Summary:
Ref T920. To send you SMS messages, we need to know your phone number.
This adds bare-bone basics (transactions, storage, editor, etc).
From here:
**Disabling Numbers**: I'll let you disable numbers in an upcoming diff.
**Primary Number**: I think I'm just going to let you pick a number as "primary", similar to how email works. We could imagine a world where you have one "MFA" number and one "notifications" number, but this seems unlikely-ish?
**Publishing Numbers (Profile / API)**: At some point, we could let you say that a number is public / "show on my profile" and provide API access / directory features. Not planning to touch this for now.
**Non-Phone Numbers**: Eventually this could be a list of other similar contact mechanisms (APNS/GCM devices, Whatsapp numbers, ICQ number, twitter handle so MFA can slide into your DM's?). Not planning to touch this for now, but the path should be straightforward when we get there. This is why it's called "Contact Number", not "Phone Number".
**MFA-Required + SMS**: Right now, if the only MFA provider is SMS and MFA is required on the install, you can't actually get into Settings to add a contact number to configure SMS. I'll look at the best way to deal with this in an upcoming diff -- likely, giving you partial access to more of Setings before you get thorugh the MFA gate. Conceptually, it seems reasonable to let you adjust some other settings, like "Language" and "Accessibility", before you set up MFA, so if the "you need to add MFA" portal was more like a partial Settings screen, maybe that's pretty reasonable.
**Verifying Numbers**: We'll probably need to tackle this eventually, but I'm not planning to worry about it for now.
Test Plan: {F6137174}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: avivey, PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T920
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19988
Summary:
Ref T13222. Long ago, we had a Config option (`welcome.html`) to let you dump HTML onto the login screen, but this was relatively hard to use and not good from a security perspective.
In some cases this was obsoleted by Dashboards, but there's at least some remaining set of use cases for actual login instructions on the login screen. For example, WMF has some guidance on //which// SSO mechanism to use based on what types of account you have. On `secure`, users assume they can register by clicking "Log In With GitHub" or whatever, and it might reduce frustration to tell them upfront that registration is closed.
Some other types of auth messaging could also either use customization or defaults (e.g., the invite/welcome/approve mail).
We could do this with a bunch of Config options, but I'd generally like to move to a world where there's less stuff in Config and more configuration is contextual. I think it tends to be easier to use, and we get a lot of fringe benefits (granular permissions, API, normal transaction logs, more abililty to customize workflows and provide contextual help/hints, etc). Here, for example, we can provide a remarkup preview, which would be trickier with Config.
This does not actually do anything yet.
Test Plan: {F6137541}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19992
Summary:
Ref T13222. Ref T13231. See PHI912. I'm planning to turn MFA providers into concrete objects, so you can disable and configure them.
Currently, we only support TOTP, which doesn't require any configuration, but other provider types (like Duo or Yubikey OTP) do require some configuration (server URIs, API keys, etc). TOTP //could// also have some configuration, like "bits of entropy" or "allowed window size" or whatever, if we want.
Add concrete objects for this and standard transaction / policy / query support. These objects don't do anything interesting yet and don't actually interact with MFA, this is just skeleton code for now.
Test Plan:
{F6090444}
{F6090445}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13231, T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19935
Summary:
Depends on D19009. Ref T13053. For "Must Encrypt" mail, we must currently strip the "Thread-Topic" header because it sometimes contains sensitive information about the object.
I don't actually know if this header is useful or anyting uses it. My understanding is that it's an Outlook/Exchange thing, but we also implement "Thread-Index" which I think is what Outlook/Exchange actually look at. This header may have done something before we implemented "Thread-Index", or maybe never done anything. Or maybe older versions of Excel/Outlook did something with it and newer versions don't, or do less. So it's possible that an even better fix here would be to simply remove this, but I wasn't able to convince myself of that after Googling for 10 minutes and I don't think it's worth hours of installing Exchange/Outlook to figure out. Instead, I'm just trying to simplify our handling of this header for now, and maybe some day we'll learn more about Exchange/Outlook and can remove it.
In a number of cases we already use the object monogram or PHID as a "Thread-Topic" without users ever complaining, so I think that if this header is useful it probably isn't shown to users, or isn't shown very often (e.g., only in a specific "conversation" sub-view?). Just use the object PHID (which should be unique and stable) as a thread-topic, everywhere, automatically.
Then allow this header through for "Must Encrypt" mail.
Test Plan: Processed some local mail, saw object PHIDs for "Thread-Topic" headers.
Reviewers: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13053
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19012
Summary:
Ref T13043. In an earlier change I updated this langauge from "Deactivate" to "Revoke", but the behavior doesn't quite match.
This table has a unique key on `<isActive, keyBody>`, which enforces the rule that "a key can only be active for one unique user".
However, we set `isActive` to `null` when we revoke a key, and multiple rows are allowed to have the value `<null, "asdf">` (since a `null` column in a unique key basically means "don't enforce this unique key").
This is intentional, to support this workflow:
- You add key X to bot A.
- Whoops, wrong account.
- You revoke key X from bot A.
- You add key X to bot B.
This isn't necessarily a great workflow -- ideally, you'd throw key X away and go generate a new key after you realize you made a mistake -- but it's the sort of practical workflow that users are likely to expect and want to see work ("I don't want to generate a new key, it's already being used by 5 other services and cycling it is a ton of work and this is just a test install for my dog anyway."), and there's no technical reason we can't support it.
To prevent users from adding keys on the revocation list back to their account, just check explicitly.
(This is probably better in general anyway, because "cert-authority" support from PHI269 may mean that two keys are "equivalent" even if their text differs, and we may not be able to rely on a database test anyway.)
Test Plan:
- Added the key `ssh-rsa asdf` to my account.
- Revoked it.
- Tried to add it again.
- Before patch: worked.
- After patch: error, "this key has been revoked".
- Added it to a different account (the "I put it on the wrong bot" workflow).
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18928
Summary:
Depends on D18906. Ref T13043. When SSH keys are edited, we normally include a warning that if you don't recognize the activity you might have problems in the mail body.
Currently, this warning is also shown for revocations with `bin/auth revoke --type ssh`. However, these revocations are safe (revocations are generally not dangerous anyway) and almost certainly legitimate and administrative, so don't warn users about them.
Test Plan:
- Created and revoked a key.
- Creation mail still had warning; revocation mail no longer did.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18907
Summary:
Ref T13043. When we verify a password and a better hasher is available, we automatically upgrade the stored hash to the stronger hasher.
Add test coverage for this workflow and fix a few bugs and issues, mostly related to shuffling the old hasher name into the transaction.
This doesn't touch anything user-visible yet.
Test Plan: Ran unit tests.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18897
Summary:
Ref T13043. Currently:
- Passwords are stored separately in the "VCS Passwords" and "User" tables and don't share as much code as they could.
- Because User objects are all over the place in the code, password hashes are all over the place too (i.e., often somewhere in process memory). This is a very low-severity, theoretical sort of issue, but it could make leaving a stray `var_dump()` in the code somewhere a lot more dangerous than it otherwise is. Even if we never do this, third-party developers might. So it "feels nice" to imagine separating this data into a different table that we rarely load.
- Passwords can not be //revoked//. They can be //deleted//, but users can set the same password again. If you believe or suspect that a password may have been compromised, you might reasonably prefer to revoke it and force the user to select a //different// password.
This change prepares to remedy these issues by adding a new, more modern dedicated password storage table which supports storing multiple password types (account vs VCS), gives passwords real PHIDs and transactions, supports DestructionEngine, supports revocation, and supports `bin/auth revoke`.
It doesn't actually make anything use this new table yet. Future changes will migrate VCS passwords and account passwords to this table.
(This also gives third party applications a reasonable place to store password hashes in a consistent way if they have some need for it.)
Test Plan: Added some basic unit tests to cover general behavior. This is just skeleton code for now and will get more thorough testing when applications move.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18894
Summary: Noticed a couple of typos in the docs, and then things got out of hand.
Test Plan:
- Stared at the words until my eyes watered and the letters began to swim on the screen.
- Consulted a dictionary.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, yelirekim, PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18693
Summary:
Fixes T12554. The SSH key cache contains usernames, but is not currently dirtied on username changes.
An alternative solution would be to use user PHIDs instead of usernames in the file, which would make this unnecessary, but that would make debugging a bit harder. For now, I think this small added complexity is worth the easier debugging, but we could look at this again if cache management gets harder in the future.
Test Plan:
- Added a key as `ducksey`, ran `bin/ssh-auth`, saw key immediately.
- Renamed `ducksey` to `ducker`, ran `bin/ssh-auth`, saw username change immediately.
- Added another key as `ducker`, ran `bin/ssh-auth`, saw key immediately.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T12554
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17687
Summary:
Ref T11469. This isn't directly related, but has been on my radar for a while: building SSH keyfiles (particular for installs with a lot of keys, like ours) can be fairly slow.
At least one cluster instance is making multiple clone requests per second. While that should probably be rate limited separately, caching this should mitigate the impact of these requests.
This is pretty straightforward to cache since it's exactly the same every time, and only changes when users modify SSH keys (which is rare).
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/auth-ssh`, saw authfile generate.
- Ran it again, saw it read from cache.
- Changed an SSH key.
- Ran it again, saw it regenerate.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T11469
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16744
Summary: Ref T10917. This is getting added as a link right now, which causes it to get `<a href>`'d in HTML mail. Add it as text instead.
Test Plan: Edited a key, examined HTML mail body carefully.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15952
Summary:
Ref T10917. This cheats fairly heavily to generate SSH key mail:
- Generate normal transaction mail.
- Force it to go to the user.
- Use `setForceDelivery()` to force it to actually be delivered.
- Add some warning language to the mail body.
This doesn't move us much closer to Glorious Infrastructure for this whole class of events, but should do what it needs to for now and doesn't really require anything sketchy.
Test Plan: Created and edited SSH keys, got security notice mail.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15948
Summary:
Ref T10917. Converts web UI edits to transactions.
This is about 95% "the right way", and then I cheated on the last 5% instead of building a real EditEngine. We don't need it for anything else right now and some of the dialog workflows here are a little weird so I'm just planning to skip it for the moment unless it ends up being easier to do after the next phase (mail notifications) or something like that.
Test Plan: {F1652160}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15947
Summary:
Fixes T9997. This was in the database since v0, I just never hooked up the UI since it wasn't previously meaningful.
However, it now makes sense to have a provider like Asana with login disabled and use it only for integrations.
Test Plan: Disabled login on a provider, verified it was no longer available for login/registration but still linkable.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9997
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14794
Summary: Ref T7153. I am not sure if this is 100% correct because sometimes you have to POST vs GET and I don't know if the redirect response will / can do the right thing? I think options to fix this would be to 1) restrict this functionality to JUST the Phabricator OAuth provider type or 2) something really fancy with an HTTP(S) future. The other rub right now is when you logout you get half auto-logged in again... Thoughts on that?
Test Plan: setup my local instance to JUST have phabricator oauth available to login. was presented with the dialog automagically...!
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7153
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11701
Summary: This appears to be a typo, identified by `ArcanistXHPASTLinter::LINT_DUPLICATE_SWITCH_CASE` (see D11171).
Test Plan: `arc lint`
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11194
Summary:
Ref T5861. Currently, mail tags are hard-coded; move them into applications. Each Editor defines its own tags.
This has zero impact on the UI or behavior.
Test Plan:
- Checked/unchecked some options, saved form.
- Swapped back to `master` and saw exactly the same values.
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5861
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10238
Summary: This is useful when you're trying to onboard an entire office and you end up using the Google OAuth anyway.
Test Plan: tested locally. Maybe I should write some tests?
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9150
Summary:
Ref T1536. None of this code is reachable.
For the new web UI for auth edits, give providers more and better customization options for handling the form. Allow them to format transactions.
Also fix the "Auth" application icon.
Test Plan: {F46718}
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T1536
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D6221
Summary: Ref T1536. When auth providers are edited, show the edit history.
Test Plan: {F46400}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran, chad
Maniphest Tasks: T1536
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D6203
Summary: Ref T1536. Many rough / broken edges, but adds the rough skeleton of the provider edit workflow.
Test Plan: {F46333}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran, chad
Maniphest Tasks: T1536
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D6200
