Summary: Depends on D20008. Ref T920. Continue fleshing out contact number behaviors.
Test Plan:
- Enabled and disabled a contact number.
- Saw list, detail views reflect change.
- Added number X, disabled it, added it again (allowed), enabled the disabled one ("already in use" exception).
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T920
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D20010
Summary:
Ref T920. To send you SMS messages, we need to know your phone number.
This adds bare-bone basics (transactions, storage, editor, etc).
From here:
**Disabling Numbers**: I'll let you disable numbers in an upcoming diff.
**Primary Number**: I think I'm just going to let you pick a number as "primary", similar to how email works. We could imagine a world where you have one "MFA" number and one "notifications" number, but this seems unlikely-ish?
**Publishing Numbers (Profile / API)**: At some point, we could let you say that a number is public / "show on my profile" and provide API access / directory features. Not planning to touch this for now.
**Non-Phone Numbers**: Eventually this could be a list of other similar contact mechanisms (APNS/GCM devices, Whatsapp numbers, ICQ number, twitter handle so MFA can slide into your DM's?). Not planning to touch this for now, but the path should be straightforward when we get there. This is why it's called "Contact Number", not "Phone Number".
**MFA-Required + SMS**: Right now, if the only MFA provider is SMS and MFA is required on the install, you can't actually get into Settings to add a contact number to configure SMS. I'll look at the best way to deal with this in an upcoming diff -- likely, giving you partial access to more of Setings before you get thorugh the MFA gate. Conceptually, it seems reasonable to let you adjust some other settings, like "Language" and "Accessibility", before you set up MFA, so if the "you need to add MFA" portal was more like a partial Settings screen, maybe that's pretty reasonable.
**Verifying Numbers**: We'll probably need to tackle this eventually, but I'm not planning to worry about it for now.
Test Plan: {F6137174}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: avivey, PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T920
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19988
Summary:
Ref T13222. This updates the CLI tools and documentation for the changes in D19975.
The flags `--type` and `--all-types` retain their current meaning. In most cases, `bin/auth strip --type totp` is sufficient and you don't need to bother looking up the relevant provider PHID. The existing `bin/auth list-factors` is also unchanged.
The new `--provider` flag allows you to select configs from a particular provider in a more granular way. The new `bin/auth list-mfa-providers` provides an easy way to get PHIDs.
(In the Phacility cluster, the "Strip MFA" action just reaches into the database and deletes rows manually, so this isn't terribly important. I verified that the code should still work properly.)
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/auth list-mfa-providers`.
- Stripped by user / type / provider.
- Grepped for `list-factors` and `auth strip`.
- Hit all (?) of the various possible error cases.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19976
Summary:
Ref T13222. Users configure "Factor Configs", which say "I have an entry on my phone for TOTP secret key XYZ".
Currently, these point at raw implementations -- always "TOTP" in practice.
To support configuring available MFA types (like "no MFA") and adding MFA types that need some options set (like "Duo", which needs API keys), bind "Factor Configs" to a "Factor Provider" instead.
In the future, several "Factors" will be available (TOTP, SMS, Duo, Postal Mail, ...). Administrators configure zero or more "MFA Providers" they want to use (e.g., "Duo" + here's my API key). Then users can add configs for these providers (e.g., "here's my Duo account").
Upshot:
- Factor: a PHP subclass, implements the technical details of a type of MFA factor (TOTP, SMS, Duo, etc).
- FactorProvider: a storage object, owned by administrators, configuration of a Factor that says "this should be available on this install", plus provides API keys, a human-readable name, etc.
- FactorConfig: a storage object, owned by a user, says "I have a factor for provider X on my phone/whatever with secret key Q / my duo account is X / my address is Y".
Couple of things not covered here:
- Statuses for providers ("Disabled", "Deprecated") don't do anything yet, but you can't edit them anyway.
- Some `bin/auth` tools need to be updated.
- When no providers are configured, the MFA panel should probably vanish.
- Documentation.
Test Plan:
- Ran migration with providers, saw configs point at the first provider.
- Ran migration without providers, saw a provider created and configs pointed at it.
- Added/removed factors and providers. Passed MFA gates. Spot-checked database for general sanity.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19975
Summary:
Depends on D19994. See PHI1027. If an install has customized the "Welcome Mail" message, include it in welcome mail. A special custom message from the profile screen overrides it, if provided.
(I fiddled with putting the custom message as "placeholder" text in the remarkup area as a hint, but newlines in "placeholder" text appear to have issues in Safari and Firefox. I think this is probably reasonably clear as-is.)
Make both render remarkup-into-text so things like links work properly, as it's reasonably likely that installs will want to link to things.
Test Plan:
- With custom "Welcome Mail" text, sent mail with no custom override (got custom text) and a custom override (got overridden text).
- Linked to some stuff, got sensible links in the mail (`bin/mail show-outbound`).
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19995
Summary: Depends on D19992. Ref T13222. If administrators provide a custom login message, show it on the login screen.
Test Plan:
{F6137930}
- Viewed login screen with and without a custom message.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19994
Summary:
Ref T13222. Long ago, we had a Config option (`welcome.html`) to let you dump HTML onto the login screen, but this was relatively hard to use and not good from a security perspective.
In some cases this was obsoleted by Dashboards, but there's at least some remaining set of use cases for actual login instructions on the login screen. For example, WMF has some guidance on //which// SSO mechanism to use based on what types of account you have. On `secure`, users assume they can register by clicking "Log In With GitHub" or whatever, and it might reduce frustration to tell them upfront that registration is closed.
Some other types of auth messaging could also either use customization or defaults (e.g., the invite/welcome/approve mail).
We could do this with a bunch of Config options, but I'd generally like to move to a world where there's less stuff in Config and more configuration is contextual. I think it tends to be easier to use, and we get a lot of fringe benefits (granular permissions, API, normal transaction logs, more abililty to customize workflows and provide contextual help/hints, etc). Here, for example, we can provide a remarkup preview, which would be trickier with Config.
This does not actually do anything yet.
Test Plan: {F6137541}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19992
Summary:
Ref T13222. Ref T13231. See PHI912. I'm planning to turn MFA providers into concrete objects, so you can disable and configure them.
Currently, we only support TOTP, which doesn't require any configuration, but other provider types (like Duo or Yubikey OTP) do require some configuration (server URIs, API keys, etc). TOTP //could// also have some configuration, like "bits of entropy" or "allowed window size" or whatever, if we want.
Add concrete objects for this and standard transaction / policy / query support. These objects don't do anything interesting yet and don't actually interact with MFA, this is just skeleton code for now.
Test Plan:
{F6090444}
{F6090445}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13231, T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19935
Summary:
Depends on D19904. Ref T13226. Ref T13222. Currently, partial sessions (where you've provided a primary auth factor like a password, but not yet provided MFA) work like normal sessions: they're good for 30 days and extend indefinitely under regular use.
This behavior is convenient for full sessions, but normal users don't ever spend 30 minutes answering MFA, so there's no real reason to do it for partial sessions. If we add login alerts in the future, limiting partial sessions to a short lifetime will make them more useful, since an attacker can't get one partial session and keep extending it forever while waiting for an opportunity to get past your MFA.
Test Plan:
- Did a partial login (to the MFA prompt), checked database, saw a ~29 minute partial session.
- Did a full login, saw session extend to ~30 days.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13226, T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19905
Summary:
Depends on D19902. Ref T13222. This is mostly a "while I'm in here..." change since MFA is getting touched so much anyway.
Doing cluster support, I sometimes need to log into user accounts on instances that have MFA. I currently accomplish this by doing `bin/auth recover`, getting a parital session, and then forcing it into a full session in the database. This is inconvenient and somewhat dangerous.
Instead, allow `bin/auth recover` to generate a link that skips the "partial session" stage: adding required MFA, providing MFA, and signing legalpad documents.
Anyone who can run `bin/auth recover` can do this anyway, this just reduces the chance I accidentally bypass MFA on the wrong session when doing support stuff.
Test Plan:
- Logged in with `bin/auth recover`, was prompted for MFA.
- Logged in with `bin/auth recover --force-full-session`, was not prompted for MFA.
- Did a password reset, followed reset link, was prompted for MFA.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19903
Summary:
Depends on D19919. Ref T11351. This method appeared in D8802 (note that "get...Object" was renamed to "get...Transaction" there, so this method was actually "new" even though a method of the same name had existed before).
The goal at the time was to let Harbormaster post build results to Diffs and have them end up on Revisions, but this eventually got a better implementation (see below) where the Harbormaster-specific code can just specify a "publishable object" where build results should go.
The new `get...Object` semantics ultimately broke some stuff, and the actual implementation in Differential was removed in D10911, so this method hasn't really served a purpose since December 2014. I think that broke the Harbormaster thing by accident and we just lived with it for a bit, then Harbormaster got some more work and D17139 introduced "publishable" objects which was a better approach. This was later refined by D19281.
So: the original problem (sending build results to the right place) has a good solution now, this method hasn't done anything for 4 years, and it was probably a bad idea in the first place since it's pretty weird/surprising/fragile.
Note that `Comment` objects still have an unrelated method with the same name. In that case, the method ties the `Comment` storage object to the related `Transaction` storage object.
Test Plan: Grepped for `getApplicationTransactionObject`, verified that all remaining callsites are related to `Comment` objects.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T11351
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19920
Summary:
Depends on D19918. Ref T11351. In D19918, I removed all calls to this method. Now, remove all implementations.
All of these implementations just `return $timeline`, only the three sites in D19918 did anything interesting.
Test Plan: Used `grep willRenderTimeline` to find callsites, found none.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T11351
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19919
Summary:
Depends on D19894. Ref T13222. See PHI873. When you provide a correct response to an MFA challenge, we mark it as "answered".
Currently, we never let you reuse an "answered" token. That's usually fine, but if you have 2+ factors on your account and get one or more (but fewer than all of them) right when you submit the form, you need to answer them all again, possibly after waiting for a lockout period. This is needless.
When you answer a challenge correctly, add a hidden input with a code proving you got it right so you don't need to provide another answer for a little while.
Why not just put your response in a form input, e.g. `<input type="hidden" name="totp-response" value="123456" />`?
- We may allow the "answered" response to be valid for a different amount of time than the actual answer. For TOTP, we currently allow a response to remain valid for 60 seconds, but the actual code you entered might expire sooner.
- In some cases, there's no response we can provide (with push + approve MFA, you don't enter a code, you just tap "yes, allow this" on your phone). Conceivably, we may not be able to re-verify a push+approve code if the remote implements one-shot answers.
- The "responseToken" stuff may end up embedded in normal forms in some cases in the future, and this approach just generally reduces the amount of plaintext MFA we have floating around.
Test Plan:
- Added 2 MFA tokens to my account.
- Hit the MFA prompt.
- Provided one good response and one bad response.
- Submitted the form.
- Old behavior: good response gets locked out for ~120 seconds.
- New behavior: good response is marked "answered", fixing the other response lets me submit the form.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19895
Summary:
Depends on D19893. Ref T13222. See PHI873. A challenge is "answered" if you provide a valid response. A challenge is "completed" if we let you through the MFA check and do whatever actual action the check is protecting.
If you only have one MFA factor, challenges will be "completed" immediately after they are "answered". However, if you have two or more factors, it's possible to "answer" one or more prompts, but fewer than all of the prompts, and end up with "answered" challenges that are not "completed".
In the future, it may also be possible to answer all the challenges but then have an error occur before they are marked "completed" (for example, a unique key collision in the transaction code). For now, nothing interesting happens between "answered" and "completed". This would take the form of the caller explicitly providing flags like "wait to mark the challenges as completed until I do something" and "okay, mark the challenges as completed now".
This change prevents all token reuse, even on the same workflow. Future changes will let the answered challenges "stick" to the client form so you don't have to re-answer challenges for a short period of time if you hit a unique key collision.
Test Plan:
- Used a token to get through an MFA gate.
- Tried to go through another gate, was told to wait for a long time for the next challenge window.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19894
Summary:
Depends on D19888. Ref T13222. When we issue an MFA challenge, prevent the user from responding to it in the context of a different workflow: if you ask for MFA to do something minor (award a token) you can't use the same challenge to do something more serious (launch nukes).
This defuses highly-hypothetical attacks where the attacker:
- already controls the user's session (since the challenge is already bound to the session); and
- can observe MFA codes.
One version of this attack is the "spill coffee on the victim when the code is shown on their phone, then grab their phone" attack. This whole vector really strains the bounds of plausibility, but it's easy to lock challenges to a workflow and it's possible that there's some more clever version of the "spill coffee" attack available to more sophisticated social engineers or with future MFA factors which we don't yet support.
The "spill coffee" attack, in detail, is:
- Go over to the victim's desk.
- Ask them to do something safe and nonsuspicious that requires MFA (sign `L123 Best Friendship Agreement`).
- When they unlock their phone, spill coffee all over them.
- Urge them to go to the bathroom to clean up immediately, leaving their phone and computer in your custody.
- Type the MFA code shown on the phone into a dangerous MFA prompt (sign `L345 Eternal Declaration of War`).
- When they return, they may not suspect anything (it would be normal for the MFA token to have expired), or you can spill more coffee on their computer now to destroy it, and blame it on the earlier spill.
Test Plan:
- Triggered signatures for two different documents.
- Got prompted in one, got a "wait" in the other.
- Backed out of the good prompt, returned, still prompted.
- Answered the good prompt.
- Waited for the bad prompt to expire.
- Went through the bad prompt again, got an actual prompt this time.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19889
Summary:
Depends on D19886. Ref T13222. Clean up MFA challenges after they expire.
(There's maybe some argument to keeping these around for a little while for debugging/forensics, but I suspect it would never actually be valuable and figure we can cross that bridge if we come to it.)
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/garbage collect --collector ...` and saw old MFA challenges collected.
- Triggered a new challenge, GC'd again, saw it survive GC while still active.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19888
Summary:
Ref T13222. See PHI873. Ref T9770.
Currently, we support only TOTP MFA. For some MFA (SMS and "push-to-app"-style MFA) we may need to keep track of MFA details (e.g., the code we SMS'd you). There isn't much support for that yet.
We also currently allow free reuse of TOTP responses across sessions and workflows. This hypothetically enables some "spyglass" attacks where you look at someone's phone and type the code in before they do. T9770 discusses this in more detail, but is focused on an attack window starting when the user submits the form. I claim the attack window opens when the TOTP code is shown on their phone, and the window between the code being shown and being submitted is //much// more interesting than the window after it is submitted.
To address both of these cases, start tracking MFA "Challenges". These are basically a record that we asked you to give us MFA credentials.
For TOTP, the challenge binds a particular timestep to a given session, so an attacker can't look at your phone and type the code into their browser before (or after) you do -- they have a different session. For now, this means that codes are reusable in the same session, but that will be refined in the future.
For SMS / push, the "Challenge" would store the code we sent you so we could validate it.
This is mostly a step on the way toward one-shot MFA, ad-hoc MFA in comment action stacks, and figuring out what's going on with Duo.
Test Plan:
- Passed MFA normally.
- Passed MFA normally, simultaneously, as two different users.
- With two different sessions for the same user:
- Opened MFA in A, opened MFA in B. B got a "wait".
- Submitted MFA in A.
- Clicked "Wait" a bunch in B.
- Submitted MFA in B when prompted.
- Passed MFA normally, then passed MFA normally again with the same code in the same session. (This change does not prevent code reuse.)
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222, T9770
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19886
Summary:
Ref T13222. Ref T13225. We store a digest of the session key in the session table (not the session key itself) so that users with access to this table can't easily steal sessions by just setting their cookies to values from the table.
Users with access to the database can //probably// do plenty of other bad stuff (e.g., T13134 mentions digesting Conduit tokens) but there's very little cost to storing digests instead of live tokens.
We currently digest session keys with HMAC-SHA1. This is fine, but HMAC-SHA256 is better. Upgrade:
- Always write new digests.
- We still match sessions with either digest.
- When we read a session with an old digest, upgrade it to a new digest.
In a few months we can throw away the old code. When we do, installs that skip upgrades for a long time may suffer a one-time logout, but I'll note this in the changelog.
We could avoid this by storing `hmac256(hmac1(key))` instead and re-hashing in a migration, but I think the cost of a one-time logout for some tiny subset of users is very low, and worth keeping things simpler in the long run.
Test Plan:
- Hit a page with an old session, got a session upgrade.
- Reviewed sessions in Settings.
- Reviewed user logs.
- Logged out.
- Logged in.
- Terminated other sessions individually.
- Terminated all other sessions.
- Spot checked session table for general sanity.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13225, T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19883
Summary:
Ref T13222. See PHI873. I'm preparing to introduce a new MFA "Challenge" table which stores state about challenges we've issued (to bind challenges to sessions and prevent most challenge reuse).
This table will reference sessions (since each challenge will be bound to a particular session) but sessions currently don't have PHIDs. Give them PHIDs and slightly modernize some related code.
Test Plan:
- Ran migrations.
- Verified table got PHIDs.
- Used `var_dump()` to dump an organic user session.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19881
Summary:
Ref T13197. See PHI873. Record when a user has MFA'd and add a little icon to the transaction, similar to the exiting "Silent" icon.
For now, this just makes this stuff more auditable. Future changes may add ways to require MFA for certain specific transactions, outside of the ones that already always require MFA (like revealing credentials).
Test Plan: {F5877960}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13197
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19665
Summary:
Depends on D19585. Ref T13164. This is a precursor for D19586, which causes Editors to start doing more explicit CAN_EDIT checks.
Passwords have an Editor, but don't actually define a CAN_EDIT capability. Define one (you can edit a password if you can edit the object the password is associated with).
(Today, this object is always a User -- this table just unified VCS passwords and Account passwords so they can be handled more consistently.)
Test Plan:
- With D19586, ran unit tests and got a pass.
- Edited my own password.
- Tried to edit another user's password and wasn't permitted to.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13164
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19592
Summary:
Ref T13065. `mailKey`s are a private secret for each object. In some mail configurations, they help us ensure that inbound mail is authentic: when we send you mail, the "Reply-To" is "T123+456+abcdef".
- The `T123` is the object you're actually replying to.
- The `456` is your user ID.
- The `abcdef` is a hash of your user account with the `mailKey`.
Knowing this hash effectively proves that Phabricator has sent you mail about the object before, i.e. that you legitimately control the account you're sending from. Without this, anyone could send mail to any object "From" someone else, and have comments post under their username.
To generate this hash, we need a stable secret per object. (We can't use properties like the PHID because the secret has to be legitimately secret.)
Today, we store these in `mailKey` properties on the actual objects, and manually generate them. This results in tons and tons and tons of copies of this same ~10 lines of code.
Instead, just store them in the Mail application and generate them on demand. This change also anticipates possibly adding flags like "must encrypt" and "original subject", which are other "durable metadata about mail transmission" properties we may have use cases for eventually.
Test Plan:
- See next change for additional testing and context.
- Sent mail about Herald rules (next change); saw mail keys generate cleanly.
- Destroyed a Herald rule with a mail key, saw the mail properties get nuked.
- Grepped for `getMailKey()` and converted all callsites I could which aren't the copy/pasted boilerplate present in 50 places.
- Used `bin/mail receive-test --to T123` to test normal mail receipt of older-style objects and make sure that wasn't broken.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13065
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19399
Summary:
Depends on D18907. Ref T13043. Ref T12509. We have some weird old password digest behavior that isn't terribly concerning, but also isn't great.
Specifically, old passwords were digested in weird ways before being hashed. Notably, account passwords were digested with usernames, so your password stops working if your username is chagned. Not the end of the world, but silly.
Mark all existing hashes as "v1", and automatically upgrade then when they're used or changed. Some day, far in the future, we could stop supporting these legacy digests and delete the code and passwords and just issue upgrade advice ("Passwords which haven't been used in more than two years no longer work."). But at least get things on a path toward sane, modern behavior.
Test Plan: Ran migration. Spot-checked that everthing in the database got marked as "v1". Used an existing password to login successfully. Verified that it was upgraded to a `null` (modern) digest. Logged in with it again.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043, T12509
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18908
Summary:
Ref T13043. This moves user account passwords to the new shared infrastructure.
There's a lot of code changes here, but essentially all of it is the same as the VCS password logic in D18898.
Test Plan:
- Ran migration.
- Spot checked table for general sanity.
- Logged in with an existing password.
- Hit all error conditions on "change password", "set password", "register new account" flows.
- Verified that changing password logs out other sessions.
- Verified that revoked passwords of a different type can't be selected.
- Changed passwords a bunch.
- Verified that salt regenerates properly after password change.
- Tried to login with the wrong password, which didn't work.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18903
Summary:
Ref T13043. In D18898 I moved VCS passwords to the new shared infrastructure.
Before account passwords can move, we need to make two changes:
- For legacy reasons, VCS passwords and Account passwords have different "digest" algorithms. Both are more complicated than they should be, but we can't easily fix it without breaking existing passwords. Add a `PasswordHashInterface` so that objects which can have passwords hashes can implement custom digest logic for each password type.
- Account passwords have a dedicated external salt (`PhabricatorUser->passwordSalt`). This is a generally reasonable thing to support (since not all hashers are self-salting) and we need to keep it around so existing passwords still work. Add salt support to `AuthPassword` and make it generate/regenerate when passwords are updated.
Then add a nice story about password digestion.
Test Plan: Ran migrations. Used an existing VCS password; changed VCS password. Tried to use a revoked password. Unit tests still pass. Grepped for callers to legacy `PhabricatorHash::digestPassword()`, found none.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18900
Summary:
Ref T13043. This provides a new piece of shared infrastructure that VCS passwords and account passwords can use to validate passwords that users enter.
This isn't reachable by anything yet.
The test coverage of the "upgrade" flow (where we rehash a password to use a stronger hasher) isn't great in this diff, I'll expand that in the next change and then start migrating things.
Test Plan: Added a bunch of unit tests.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18896
Summary:
Ref T13043. Currently:
- Passwords are stored separately in the "VCS Passwords" and "User" tables and don't share as much code as they could.
- Because User objects are all over the place in the code, password hashes are all over the place too (i.e., often somewhere in process memory). This is a very low-severity, theoretical sort of issue, but it could make leaving a stray `var_dump()` in the code somewhere a lot more dangerous than it otherwise is. Even if we never do this, third-party developers might. So it "feels nice" to imagine separating this data into a different table that we rarely load.
- Passwords can not be //revoked//. They can be //deleted//, but users can set the same password again. If you believe or suspect that a password may have been compromised, you might reasonably prefer to revoke it and force the user to select a //different// password.
This change prepares to remedy these issues by adding a new, more modern dedicated password storage table which supports storing multiple password types (account vs VCS), gives passwords real PHIDs and transactions, supports DestructionEngine, supports revocation, and supports `bin/auth revoke`.
It doesn't actually make anything use this new table yet. Future changes will migrate VCS passwords and account passwords to this table.
(This also gives third party applications a reasonable place to store password hashes in a consistent way if they have some need for it.)
Test Plan: Added some basic unit tests to cover general behavior. This is just skeleton code for now and will get more thorough testing when applications move.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18894
Summary: Ref T13043. Adds CLI support for revoking SSH keys. Also retargets UI language from "Deactivate" to "Revoke" to make it more clear that this is a one-way operation. This operation is already correctly implemented as a "Revoke" operation.
Test Plan: Used `bin/auth revoke --type ssh` to revoke keys, verified they became revoked (with proper transactions) in the UI. Revoked keys from the web UI flow.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18893
Summary:
Ref T12509. This adds support for HMAC+SHA256 (instead of HMAC+SHA1). Although HMAC+SHA1 is not currently broken in any sense, SHA1 has a well-known collision and it's good to look at moving away from HMAC+SHA1.
The new mechanism also automatically generates and stores HMAC keys.
Currently, HMAC keys largely use a per-install constant defined in `security.hmac-key`. In theory this can be changed, but in practice essentially no install changes it.
We generally (in fact, always, I think?) don't use HMAC digests in a way where it matters that this key is well-known, but it's slightly better if this key is unique per class of use cases. Principally, if use cases have unique HMAC keys they are generally less vulnerable to precomputation attacks where an attacker might generate a large number of HMAC hashes of well-known values and use them in a nefarious way. The actual threat here is probably close to nonexistent, but we can harden against it without much extra effort.
Beyond that, this isn't something users should really have to think about or bother configuring.
Test Plan:
- Added unit tests.
- Used `bin/files integrity` to verify, strip, and recompute hashes.
- Tampered with a generated HMAC key, verified it invalidated hashes.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T12509
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17630
Summary:
This has been replaced by `PolicyCodex` after D16830. Also:
- Rebuild Celerity map to fix grumpy unit test.
- Fix one issue on the policy exception workflow to accommodate the new code.
Test Plan:
- `arc unit --everything`
- Viewed policy explanations.
- Viewed policy errors.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: hach-que, PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16831
Summary:
Ref T10917. This cheats fairly heavily to generate SSH key mail:
- Generate normal transaction mail.
- Force it to go to the user.
- Use `setForceDelivery()` to force it to actually be delivered.
- Add some warning language to the mail body.
This doesn't move us much closer to Glorious Infrastructure for this whole class of events, but should do what it needs to for now and doesn't really require anything sketchy.
Test Plan: Created and edited SSH keys, got security notice mail.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15948
Summary:
Ref T10917. Converts web UI edits to transactions.
This is about 95% "the right way", and then I cheated on the last 5% instead of building a real EditEngine. We don't need it for anything else right now and some of the dialog workflows here are a little weird so I'm just planning to skip it for the moment unless it ends up being easier to do after the next phase (mail notifications) or something like that.
Test Plan: {F1652160}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15947
Summary:
Ref T10917. This primarily prepares these for transactions by giving us a place to:
- review old deactivated keys; and
- review changes to keys.
Future changes will add transactions and a timeline so key changes are recorded exhaustively and can be more easily audited.
Test Plan:
{F1652089}
{F1652090}
{F1652091}
{F1652092}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15946
Summary:
Ref T10917. Currently, when you delete an SSH key, we really truly delete it forever.
This isn't very consistent with other applications, but we built this stuff a long time ago before we were as rigorous about retaining data and making it auditable.
In partiular, destroying data isn't good for auditing after security issues, since it means we can't show you logs of any changes an attacker might have made to your keys.
To prepare to improve this, stop destoying data. This will allow later changes to become transaction-oriented and show normal transaction logs.
The tricky part here is that we have a `UNIQUE KEY` on the public key part of the key.
Instead, I changed this to `UNIQUE (key, isActive)`, where `isActive` is a nullable boolean column. This works because MySQL does not enforce "unique" if part of the key is `NULL`.
So you can't have two rows with `("A", 1)`, but you can have as many rows as you want with `("A", null)`. This lets us keep the "each key may only be active for one user/object" rule without requiring us to delete any data.
Test Plan:
- Ran schema changes.
- Viewed public keys.
- Tried to add a duplicate key, got rejected (already associated with another object).
- Deleted SSH key.
- Verified that the key was no longer actually deleted from the database, just marked inactive (in future changes, I'll update the UI to be more clear about this).
- Uploaded a new copy of the same public key, worked fine (no duplicate key rejection).
- Tried to upload yet another copy, got rejected.
- Generated a new keypair.
- Tried to upload a duplicate to an Almanac device, got rejected.
- Generated a new pair for a device.
- Trusted a device key.
- Untrusted a device key.
- "Deleted" a device key.
- Tried to trust a deleted device key, got "inactive" message.
- Ran `bin/ssh-auth`, got good output with unique keys.
- Ran `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub | ./bin/ssh-auth-key`, got good output with one key.
- Used `auth.querypublickeys` Conduit method to query keys, got good active keys.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15943
Summary: [WIP] Tossing this up for safety and to read through it. Need to test, update some of the other flows. This updates everything in Auth for new UI and modern conventions.
Test Plan: Loooots of random testing, new providers, edit providers, logging out, forgot password... more coming.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15550
Summary:
Ref T10603. This makes minor updates to temporary tokens:
- Rename `objectPHID` (which is sometimes used to store some other kind of identifier instead of a PHID) to `tokenResource` (i.e., which resource does this token permit access to?).
- Add a `userPHID` column. For LFS tokens and some other types of tokens, I want to bind the token to both a resource (like a repository) and a user.
- Add a `properties` column. This makes tokens more flexible and supports custom behavior (like scoping LFS tokens even more tightly).
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/storage upgrade -f`, got a clean upgrade.
- Viewed one-time tokens.
- Revoked one token.
- Revoked all tokens.
- Performed a one-time login.
- Performed a password reset.
- Added an MFA token.
- Removed an MFA token.
- Used a file token to view a file.
- Verified file token was removed after viewing file.
- Linked my account to an OAuth1 account (Twitter).
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15478
Summary:
Ref T10603. For LFS, we need to issue a new type of temporary token.
This makes the temporary token code modular so applications can add new token types without modifying the Auth application.
(I'm moving slowly here because it impacts authentication.)
Test Plan:
- Used `bin/auth recover` to get a one-time token from the CLI.
- Used "Forgot your password?" to get a one-time token from the web UI.
- Followed the web UI token to initiate a password reset, prompting generation of a password token.
- Viewed these tokens in the web UI:
{F1176908}
- Revoked a token.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15475
Summary: Ref T9967
Test Plan:
Ran migrations.
Verified database populated properly with PHIDs (SELECT * FROM auth_sshkey;).
Ran auth.querypublickeys conduit method to see phids show up
Ran bin/remove destroy <phid>.
Viewed the test key was gone.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T9967
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14823
Summary:
Fixes T9997. This was in the database since v0, I just never hooked up the UI since it wasn't previously meaningful.
However, it now makes sense to have a provider like Asana with login disabled and use it only for integrations.
Test Plan: Disabled login on a provider, verified it was no longer available for login/registration but still linkable.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9997
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14794
Summary: Fixes T7159.
Test Plan:
Created a legalpad document that needed a signature and I was required to sign it no matter what page I hit. Signed it and things worked! Added a new legalpad document and I had to sign again!
Ran unit tests and they passed!
Logged out as a user who was roadblocked into signing a bunch of stuff and it worked!
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7159
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11759
Summary:
Ref T7152. Ref T3554.
- When an administrator clicks "send invites", queue tasks to send the invites.
- Then, actually send the invites.
- Make the links in the invites work properly.
- Also provide `bin/worker execute` to make debugging one-off workers like this easier.
- Clean up some UI, too.
Test Plan:
We now get as far as the exception which is a placeholder for a registration workflow.
{F291213}
{F291214}
{F291215}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3554, T7152
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11736
Summary:
Ref T7152. This implements the administrative UI for the upstream email invite workflow.
Pieces of this will be reused in Instances to implement the instance invite workflow, although some of it is probably going to be a bit copy/pastey.
This doesn't actually create or send invites yet, and they still can't be carried through registration.
Test Plan:
{F290970}
{F290971}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7152
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11733
Summary:
Ref T7152. This builds the core of email invites and implements all the hard logic for them, covering it with a pile of tests.
There's no UI to create these yet, so users can't actually get invites (and administrators can't send them).
This stuff is a complicated mess because there are so many interactions between accounts, email addresses, email verification, email primary-ness, and user verification. However, I think I got it right and got test coverage everwhere.
The degree to which this is exception-driven is a little icky, but I think it's a reasonable way to get the testability we want while still making it hard for callers to get the flow wrong. In particular, I expect there to be at least two callers (one invite flow in the upstream, and one derived invite flow in Instances) so I believe there is merit in burying as much of this logic inside the Engine as is reasonably possible.
Test Plan: Unit tests only.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7152
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11723
Summary: Ref T7153. I am not sure if this is 100% correct because sometimes you have to POST vs GET and I don't know if the redirect response will / can do the right thing? I think options to fix this would be to 1) restrict this functionality to JUST the Phabricator OAuth provider type or 2) something really fancy with an HTTP(S) future. The other rub right now is when you logout you get half auto-logged in again... Thoughts on that?
Test Plan: setup my local instance to JUST have phabricator oauth available to login. was presented with the dialog automagically...!
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7153
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11701
Summary: Fixes T6693.
Test Plan:
Made a bunch of comments on a diff with differential, being sure to leave inlines here and there. This reproduced the issue in T6693. With this patch this issue no longer reproduces!
Successfully "showed older changes" in Maniphest too.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6693
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10931
Summary:
Ref T4712. Thus far, it seems that most "non-standard" things can be done pretty easily in the controller. Aside from deploying, this diff had to fix a few bugs / missing implementations of stuff.
(Notably, PhabricatorAuthProviderConfig, HeraldRule, PhabricatorSlowvotePoll, and AlmanacNetwork needed to implement PhabricatorApplicationTransactionInterface, PhabricatorAuthAuthProviderPHIDType had to be added, and a rendering bug in transactions of type PhabricatorOAuth2AuthProvider had to be fixed.)
Test Plan: Almanac - looked at binding, device, network, and service view controllers and verified timeline displayed properly. Herald - looked at a rule and verified timeline. Slowvote - looked at a vote and verified timeline. Auth - looked at an auth provider (Facebook) and verified proper display of transactions within timeline.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4712
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10921
Summary:
Ref T6240. Some discussion in that task. In instance/cluster environments, daemons need to make Conduit calls that bypass policy checks.
We can't just let anyone add SSH keys with this capability to the web directly, because then an adminstrator could just add a key they own and start signing requests with it, bypassing policy checks.
Add a `bin/almanac trust-key --id <x>` workflow for trusting keys. Only trusted keys can sign requests.
Test Plan:
- Generated a user key.
- Generated a device key.
- Trusted a device key.
- Untrusted a device key.
- Hit the various errors on trust/untrust.
- Tried to edit a trusted key.
{F236010}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6240
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10878
