"Content-Disposition: attachment"
Summary:
We currently serve some files off the primary domain (with "Content-Disposition:
attachment" + a CSRF check) and some files off the alternate domain (without
either).
This is not sufficient, because some UAs (like the iPad) ignore
"Content-Disposition: attachment". So there's an attack that goes like this:
- Alice uploads xss.html
- Alice says to Bob "hey download this file on your iPad"
- Bob clicks "Download" on Phabricator on his iPad, gets XSS'd.
NOTE: This removes the CSRF check for downloading files. The check is nice to
have but only raises the barrier to entry slightly. Between iPad / sniffing /
flash bytecode attacks, single-domain installs are simply insecure. We could
restore the check at some point in conjunction with a derived authentication
cookie (i.e., a mini-session-token which is only useful for downloading files),
but that's a lot of complexity to drop all at once.
(Because files are now authenticated only by knowing the PHID and secret key,
this also fixes the "no profile pictures in public feed while logged out"
issue.)
Test Plan: Viewed, info'd, and downloaded files
Reviewers: btrahan, arice, alok
Reviewed By: arice
CC: aran, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T843
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D1608
Summary: I've also moved the response generation for 404 from
##AphrontDefaultApplicationConfiguration## to ##buildResponseString()##
Test Plan:
Visit /
Visit /mail/
Visit /x/
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
CC: aran, epriestley, vrana
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D1406
Summary:
See T549. Under configurations where files are served from an alternate domain
which does not have cookie credentials, we use random keys to prevent browsing,
similar to how Facebook relies on pseudorandom information in image URIs (we
could some day go farther than this and generate file sessions on the alternate
domain or something, I guess).
Currently, we generate these random keys in a roundabout manner. Instead, use a
real entropy source and store the key on the object. This reduces the number of
sha1() calls in the codebase as per T547.
Test Plan: Ran upgrade scripts, verified database was populated correctly.
Configured alternate file domain, uploaded file, verified secret generated and
worked properly. Changed secret, was given 404.
Reviewers: jungejason, benmathews, nh, tuomaspelkonen, aran
Reviewed By: aran
CC: aran, epriestley
Differential Revision: 1036
domain
Summary:
See D758, D759.
- Provide a strongly recommended setting which permits configuration of an
alternate domain.
- Lock cookies down better: set them on the exact domain, and use SSL-only if
the configuration is HTTPS.
- Prevent Phabriator from setting cookies on other domains.
This assumes D759 will land, it is not effective without that change.
Test Plan:
- Attempted to login from a different domain and was rejected.
- Logged out, logged back in normally.
- Put install in setup mode and verified it revealed a warning.
- Configured an alterate domain.
- Tried to view an image with an old URI, got a 400.
- Went to /files/ and verified links rendered to the alternate domain.
- Viewed an alternate domain file.
- Tried to view an alternate domain file without the secret key, got a 404.
Reviewers: andrewjcg, erling, aran, tuomaspelkonen, jungejason, codeblock
CC: aran
Differential Revision: 760
