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Author SHA1 Message Date
vrana
6cc196a2e5 Move files in Phabricator one level up
Summary:
- `kill_init.php` said "Moving 1000 files" - I hope that this is not some limit in `FileFinder`.
- [src/infrastructure/celerity] `git mv utils.php map.php; git mv api/utils.php api.php`
- Comment `phutil_libraries` in `.arcconfig` and run `arc liberate`.

NOTE: `arc diff` timed out so I'm pushing it without review.

Test Plan:
/D1234
Browsed around, especially in `applications/repository/worker/commitchangeparser` and `applications/` in general.

Auditors: epriestley

Maniphest Tasks: T1103
2012-06-01 12:32:44 -07:00
epriestley
b2890eeb0e Add "final" to all Phabricator "Controller" classes
Summary:
These are all unambiguously unextensible. Issues I hit:

  - Maniphest Change/Diff controllers, just consolidated them.
  - Some search controllers incorrectly extend from "Search" but should extend from "SearchBase". This has no runtime effects.
  - D1836 introduced a closure, which we don't handle correctly (somewhat on purpose; we target PHP 5.2). See T962.

Test Plan: Ran "testEverythingImplemented" unit test to identify classes extending from `final` classes. Resolved issues.

Reviewers: btrahan

Reviewed By: btrahan

CC: aran, epriestley

Maniphest Tasks: T795

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D1843
2012-03-09 15:46:25 -08:00
epriestley
15ef2fced0 Fix conservative CSRF token cycling limit
Summary:
We currently cycle CSRF tokens every hour and check for the last two valid ones.
This means that a form could go stale in as little as an hour, and is certainly
stale after two.

When a stale form is submitted, you basically get a terrible heisen-state where
some of your data might persist if you're lucky but more likely it all just
vanishes. The .js file below outlines some more details.

This is a pretty terrible UX and we don't need to be as conservative about CSRF
validation as we're being. Remedy this problem by:

  - Accepting the last 6 CSRF tokens instead of the last 1 (i.e., pages are
valid for at least 6 hours, and for as long as 7).
  - Using JS to refresh the CSRF token every 55 minutes (i.e., pages connected
to the internet are valid indefinitely).
  - Showing the user an explicit message about what went wrong when CSRF
validation fails so the experience is less bewildering.

They should now only be able to submit with a bad CSRF token if:

  - They load a page, disconnect from the internet for 7 hours, reconnect, and
submit the form within 55 minutes; or
  - They are actually the victim of a CSRF attack.

We could eventually fix the first one by tracking reconnects, which might be
"free" once the notification server gets built. It will probably never be an
issue in practice.

Test Plan:
  - Reduced CSRF cycle frequency to 2 seconds, submitted a form after 15
seconds, got the CSRF exception.
  - Reduced csrf-refresh cycle frequency to 3 seconds, submitted a form after 15
seconds, got a clean form post.
  - Added debugging code the the csrf refresh to make sure it was doing sensible
things (pulling different tokens, finding all the inputs).

Reviewed By: aran
Reviewers: tuomaspelkonen, jungejason, aran
CC: aran, epriestley
Differential Revision: 660
2011-07-14 08:09:40 -07:00