Summary:
Ref T4209. Ref T6240. Ref T6238. See D10401 for original discussion.
On OSX, `ssh-keygen` doesn't support PKCS8:
- When we hit an issue with this, raise a more tailored message about it.
- Allow the user to work around the problem with `auth cache-pkcs8 ...`, providing reasonable guidance / warnings.
In practice, this only really matters very much for one key, which I'm just going to make the services extension cache automatically. So it's sort of moot, but good to have around for weird cases and to make testing easier.
Test Plan: Hit error, cached key, got clean asymmetric auth.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4209, T6240, T6238
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11021
Summary:
Fixes T3347. We can't really do this one as a config thing since we don't know if the user wants to use LDAP.
Instead, just give them a better message than they otherwise get when they try to install/configure/use LDAP.
Test Plan: Faked it and got a reasonable message.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3347
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10260
Summary:
Fixes T3732. Ref T1205. Ref T3116.
External accounts (like emails used as identities, Facebook accounts, LDAP accounts, etc.) are stored in "ExternalAccount" objects.
Currently, we have a very restrictive `CAN_VIEW` policy for ExternalAccounts, to add an extra layer of protection to make sure users can't use them in unintended ways. For example, it would be bad if a user could link their Phabricator account to a Facebook account without proper authentication. All of the controllers which do sensitive things have checks anyway, but a restrictive CAN_VIEW provided an extra layer of protection. Se T3116 for some discussion.
However, this means that when grey/external users take actions (via email, or via applications like Legalpad) other users can't load the account handles and can't see anything about the actor (they just see "Restricted External Account" or similar).
Balancing these concerns is mostly about not making a huge mess while doing it. This seems like a reasonable approach:
- Add `CAN_EDIT` on these objects.
- Make that very restricted, but open up `CAN_VIEW`.
- Require `CAN_EDIT` any time we're going to do something authentication/identity related.
This is slightly easier to get wrong (forget CAN_EDIT) than other approaches, but pretty simple, and we always have extra checks in place anyway -- this is just a safety net.
I'm not quite sure how we should identify external accounts, so for now we're just rendering "Email User" or similar -- clearly not a bug, but not identifying. We can figure out what to render in the long term elsewhere.
Test Plan:
- Viewed external accounts.
- Linked an external account.
- Refreshed an external account.
- Edited profile picture.
- Viewed sessions panel.
- Published a bunch of stuff to Asana/JIRA.
- Legalpad signature page now shows external accounts.
{F171595}
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3732, T1205, T3116
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9767
Summary: Ran `arc lint --apply-patches --everything` over rP, mainly to change double quotes to single quotes where appropriate. These changes also validate that the `ArcanistXHPASTLinter::LINT_DOUBLE_QUOTE` rule is working as expected.
Test Plan: Eyeballed it.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9431
Summary: Ref T5089. Adds a `security.require-multi-factor-auth` which forces all users to enroll in MFA before they can use their accounts.
Test Plan:
Config:
{F159750}
Roadblock:
{F159748}
After configuration:
{F159749}
- Required MFA, got roadblocked, added MFA, got unblocked.
- Removed MFA, got blocked again.
- Used `bin/auth strip` to strip MFA, got blocked.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5089
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9285
Summary:
Ref T4398. This code hadn't been touched in a while and had a few crufty bits.
**One Time Resets**: Currently, password reset (and similar links) are valid for about 48 hours, but we always use one token to generate them (it's bound to the account). This isn't horrible, but it could be better, and it produces a lot of false positives on HackerOne.
Instead, use TemporaryTokens to make each link one-time only and good for no more than 24 hours.
**Coupling of Email Verification and One-Time Login**: Currently, one-time login links ("password reset links") are tightly bound to an email address, and using a link verifies that email address.
This is convenient for "Welcome" emails, so the user doesn't need to go through two rounds of checking email in order to login, then very their email, then actually get access to Phabricator.
However, for other types of these links (like those generated by `bin/auth recover`) there's no need to do any email verification.
Instead, make the email verification part optional, and use it on welcome links but not other types of links.
**Message Customization**: These links can come out of several workflows: welcome, password reset, username change, or `bin/auth recover`. Add a hint to the URI so the text on the page can be customized a bit to help users through the workflow.
**Reset Emails Going to Main Account Email**: Previously, we would send password reset email to the user's primary account email. However, since we verify email coming from reset links this isn't correct and could allow a user to verify an email without actually controlling it.
Since the user needs a real account in the first place this does not seem useful on its own, but might be a component in some other attack. The user might also no longer have access to their primary account, in which case this wouldn't be wrong, but would not be very useful.
Mitigate this in two ways:
- First, send to the actual email address the user entered, not the primary account email address.
- Second, don't let these links verify emails: they're just login links. This primarily makes it more difficult for an attacker to add someone else's email to their account, send them a reset link, get them to login and implicitly verify the email by not reading very carefully, and then figure out something interesting to do (there's currently no followup attack here, but allowing this does seem undesirable).
**Password Reset Without Old Password**: After a user logs in via email, we send them to the password settings panel (if passwords are enabled) with a code that lets them set a new password without knowing the old one.
Previously, this code was static and based on the email address. Instead, issue a one-time code.
**Jump Into Hisec**: Normally, when a user who has multi-factor auth on their account logs in, we prompt them for factors but don't put them in high security. You usually don't want to go do high-security stuff immediately after login, and it would be confusing and annoying if normal logins gave you a "YOU ARE IN HIGH SECURITY" alert bubble.
However, if we're taking you to the password reset screen, we //do// want to put the user in high security, since that screen requires high security. If we don't do this, the user gets two factor prompts in a row.
To accomplish this, we set a cookie when we know we're sending the user into a high security workflow. This cookie makes login finalization upgrade all the way from "partial" to "high security", instead of stopping halfway at "normal". This is safe because the user has just passed a factor check; the only reason we don't normally do this is to reduce annoyance.
**Some UI Cleanup**: Some of this was using really old UI. Modernize it a bit.
Test Plan:
- **One Time Resets**
- Used a reset link.
- Tried to reuse a reset link, got denied.
- Verified each link is different.
- **Coupling of Email Verification and One-Time Login**
- Verified that `bin/auth`, password reset, and username change links do not have an email verifying URI component.
- Tried to tack one on, got denied.
- Used the welcome email link to login + verify.
- Tried to mutate the URI to not verify, or verify something else: got denied.
- **Message Customization**
- Viewed messages on the different workflows. They seemed OK.
- **Reset Emails Going to Main Account Email**
- Sent password reset email to non-primary email.
- Received email at specified address.
- Verified it does not verify the address.
- **Password Reset Without Old Password**
- Reset password without knowledge of old one after email reset.
- Tried to do that without a key, got denied.
- Tried to reuse a key, got denied.
- **Jump Into Hisec**
- Logged in with MFA user, got factor'd, jumped directly into hisec.
- Logged in with non-MFA user, no factors, normal password reset.
- **Some UI Cleanup**
- Viewed new UI.
- **Misc**
- Created accounts, logged in with welcome link, got verified.
- Changed a username, used link to log back in.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9252
Summary:
Ref T4398. The major goals here is to let administrators strip auth factors in two cases:
- A user lost their phone and needs access restored to their account; or
- an install previously used an API-based factor like SMS, but want to stop supporting it (this isn't possible today).
Test Plan:
- Used `bin/auth list-factors` to show installed factors.
- Used `bin/auth strip` with various mixtures of flags to selectively choose and strip factors from accounts.
- Also ran `bin/auth refresh` to verify refreshing OAuth tokens works (small `OAuth` vs `OAuth2` tweak).
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8909
Summary:
Ref T2015. Not directly related to Drydock, but I've wanted to do this for a bit.
Introduce a common base class for all the workflows in the scripts in `bin/*`. This slightly reduces code duplication by moving `isExecutable()` to the base, but also provides `getViewer()`. This is a little nicer than `PhabricatorUser::getOmnipotentUser()` and gives us a layer of indirection if we ever want to introduce more general viewer mechanisms in scripts.
Test Plan: Lint; ran some of the scripts.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T2015
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7838
Summary:
Fixes T4132. If you run "bin/auth recover" before setting the base URI, it throws when trying to generate a production URI.
Instead, just show the path. We can't figure out the domain, and I think this is less confusing than showing "your.phabricator.example.com", etc.
Test Plan: Ran `bin/auth recover <user>` for valid and missing base-uri.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4132
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7615
Summary: The once-choppy LDAP waters seem to have calmed down a bit. Use the service profile log to get a pretty good idea of what's going on with LDAP (see D6391) instead of invasive logging to get a slightly better idea.
Test Plan:
$ ~/src/php-src/sapi/cli/php -f ./bin/auth ldap --trace
>>> [2] <connect> phabricator2_auth
<<< [2] <connect> 1,755 us
>>> [3] <query> SELECT * FROM `auth_providerconfig` ORDER BY id DESC
<<< [3] <query> 423 us
Enter LDAP Credentials
LDAP Username: ldapuser
>>> [4] <exec> $ stty -echo
<<< [4] <exec> 10,370 us
LDAP Password: >>> [5] <exec> $ stty echo
<<< [5] <exec> 6,844 us
Connecting to LDAP...
>>> [6] <ldap> connect (127.0.0.1:389)
<<< [6] <ldap> 12,932 us
>>> [7] <ldap> bind (sn=ldapuser,ou=People, dc=aphront, dc=com)
<<< [7] <ldap> 6,860 us
>>> [8] <ldap> search (ou=People, dc=aphront, dc=com, sn=ldapuser)
<<< [8] <ldap> 5,907 us
Found LDAP Account: ldapuser
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D6392
Summary:
Ref T1536. Ref T2852. Currently, after refreshing the token we don't actually return it. This means that code relying on token refresh fails once per hour (for Asana) in a sort of subtle way. Derp.
Update `bin/auth refresh` to make this failure more clear.
Test Plan: Set `force refresh` flag and verified a return value.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T1536, T2852
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D6295
Summary:
Ref T2852. Give OAuth providers a formal method so you can ask them for tokens; they issue a refresh request if necessary.
We could automatically refresh these tokens in daemons as they near expiry to improve performance; refreshes are blocking in-process round trip requests. If we do this for all tokens, it's a lot of requests (say, 20k users * 2 auth mechanisms * 1-hour tokens ~= a million requests a day). We could do it selectively for tokens that are actually in use (i.e., if we refresh a token in response to a user request, we keep refreshing it for 24 hours automatically). For now, I'm not pursuing any of this.
If we fail to refresh a token, we don't have a great way to communicate it to the user right now. The remedy is "log out and log in again", but there's no way for them to figure this out. The major issue is that a lot of OAuth integrations should not throw if they fail, or can't reasonably be rasied to the user (e.g., activity in daemons, loading profile pictures, enriching links, etc). For now, this shouldn't really happen. In future diffs, I plan to make the "External Accounts" settings page provide some information about tokens again, and possibly push some flag to accounts like "you should refresh your X link", but we'll see if issues crop up.
Test Plan: Used `bin/auth refresh` to verify refreshes. I'll wait an hour and reload a page with an Asana link to verify the auto-refresh part.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T2852
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D6280
Summary: Ref T2852. Provide a script for inspecting/debugging OAuth token refresh.
Test Plan: Ran `bin/auth refresh` with various arguments, saw token refreshes.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T2852
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D6276
Summary: Ref T1536. After DB-driven auth config, we need to load this differently.
Test Plan: Ran `bin/auth ldap`.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T1536
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D6287
Summary: Ref T1536. This script basically exists to restore access if/when users shoot themselves in the foot by disabling all auth providers and can no longer log in.
Test Plan: {F46411}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T1536
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D6205
