Summary:
Fixes T6741. Ref T10246. Broadly, we want to protect Almanac cluster services:
- Today, against users in the Phacility cluster accidentally breaking their own instances.
- In the future, against attackers compromising administrative accounts and adding a new "cluster database" which points at hardware they control.
The way this works right now is really complicated: there's a global "can create cluster services" setting, and then separate per-service and per-device locks.
Instead, change "Can Create Cluster Services" into "Can Manage Cluster Services". Require this permission (in addition to normal permissions) to edit or create any cluster service.
This permission can be locked to "No One" via config (as we do in the Phacility cluster) so we only need this one simple setting.
There's also zero reason to individually lock //some// of the cluster services.
Also improve extended policy errors.
The UI here is still a little heavy-handed, but should be good enough for the moment.
Test Plan:
- Ran migrations.
- Verified that cluster services and bindings reported that they belonged to the cluster.
- Edited a cluster binding.
- Verified that the bound device was marked as a cluster device
- Moved a cluster binding, verified the old device was unmarked as a cluster device.
- Tried to edit a cluster device as an unprivileged user, got a sensible error.
{F1126552}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T6741, T10246
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15339
Summary: `ssh-keygen` declines to run on a too-public key. Write the correctly-restricted key a little earlier in the workflow.
Test Plan:
```
epriestley@orbital ~/dev/phabricator $ chmod 644 ~/dev/core/conf/keys/daemon.key
epriestley@orbital ~/dev/phabricator $ ./bin/almanac register --private-key ~/dev/core/conf/keys/daemon.key --identify-as local.phacility.net --device daemon.phacility.net --force --allow-key-reuse
Installing public key...
Installing private key...
Installing device ID...
HOST REGISTERED This host has been registered as "local.phacility.net" and a trusted keypair has been installed.
epriestley@orbital ~/dev/phabricator $
```
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11700
Summary:
Ref T5833. In some cases, we need to know if an Almanac device is the localhost or not, so we can either handle or forward the request.
To accomplish this, write a device ID when running `bin/almanac register`.
Using `--allow-key-reuse` and `--identify-as`, multiple devices are permitted to //authenticate// as one device but //identify// as different devices. In the Phacility cluster, this allows all the `repoXXX` machines to have one keypair (making key management much easier) but still work as separate devices. This is an advanced feature; normal installs with 1-3 hosts would just generate a key + device per host and identify/authenticate as the same device.
Test Plan: Ran commands with lots of flags like `PHACILITY_INSTANCE=local sudo -E ./bin/almanac register --device daemon.phacility.net --private-key ~/dev/core/conf/keys/daemon.key --force --allow-key-reuse --identify-as local001.phacility.net`. Got a good result from `AlmanacKeys::getDeviceID()` afterward.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11452
Summary: Ref T6822.
Test Plan: `grep`. This method is only called from within `PhutilArgumentWorkflow::__construct`.
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6822
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11415
Summary:
Ref T2783. This is basically a more refined version of D10400, which churned a bit on things like SSH key storage, the actual way the signing protocol shook out, etc.
- When Phabricator tries to make an intra-cluster service call as the omnipotent user, sign it with the host's device key.
- Add `bin/almanac register` to say "this host is X device, identified by private key Y". This stores the keypair locally, adds the public key to Almanac, and trusts it.
Net effect is that once a host has been registered, the daemons can make calls to other nodes as the omnipotent user. This is primarily necessary so they can access repository API methods on remote hosts.
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/almanac register` with various valid and invalid inputs.
- Verified keys get generated/added/stored properly.
- Made a device-signed cluster Conduit call.
- Made a normal old user-signed cluster Conduit call.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T2783
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11158
Summary:
Fixes T6741. This allows Almanac services to be locked from the CLI. Locked services (and their bindings, interfaces and devices) can not be edited. This serves two similar use cases:
- For normal installs, you can protect cluster configuration from an attacker who compromises an account (or generally harden services which are intended to be difficult to edit).
- For Phacility, we can lock externally-managed instance cluster configuration without having to pull any spooky tricks.
Test Plan:
- Locked and unlocked services.
- Verified locking a service locks connected properties, bindings, binding properties, interfaces, devices, and device properties.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6741
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11006
Summary:
Ref T6240. Some discussion in that task. In instance/cluster environments, daemons need to make Conduit calls that bypass policy checks.
We can't just let anyone add SSH keys with this capability to the web directly, because then an adminstrator could just add a key they own and start signing requests with it, bypassing policy checks.
Add a `bin/almanac trust-key --id <x>` workflow for trusting keys. Only trusted keys can sign requests.
Test Plan:
- Generated a user key.
- Generated a device key.
- Trusted a device key.
- Untrusted a device key.
- Hit the various errors on trust/untrust.
- Tried to edit a trusted key.
{F236010}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6240
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10878
Summary:
Ref T5833. Currently, we have an `AlmanacDeviceProperty`, but it doesn't use CustomFields and is specific to devices. Make this more generic:
- Reuse most of the CustomField infrastructure (so we can eventually get easy support for nice editor UIs, etc).
- Make properties more generic so Services, Bindings and Devices can all have them.
The major difference between this implementation and existing CustomField implementations is that all other implementations are application-authoritative: the application code determines what the available list of fields is.
I want Almanac to be a bit more freeform (basically: you can write whatever properties you want, and we'll put nice UIs on them if we have a nice UI available). For example, we might have some sort of "ServiceTemplate" that says "a database binding should usually have the fields 'writable', 'active', 'credential'", which would do things like offer these as options and put a nice UI on them, but you should also be able to write whatever other properties you want and add services without building a specific service template for them.
This involves a little bit of rule bending, but ends up pretty clean. We can adjust CustomField to accommodate this a bit more gracefully later on if it makes sense.
Test Plan: {F229172}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10777
Summary:
Ref T4209. This creates storage for public keys against authorized hosts, such that servers can be authorized to make Conduit calls as the omnipotent user.
Servers are registered into this system by running the following command once:
```
bin/almanac register
```
NOTE: This doesn't implement authorization between servers, just the storage of public keys.
Placing this against Almanac seemed like the most sensible place, since I'm imagining in future that the `register` command will accept more information (like the hostname of the server so it can be found in the service directory).
Test Plan: Ran `bin/almanac register` and saw the host (and public key information) appear in the database.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T4209
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10400
