Summary:
Currently, PhortuneAccounts have a very open default policy to allow merchants to see and interact with them.
This has the undesirable side effect of leaking their names in too many places, because all users are allowed to load the handles for the accounts. Although this information is not super sensitive, we shouldn't expose it.
I went through about 5 really messy diffs trying to fix this. It's very complicated because there are a lot of objects and many of them are related to PhortuneAccounts, but PhortuneAccounts are not bound to a specific merchant. This lead to a lot of threading viewers and merchants all over the place through the call stack and some really sketchy diffs with OmnipotentUsers that weren't going anywhere good.
This is the cleanest approach I came up with, by far:
- Introduce the concept of an "Authority", which gives a user more powers as a viewer. For now, since we only have one use case, this is pretty open-ended.
- When a viewer is acting as a merchant, grant them authority through the merchant.
- Have Accounts check if the viewer is acting with merchant authority. This lets us easily implement the rule "merchants can see this stuff" without being too broad.
Then update the Subscription view to respect Merchant Authority.
I partially updated the Cart views to respect it. I'll finish this up in a separate diff, but this seemed like a good checkpoint that introduced the concept without too much extra baggage.
This feels pretty good/clean to me, overall, even ignoring the series of horrible messes I made on my way here.
Test Plan:
- Verified I can see everything I need to as a merchant (modulo un-updated Cart UIs).
- Verified I can see nothing when acting as a normal user.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11945
Summary: Fixes T7159.
Test Plan:
Created a legalpad document that needed a signature and I was required to sign it no matter what page I hit. Signed it and things worked! Added a new legalpad document and I had to sign again!
Ran unit tests and they passed!
Logged out as a user who was roadblocked into signing a bunch of stuff and it worked!
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7159
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11759
Summary:
Ref T7152. Ref T1139. This updates Phabricator so third-party libraries can translate their own stuff. Also:
- Hide "All Caps" when not in development mode, since some users have found this a little confusing.
- With other changes, adds a "Raw Strings" mode (development mode only).
- Add an example silly translation to make sure the serious business flag works.
- Add a basic British English translation.
- Simplify handling of translation overrides.
Test Plan:
- Flipped serious business / development on and off and saw silly/development translations drop off.
- Switched to "All Caps" and saw all caps.
- Switched to Very English, Wow!
- Switched to British english and saw "colour".
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7152, T1139
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11747
Summary:
Ref T7152. This builds the core of email invites and implements all the hard logic for them, covering it with a pile of tests.
There's no UI to create these yet, so users can't actually get invites (and administrators can't send them).
This stuff is a complicated mess because there are so many interactions between accounts, email addresses, email verification, email primary-ness, and user verification. However, I think I got it right and got test coverage everwhere.
The degree to which this is exception-driven is a little icky, but I think it's a reasonable way to get the testability we want while still making it hard for callers to get the flow wrong. In particular, I expect there to be at least two callers (one invite flow in the upstream, and one derived invite flow in Instances) so I believe there is merit in burying as much of this logic inside the Engine as is reasonably possible.
Test Plan: Unit tests only.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7152
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11723
Summary: Ref T7094. We already had and were mostly using "needProfileImage" on the people query class. Only real trick in this diff is deleting a conduit end point that has been marked deprecated for the better part of 3 years.
Test Plan: clicked around the people action and profiles and calendars loaded nicely.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7094
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11630
Summary:
Ref T2783. Ref T6706.
- Add `cluster.addresses`. This is a whitelist of CIDR blocks which define cluster hosts.
- When we recieve a request that has a cluster-based authentication token, require the cluster to be configured and require the remote address to be a cluster member before we accept it.
- This provides a general layer of security for these mechanisms.
- In particular, it means they do not work by default on unconfigured hosts.
- When cluster addresses are configured, and we receive a request //to// an address not on the list, reject it.
- This provides a general layer of security for getting the Ops side of cluster configuration correct.
- If cluster nodes have public IPs and are listening on them, we'll reject requests.
- Basically, this means that any requests which bypass the LB get rejected.
Test Plan:
- With addresses not configured, tried to make requests; rejected for using a cluster auth mechanism.
- With addresses configred wrong, tried to make requests; rejected for sending from (or to) an address outside of the cluster.
- With addresses configured correctly, made valid requests.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6706, T2783
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11159
Summary:
Ref T6240. Some discussion in that task. In instance/cluster environments, daemons need to make Conduit calls that bypass policy checks.
We can't just let anyone add SSH keys with this capability to the web directly, because then an adminstrator could just add a key they own and start signing requests with it, bypassing policy checks.
Add a `bin/almanac trust-key --id <x>` workflow for trusting keys. Only trusted keys can sign requests.
Test Plan:
- Generated a user key.
- Generated a device key.
- Trusted a device key.
- Untrusted a device key.
- Hit the various errors on trust/untrust.
- Tried to edit a trusted key.
{F236010}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6240
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10878
Summary:
Ref T5833. I want to add SSH keys to Almanac devices, but the edit workflows for them are currently bound tightly to users.
Instead, decouple key management from users and the settings panel.
Test Plan:
- Uploaded, generated, edited and deleted SSH keys.
- Hit missing name, missing key, bad key format, duplicate key errors.
- Edited/generated/deleted/etc keys for a bot user as an administrator.
- Got HiSec'd on everything.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10824
Summary:
Ref T5833. This fixes a few weird things with this table:
- A bunch of columns were nullable for no reason.
- We stored an MD5 hash of the key (unusual) but never used it and callers were responsible for manually populating it.
- We didn't perform known-key-text lookups by using an index.
Test Plan:
- Ran migrations.
- Faked duplicate keys, saw them clean up correctly.
- Added new keys.
- Generated new keys.
- Used `bin/auth-ssh` and `bin/auth-ssh-key`.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10805
Summary: Ref T1191. Same deal as D10786. These were previously case-insensitive, but changed to a case-sensitive column type.
Test Plan: Ran `bin/storage adjust` and got and adjustment.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: webframp, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10806
Summary: Ref T5833. Since these will no longer be bound specifically to users, bring them to a more central location.
Test Plan:
- Edited SSH keys.
- Ran `bin/ssh-auth` and `bin/ssh-auth-key`.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10791
Summary: Ref T1191. After adjustment, usernames currently end up case-sensitive, which means `alincoln` and `Alincoln` are different users. Make them case-sensitive so these names collie.
Test Plan: Ran `bin/storage adjust`.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10786
Summary:
Ref T1191. Notable stuff:
- Adds `--disable-utf8mb4` to `bin/storage` to make it easier to test what things will (approximately) do on old MySQL. This isn't 100% perfect but should catch all the major stuff. It basically makes us pretend the server is an old server.
- Require utf8mb4 to dump a quickstart.
- Fix some issues with quickstart generation, notably special casing the FULLTEXT handling.
- Add an `--unsafe` flag to `bin/storage adjust` to let it truncate data to fix schemata.
- Fix some old patches which don't work if the default table charset is utf8mb4.
Test Plan:
- Dumped a quickstart.
- Loaded the quickstart with utf8mb4.
- Loaded the quickstart with `--disable-utf8mb4` (verified that we get binary columns, etc).
- Adjusted schema with `--disable-utf8mb4` (got a long adjustment with binary columns, some truncation stuff with weird edge case test data).
- Adjusted schema with `--disable-utf8mb4 --unsafe` (got truncations and clean adjust).
- Adjusted schema back without `--disable-utf8mb4` (got a long adjustment with utf8mb4 columns, some invalid data on truncated utf8).
- Adjusted schema without `--disable-utf8mb4`, but with `--unsafe` (got truncations on the invalid data).
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10757
Summary:
Ref T1191. Now that the whole database is covered, we don't need to do as much work to build expected schemata. Doing them database-by-database was helpful in converting, but is just reudndant work now.
Instead of requiring every application to build its Lisk objects, just build all Lisk objects.
I removed `harbormaster.lisk_counter` because it is unused.
It would be nice to autogenerate edge schemata, too, but that's a little trickier.
Test Plan: Database setup issues are all green.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley, hach-que
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10620
Summary:
Ref T1191. Some notes here:
- Drops the old LDAP and OAuth info tables. These were migrated to the ExternalAccount table a very long time ago.
- Separates surplus/missing keys from other types of surplus/missing things. In the long run, my plan is to have only two notice levels:
- Error: something we can't fix (missing database, table, or column; overlong key).
- Warning: something we can fix (surplus anything, missing key, bad column type, bad key columns, bad uniqueness, bad collation or charset).
- For now, retaining three levels is helpful in generating all the expected scheamta.
Test Plan:
- Saw ~200 issues resolve, leaving ~1,300.
- Grepped for removed tables.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10580
Summary: Ref T5861. Adds an option to opt out of all notification email. We'll still send you password resets, email verifications, etc.
Test Plan:
{F189484}
- Added unit tests.
- With preference set to different things, tried to send myself mail. Mail respected preferences.
- Sent password reset email, which got through the preference.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: rush898, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5861
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10237
Summary: Fixes T5510. This purely reduces false positives from HackerOne: we currently rotate CSRF tokens, but do not bind them explicitly to specific sessions. Doing so has no real security benefit and may make some session rotation changes more difficult down the line, but researchers routinely report it. Just conform to expectations since the expected behavior isn't bad and this is less work for us than dealing with false positives.
Test Plan:
- With two browsers logged in under the same user, verified I was issued different CSRF tokens.
- Verified the token from one browser did not work in the other browser's session.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5510
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10136
Summary: Ref T5655. Rename `PhabricatorPHIDType` subclasses for clarity (see discussion in D9839). I'm not too keen on some of the resulting class names, so feel free to suggest alternatives.
Test Plan: Ran unit tests.
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Maniphest Tasks: T5655
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9986
Summary: Ref T5655. The `PhabricatorDestructibleInterface` interface is misspelled as `PhabricatorDestructableInterface`. Fix the spelling mistake.
Test Plan: `grep`. Seeing as this interface is fairly recent, I don't expect that this would cause any widespread breakages.
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T5655
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9988
Summary:
Fixes T5614. Ref T4420. Other than the "users" datasource and a couple of others, many datasources ignore what the user typed and just return all results, then rely on the client to filter them.
This works fine for rarely used ("legalpad documents") or always small ("task priorities", "applications") datasets, but is something we should graudally move away from as datasets get larger.
Add a token table to projects, populate it, and use it to drive the datasource query. Additionally, expose it on the applicationsearch UI.
Test Plan:
- Ran migration.
- Manually checked the table.
- Searched for projects by name from ApplicationSearch.
- Searched for projects by name from typeahead.
- Manually checked the typeahead response.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5614, T4420
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9896
Summary:
Ref T4420. This was a performance hack introduced long ago to make typeaheads for users a little cheaper. The idea was that you could load some of an object's columns and skip other ones.
We now always load users on demand, so the cost of loading the whole objects is very small. No other use cases ever arose for this, and it seems unlikely that they will in the future. Remove it all.
Test Plan:
- Grepped for `CONFIG_PARTIAL_OBJECTS`.
- Grepped for `dirtyFields`.
- Grepped for `missingFields`.
- Grepped for `resetDirtyFields`.
- Grepped for `loadColumns`.
- Grepped for `loadColumnsWhere`.
- Grepped for `loadRawDataWhere`.
- Loaded and saved some lisk objects.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4420
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9895
Summary:
Fixes T3732. Ref T1205. Ref T3116.
External accounts (like emails used as identities, Facebook accounts, LDAP accounts, etc.) are stored in "ExternalAccount" objects.
Currently, we have a very restrictive `CAN_VIEW` policy for ExternalAccounts, to add an extra layer of protection to make sure users can't use them in unintended ways. For example, it would be bad if a user could link their Phabricator account to a Facebook account without proper authentication. All of the controllers which do sensitive things have checks anyway, but a restrictive CAN_VIEW provided an extra layer of protection. Se T3116 for some discussion.
However, this means that when grey/external users take actions (via email, or via applications like Legalpad) other users can't load the account handles and can't see anything about the actor (they just see "Restricted External Account" or similar).
Balancing these concerns is mostly about not making a huge mess while doing it. This seems like a reasonable approach:
- Add `CAN_EDIT` on these objects.
- Make that very restricted, but open up `CAN_VIEW`.
- Require `CAN_EDIT` any time we're going to do something authentication/identity related.
This is slightly easier to get wrong (forget CAN_EDIT) than other approaches, but pretty simple, and we always have extra checks in place anyway -- this is just a safety net.
I'm not quite sure how we should identify external accounts, so for now we're just rendering "Email User" or similar -- clearly not a bug, but not identifying. We can figure out what to render in the long term elsewhere.
Test Plan:
- Viewed external accounts.
- Linked an external account.
- Refreshed an external account.
- Edited profile picture.
- Viewed sessions panel.
- Published a bunch of stuff to Asana/JIRA.
- Legalpad signature page now shows external accounts.
{F171595}
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3732, T1205, T3116
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9767
Summary: Ran `arc lint --apply-patches --everything` over rP, mainly to change double quotes to single quotes where appropriate. These changes also validate that the `ArcanistXHPASTLinter::LINT_DOUBLE_QUOTE` rule is working as expected.
Test Plan: Eyeballed it.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9431
Summary: Ref T5089. Adds a `security.require-multi-factor-auth` which forces all users to enroll in MFA before they can use their accounts.
Test Plan:
Config:
{F159750}
Roadblock:
{F159748}
After configuration:
{F159749}
- Required MFA, got roadblocked, added MFA, got unblocked.
- Removed MFA, got blocked again.
- Used `bin/auth strip` to strip MFA, got blocked.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5089
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9285
Summary: Both email verify and welcome links now verify email, centralize them and record them in the user activity log.
Test Plan:
- Followed a "verify email" link and got verified.
- Followed a "welcome" (verifying) link.
- Followed a "reset" (non-verifying) link.
- Looked in the activity log for the verifications.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9284
Summary:
Fixes T5143. Currently, if your allowed domain is "example.com", we reject signups from "@Example.com".
Instead, lowercase both parts before performing the check.
Test Plan:
- Before patch:
- Set allowed domains to "yghe.net".
- Tried "x@yghe.net", no error.
- Tried "x@xxxy.net", error.
- Tried "x@yghE.net", incorrectly results in an error.
- After patch:
- Set allowed domains to "yghe.net".
- Tried "x@yghe.net", no error.
- Tried "x@xxxy.net", error.
- Tried "x@yghE.net", this correctly no longer produces an error.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5143
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9261
Summary:
Ref T4398. This code hadn't been touched in a while and had a few crufty bits.
**One Time Resets**: Currently, password reset (and similar links) are valid for about 48 hours, but we always use one token to generate them (it's bound to the account). This isn't horrible, but it could be better, and it produces a lot of false positives on HackerOne.
Instead, use TemporaryTokens to make each link one-time only and good for no more than 24 hours.
**Coupling of Email Verification and One-Time Login**: Currently, one-time login links ("password reset links") are tightly bound to an email address, and using a link verifies that email address.
This is convenient for "Welcome" emails, so the user doesn't need to go through two rounds of checking email in order to login, then very their email, then actually get access to Phabricator.
However, for other types of these links (like those generated by `bin/auth recover`) there's no need to do any email verification.
Instead, make the email verification part optional, and use it on welcome links but not other types of links.
**Message Customization**: These links can come out of several workflows: welcome, password reset, username change, or `bin/auth recover`. Add a hint to the URI so the text on the page can be customized a bit to help users through the workflow.
**Reset Emails Going to Main Account Email**: Previously, we would send password reset email to the user's primary account email. However, since we verify email coming from reset links this isn't correct and could allow a user to verify an email without actually controlling it.
Since the user needs a real account in the first place this does not seem useful on its own, but might be a component in some other attack. The user might also no longer have access to their primary account, in which case this wouldn't be wrong, but would not be very useful.
Mitigate this in two ways:
- First, send to the actual email address the user entered, not the primary account email address.
- Second, don't let these links verify emails: they're just login links. This primarily makes it more difficult for an attacker to add someone else's email to their account, send them a reset link, get them to login and implicitly verify the email by not reading very carefully, and then figure out something interesting to do (there's currently no followup attack here, but allowing this does seem undesirable).
**Password Reset Without Old Password**: After a user logs in via email, we send them to the password settings panel (if passwords are enabled) with a code that lets them set a new password without knowing the old one.
Previously, this code was static and based on the email address. Instead, issue a one-time code.
**Jump Into Hisec**: Normally, when a user who has multi-factor auth on their account logs in, we prompt them for factors but don't put them in high security. You usually don't want to go do high-security stuff immediately after login, and it would be confusing and annoying if normal logins gave you a "YOU ARE IN HIGH SECURITY" alert bubble.
However, if we're taking you to the password reset screen, we //do// want to put the user in high security, since that screen requires high security. If we don't do this, the user gets two factor prompts in a row.
To accomplish this, we set a cookie when we know we're sending the user into a high security workflow. This cookie makes login finalization upgrade all the way from "partial" to "high security", instead of stopping halfway at "normal". This is safe because the user has just passed a factor check; the only reason we don't normally do this is to reduce annoyance.
**Some UI Cleanup**: Some of this was using really old UI. Modernize it a bit.
Test Plan:
- **One Time Resets**
- Used a reset link.
- Tried to reuse a reset link, got denied.
- Verified each link is different.
- **Coupling of Email Verification and One-Time Login**
- Verified that `bin/auth`, password reset, and username change links do not have an email verifying URI component.
- Tried to tack one on, got denied.
- Used the welcome email link to login + verify.
- Tried to mutate the URI to not verify, or verify something else: got denied.
- **Message Customization**
- Viewed messages on the different workflows. They seemed OK.
- **Reset Emails Going to Main Account Email**
- Sent password reset email to non-primary email.
- Received email at specified address.
- Verified it does not verify the address.
- **Password Reset Without Old Password**
- Reset password without knowledge of old one after email reset.
- Tried to do that without a key, got denied.
- Tried to reuse a key, got denied.
- **Jump Into Hisec**
- Logged in with MFA user, got factor'd, jumped directly into hisec.
- Logged in with non-MFA user, no factors, normal password reset.
- **Some UI Cleanup**
- Viewed new UI.
- **Misc**
- Created accounts, logged in with welcome link, got verified.
- Changed a username, used link to log back in.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9252
Summary: Fixes T4728, first pass, Make real name optional on user accounts
Test Plan: Default real name config should be false (not required). Create new user, real name should not be required. Toggle config, real name should be required. Users with no real name should be always listed by their usernames.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T4728
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9027
Summary:
Ref T4749. Ref T3265. Ref T4909. Several goals here:
- Move user destruction to the CLI to limit the power of rogue admins.
- Start consolidating all "destroy named object" scripts into a single UI, to make it easier to know how to destroy things.
- Structure object destruction so we can do a better and more automatic job of cleaning up transactions, edges, search indexes, etc.
- Log when we destroy objects so there's a record if data goes missing.
Test Plan: Used `bin/remove destroy` to destroy several users.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3265, T4749, T4909
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8940
Summary:
Ref T4398. This prompts users for multi-factor auth on login.
Roughly, this introduces the idea of "partial" sessions, which we haven't finished constructing yet. In practice, this means the session has made it through primary auth but not through multi-factor auth. Add a workflow for bringing a partial session up to a full one.
Test Plan:
- Used Conduit.
- Logged in as multi-factor user.
- Logged in as no-factor user.
- Tried to do non-login-things with a partial session.
- Reviewed account activity logs.
{F149295}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8922
Summary:
Ref T4398. Allows auth factors to render and validate when prompted to take a hi-sec action.
This has a whole lot of rough edges still (see D8875) but does fundamentally work correctly.
Test Plan:
- Added two different TOTP factors to my account for EXTRA SECURITY.
- Took hisec actions with no auth factors, and with attached auth factors.
- Hit all the error/failure states of the hisec entry process.
- Verified hisec failures appear in activity logs.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8886
Summary:
Ref T4398. This is still pretty rough and isn't exposed in the UI yet, but basically works. Some missing features / areas for improvement:
- Rate limiting attempts (see TODO).
- Marking tokens used after they're used once (see TODO), maybe. I can't think of ways an attacker could capture a token without also capturing a session, offhand.
- Actually turning this on (see TODO).
- This workflow is pretty wordy. It would be nice to calm it down a bit.
- But also add more help/context to help users figure out what's going on here, I think it's not very obvious if you don't already know what "TOTP" is.
- Add admin tool to strip auth factors off an account ("Help, I lost my phone and can't log in!").
- Add admin tool to show users who don't have multi-factor auth? (so you can pester them)
- Generate QR codes to make the transfer process easier (they're fairly complicated).
- Make the "entering hi-sec" workflow actually check for auth factors and use them correctly.
- Turn this on so users can use it.
- Adding SMS as an option would be nice eventually.
- Adding "password" as an option, maybe? TOTP feels fairly good to me.
I'll post a couple of screens...
Test Plan:
- Added TOTP token with Google Authenticator.
- Added TOTP token with Authy.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8875
Summary:
Ref T4398. This adds a settings panel for account activity so users can review activity on their own account. Some goals are:
- Make it easier for us to develop and support auth and credential information, see T4398. This is the primary driver.
- Make it easier for users to understand and review auth and credential information (see T4842 for an example -- this isn't there yet, but builds toward it).
- Improve user confidence in security by making logging more apparent and accessible.
Minor corresponding changes:
- Entering and exiting hisec mode is now logged.
- This, sessions, and OAuth authorizations have moved to a new "Sessions and Logs" area, since "Authentication" was getting huge.
Test Plan:
- Viewed new panel.
- Viewed old UI.
- Entered/exited hisec and got prompted.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8871
Summary:
Ref T4398. Ref T4842. I want to let users review their own account activity, partly as a general security measure and partly to make some of the multi-factor stuff easier to build and debug.
To support this, implement modern policies and application search.
I also removed the "old" and "new" columns from this output, since they had limited utility and revealed email addresses to administrators for some actions. We don't let administrators access email addresses from other UIs, and the value of doing so here seems very small.
Test Plan: Used interface to issue a bunch of queries against user logs, got reasonable/expected results.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: keir, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4842, T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8856
Summary:
Ref T4398. This is roughly a "sudo" mode, like GitHub has for accessing SSH keys, or Facebook has for managing credit cards. GitHub actually calls theirs "sudo" mode, but I think that's too technical for big parts of our audience. I've gone with "high security mode".
This doesn't actually get exposed in the UI yet (and we don't have any meaningful auth factors to prompt the user for) but the workflow works overall. I'll go through it in a comment, since I need to arrange some screenshots.
Test Plan: See guided walkthrough.
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8851
Summary:
When we generate account tokens for CSRF keys and email verification, one of the inputs we use is the user's password hash. Users won't always have a password hash, so this is a weak input to key generation. This also couples CSRF weirdly with auth concerns.
Instead, give users a dedicated secret for use in token generation which is used only for this purpose.
Test Plan:
- Ran upgrade scripts.
- Verified all users got new secrets.
- Created a new user.
- Verified they got a secret.
- Submitted CSRF'd forms, they worked.
- Adjusted the CSRF token and submitted CSRF'd forms, verified they don't work.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8748
Summary:
Ref T4371. Ref T4699. Fixes T3994.
Currently, we're very conservative about sending errors back to users. A concern I had about this was that mistakes could lead to email loops, massive amounts of email spam, etc. Because of this, I was pretty hesitant about replying to email with more email when I wrote this stuff.
However, this was a long time ago. We now have Message-ID deduplication, "X-Phabricator-Sent-This-Mail", generally better mail infrastructure, and rate limiting. Together, these mechanisms should reasonably prevent anything crazy (primarily, infinite email loops) from happening.
Thus:
- When we hit any processing error after receiving a mail, try to send the author a reply with details about what went wrong. These are limited to 6 per hour per address.
- Rewrite most of the errors to be more detailed and informative.
- Rewrite most of the errors in a user-facing voice ("You sent this mail..." instead of "This mail was sent..").
- Remove the redundant, less sophisticated code which does something similar in Differential.
Test Plan:
- Using `scripts/mail/mail_receiver.php`, artificially received a pile of mail.
- Hit a bunch of different errors.
- Saw reasonable error mail get sent to me.
- Saw other reasonable error mail get rate limited.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3994, T4371, T4699
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8692
Summary:
Ref T4065. Currently, we have this super copy/pasted "edit profile picture" UI for system agents.
Instead, give administrators direct access from profiles, so they can use the same code pages do.
Test Plan: Edited my profile picture and profile details. Edited an agent's. Was unable to edit a non-agent user.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4065
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8664
Summary: Fixes T4665. The "attachable" logic was a little off after a recent change.
Test Plan: With and without a profile image, viewed a page.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4665
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8594
Summary: Ref T4400. Same deal as projects. Tweaked the CSS a touch to make it look better in these views.
Test Plan: Viewed /people/.
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley, chad
Maniphest Tasks: T4400
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8571
Summary:
This is the other half of D8548. Specifically, the attack here was to set your own editor link to `javascript\n:...` and then you could XSS yourself. This isn't a hugely damaging attack, but we can be more certain by adding a whitelist here.
We already whitelist linkable protocols in remarkup (`uri.allowed-protocols`) in general.
Test Plan:
Tried to set and use valid/invalid editor URIs.
{F130883}
{F130884}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8551
Summary:
Via HackerOne. In regular expressions, "$" matches "end of input, or before terminating newline". This means that the expression `/^A$/` matches two strings: `"A"`, and `"A\n"`.
When we care about this, use `\z` instead, which matches "end of input" only.
This allowed registration of `"username\n"` and similar.
Test Plan:
- Grepped codebase for all calls to `preg_match()` / `preg_match_all()`.
- Fixed the ones where this seemed like it could have an impact.
- Added and executed unit tests.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: aran, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8516
Summary: Put a very rough filter on what we'll accept as an email address. We can expand this if anyone is actually using local delivery or other weird things. This is mostly to avoid a theoretical case where some input is parsed differently by `PhutilAddressParser` and the actual mail adapter, in some subtle hypothetical way. This should give us only "reasonable" email addresses which parsers would be hard-pressed to trip up on.
Test Plan: Added and executed unit tests. Tried to add silly emails. Added valid emails.
Reviewers: btrahan, arice
Reviewed By: arice
CC: arice, chad, aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8320
Summary:
Via HackerOne. An attacker can bypass `auth.email-domains` by registering with an email like:
aaaaa...aaaaa@evil.com@company.com
We'll validate the full string, then insert it into the database where it will be truncated, removing the `@company.com` part. Then we'll send an email to `@evil.com`.
Instead, reject email addresses which won't fit in the table.
`STRICT_ALL_TABLES` stops this attack, I'm going to add a setup warning encouraging it.
Test Plan:
- Set `auth.email-domains` to `@company.com`.
- Registered with `aaa...aaa@evil.com@company.com`. Previously this worked, now it is rejected.
- Did a valid registration.
- Tried to add `aaa...aaaa@evil.com@company.com` as an email address. Previously this worked, now it is rejected.
- Did a valid email add.
- Added and executed unit tests.
Reviewers: btrahan, arice
Reviewed By: arice
CC: aran, chad
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8308
