Summary: Ran `arc lint --apply-patches --everything` over rP, mainly to change double quotes to single quotes where appropriate. These changes also validate that the `ArcanistXHPASTLinter::LINT_DOUBLE_QUOTE` rule is working as expected.
Test Plan: Eyeballed it.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9431
Summary:
This is just a general review of config options, to reduce the amount of damage a rogue administrator (without host access) can do. In particular:
- Fix some typos.
- Lock down some options which would potentially let a rogue administrator do something sketchy.
- Most of the new locks relate to having them register a new service account, then redirect services to their account. This potentially allows them to read email.
- Lock down some general disk stuff, which could be troublesome in combination with other vulnerabilities.
Test Plan:
- Read through config options.
- Tried to think about how to do evil things with each one.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8928
Summary:
Ref T2230. When fully set up, we have up to three users who all need to write into the repositories:
- The webserver needs to write for HTTP receives.
- The SSH user needs to write for SSH receives.
- The daemons need to write for "git fetch", "git clone", etc.
These three users don't need to be different, but in practice they are often not likely to all be the same user. If for no other reason, making them all the same user requires you to "git clone httpd@host.com", and installs are likely to prefer "git clone git@host.com".
Using three different users also allows better privilege separation. Particularly, the daemon user can be the //only// user with write access to the repositories. The webserver and SSH user can accomplish their writes through `sudo`, with a whitelisted set of commands. This means that even if you compromise the `ssh` user, you need to find a way to escallate from there to the daemon user in order to, e.g., write arbitrary stuff into the repository or bypass commit hooks.
This lays some of the groundwork for a highly-separated configuration where the SSH and HTTP users have the fewest privileges possible and use `sudo` to interact with repositories. Some future work which might make sense:
- Make `bin/phd` respect this (require start as the right user, or as root and drop privileges, if this configuration is set).
- Execute all `git/hg/svn` commands via sudo?
Users aren't expected to configure this yet so I haven't written any documentation.
Test Plan:
Added an SSH user ("dweller") and gave it sudo by adding this to `/etc/sudoers`:
dweller ALL=(epriestley) SETENV: NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/git-upload-pack, /usr/bin/git-receive-pack
Then I ran git pushes and pulls over SSH via "dweller@localhost". They successfully interacted with the repository on disk as the "epriestley" user.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T2230
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7589
Summary:
It's obvious that they're Phabricator related (why else would we provide
settings for them) and nothing else is prefaced.
Test Plan: Looked at /config/
Reviewers: epriestley, chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: epriestley
CC: aran, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T2255
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D4471
