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5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
epriestley
1f6a4cfffe Prevent users from selecting excessively bad passwords based on their username or email address
Summary:
Ref T13216. We occasionally receive HackerOne reports concerned that you can select your username as a password. I suspect very few users actually do this and that this is mostly a compliance/checklist sort of issue, not a real security issue.

On this install, we have about 41,000 user accounts. Of these, 100 have their username as a password (account or VCS). A substantial subset of these are either explicitly intentional ("demo", "bugmenot") or obvious test accounts ("test" in name, or name is a nonsensical string of gibberish, or looks like "tryphab" or similar) or just a bunch of numbers (?), or clearly a "researcher" doing this on purpose (e.g., name includes "pentest" or "xss" or similar).

So I'm not sure real users are actually very inclined to do this, and we can't really ever stop them from picking awful passwords anyway. But we //can// stop researchers from reporting that this is an issue.

Don't allow users to select passwords which contain words in a blocklist: their username, real name, email addresses, or the install's domain name. These words also aren't allowed to contain the password (that is, neither your password nor your username may be a substring of the other one). We also do a little normalization to try to split apart email addresses, domains, and real names, so I can't have "evan1234" as my password.

Test Plan:
  - Added unit tests and made them pass.
  - Tried to set my password to a bunch of variations of my username / email / domain name / real name / etc, got rejected.

Reviewers: amckinley

Reviewed By: amckinley

Maniphest Tasks: T13216

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19776
2018-11-06 12:44:07 -08:00
epriestley
5529458e14 Add test coverage for SSH key revocation
Summary: Depends on D18928. Ref T13043. Add some automated test coverage for SSH revocation rules.

Test Plan: Ran tests, got a clean bill of health.

Reviewers: amckinley

Reviewed By: amckinley

Maniphest Tasks: T13043

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18929
2018-01-25 19:47:20 -08:00
epriestley
bb12f4bab7 Add test coverage to the PasswordEngine upgrade workflow and fix a few bugs
Summary:
Ref T13043. When we verify a password and a better hasher is available, we automatically upgrade the stored hash to the stronger hasher.

Add test coverage for this workflow and fix a few bugs and issues, mostly related to shuffling the old hasher name into the transaction.

This doesn't touch anything user-visible yet.

Test Plan: Ran unit tests.

Reviewers: amckinley

Reviewed By: amckinley

Maniphest Tasks: T13043

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18897
2018-01-23 10:55:35 -08:00
epriestley
c280c85772 Consolidate password verification/revocation logic in a new PhabricatorAuthPasswordEngine
Summary:
Ref T13043. This provides a new piece of shared infrastructure that VCS passwords and account passwords can use to validate passwords that users enter.

This isn't reachable by anything yet.

The test coverage of the "upgrade" flow (where we rehash a password to use a stronger hasher) isn't great in this diff, I'll expand that in the next change and then start migrating things.

Test Plan: Added a bunch of unit tests.

Reviewers: amckinley

Reviewed By: amckinley

Maniphest Tasks: T13043

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18896
2018-01-23 10:54:49 -08:00
epriestley
9c00a43784 Add a more modern object for storing password hashes
Summary:
Ref T13043. Currently:

  - Passwords are stored separately in the "VCS Passwords" and "User" tables and don't share as much code as they could.
  - Because User objects are all over the place in the code, password hashes are all over the place too (i.e., often somewhere in process memory). This is a very low-severity, theoretical sort of issue, but it could make leaving a stray `var_dump()` in the code somewhere a lot more dangerous than it otherwise is. Even if we never do this, third-party developers might. So it "feels nice" to imagine separating this data into a different table that we rarely load.
  - Passwords can not be //revoked//. They can be //deleted//, but users can set the same password again. If you believe or suspect that a password may have been compromised, you might reasonably prefer to revoke it and force the user to select a //different// password.

This change prepares to remedy these issues by adding a new, more modern dedicated password storage table which supports storing multiple password types (account vs VCS), gives passwords real PHIDs and transactions, supports DestructionEngine, supports revocation, and supports `bin/auth revoke`.

It doesn't actually make anything use this new table yet. Future changes will migrate VCS passwords and account passwords to this table.

(This also gives third party applications a reasonable place to store password hashes in a consistent way if they have some need for it.)

Test Plan: Added some basic unit tests to cover general behavior. This is just skeleton code for now and will get more thorough testing when applications move.

Reviewers: amckinley

Reviewed By: amckinley

Maniphest Tasks: T13043

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18894
2018-01-22 15:35:28 -08:00