See discussion in D3722. Good catch -- I'd definitely say this is a bug.
Test Plan: Rendered two <div />s, one with mustcapture set to `true` and one to `false`. The first got `data-mustcapture`; the second did not.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D3723
Summary:
- `kill_init.php` said "Moving 1000 files" - I hope that this is not some limit in `FileFinder`.
- [src/infrastructure/celerity] `git mv utils.php map.php; git mv api/utils.php api.php`
- Comment `phutil_libraries` in `.arcconfig` and run `arc liberate`.
NOTE: `arc diff` timed out so I'm pushing it without review.
Test Plan:
/D1234
Browsed around, especially in `applications/repository/worker/commitchangeparser` and `applications/` in general.
Auditors: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1103
Summary:
Sending CSRF token in GET forms is dangerous because if there are external links
on the target page then the token could leak through Referer header.
The token is not required for anything because GET forms are used only to
display data, not to perform operations.
Sending CSRF tokens to external URLs leaks the token immediately.
Please note that <form action> defaults to GET.
PhabricatorUserOAuthSettingsPanelController suffered from this problem for both
reasons.
Test Plan: Save my settings (POST form).
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
CC: aran, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D1558
Summary:
We don't currently validate CSRF tokens on this workflow. This allows an
attacker to upload arbitrary files on the user's behalf. Although I believe the
tight list of servable mime-types means that's more or less the end of the
attack, this is still a vulnerability.
In the long term, the right solution is probably to pass CSRF tokens on all Ajax
requests in an HTTP header (or just a GET param) or something like that.
However, this endpoint is unique and this is the quickest and most direct way to
close the hole.
Test Plan:
- Drop-uploaded files to Files, Maniphest, Phriction and Differential.
- Modified CSRF vaidator to use __csrf__.'x' and verified uploads and form
submissions don't work.
Reviewers: andrewjcg, aran, jungejason, tuomaspelkonen, erling
Commenters: andrewjcg, pedram
CC: aran, epriestley, andrewjcg, pedram
Differential Revision: 758
