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11 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Joshua Spence
3cf9a5820f Minor formatting changes
Summary: Apply some autofix linter rules.

Test Plan: `arc lint` and `arc unit`

Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley

Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley

Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10585
2014-10-08 08:39:49 +11:00
Joshua Spence
8756d82cf6 Remove @group annotations
Summary: I'm pretty sure that `@group` annotations are useless now... see D9855. Also fixed various other minor issues.

Test Plan: Eye-ball it.

Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley, chad

Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley

Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9859
2014-07-10 08:12:48 +10:00
epriestley
ae7324fd5b Fix an anchor redirect issue with OAuth server, plus modernize the application a bit
Summary:
Ref T4593. Via HackerOne. An attacker can use the anchor reattachment, combined with the Facebook token workflow, combined with redirection on OAuth errors to capture access tokens. The attack works roughly like this:

  - Create an OAuth application on Phabricator.
  - Set the domain to `evil.com`.
  - Grab the OAuth URI for it (something like `https://phabricator.com/oauthserver/auth/?redirect_uri=http://evil.com&...`).
  - Add an invalid `scope` parameter (`scope=xyz`).
  - Use //that// URI to build a Facebook OAuth URI (something like `https://facebook.com/oauth/?redirect_uri=http://phabricator.com/...&response_type=token`).
  - After the user authorizes the application on Facebook (or instantly if they've already authorized it), they're redirected to the OAuth server, which processes the request. Since this is the 'token' workflow, it has auth information in the URL anchor/fragment.
  - The OAuth server notices the `scope` error and 302's to the attacker's domain, preserving the anchor in most browsers through anchor reattachment.
  - The attacker reads the anchor in JS and can do client workflow stuff.

To fix this, I've made several general changes/modernizations:

  - Add a new application and make it beta. This is mostly cleanup, but also turns the server off for typical installs (it's not generally useful quite yet).
  - Add a "Console" page to make it easier to navigate.
  - Modernize some of the UI, since I was touching most of it anyways.

Then I've made specific security-focused changes:

  - In the web-based OAuth workflow, send back a human-readable page when errors occur. I //think// this is universally correct. Previously, humans would get a blob of JSON if they entered an invalid URI, etc. This type of response is correct for the companion endpoint ("ServerTokenController") since it's called by programs, but I believe not correct for this endpoint ("AuthController") since it's used by humans. Most of this is general cleanup (give humans human-readable errors instead of JSON blobs).
  - Never 302 off this endpoint automatically. Previously, a small set of errors (notably, bad `scope`) would cause a 302 with 'error'. This exposes us to anchor reattachment, and isn't generally helpful to anyone, since the requesting application did something wrong and even if it's prepared to handle the error, it can't really do anything better than we can.
  - The only time we'll 'error' back now from this workflow is if a user explicitly cancels the workflow. This isn't a 302, but a normal link (the cancel button), so the anchor is lost.
  - Even if the application is already approved, don't blindly 302. Instead, show the user a confirmation dialog with a 'continue' link. This is perhaps slightly less user-friendly than the straight redirect, but I think it's pretty reasonable in general, and it gives us a lot of protection against these classes of attack. This redirect is then through a link, not a 302, so the anchor is again detached.
  -

Test Plan: I attempted to hit everything I touched. See screenshots.

Reviewers: btrahan

Reviewed By: btrahan

Subscribers: aran, epriestley

Maniphest Tasks: T4593

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8517
2014-03-13 12:59:10 -07:00
Jakub Vrana
63b4183d9a Initialize used variable
Blame Rev: rP5ad52694

Auditor: stephenyeargin
2013-07-09 21:55:27 -07:00
epriestley
a22bea2a74 Apply lint rules to Phabricator
Summary: Mostly applies a new call spacing rule; also a few things that have slipped through via pull requests and such

Test Plan: `find src/ -type f -name '*.php' | xargs -n16 arc lint --output summary --apply-patches`

Reviewers: chad

Reviewed By: chad

CC: aran

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D5002
2013-02-19 13:33:10 -08:00
epriestley
ef7f16180c Restore merge of phutil_tag. 2013-02-13 14:51:18 -08:00
epriestley
73cce6e131 Revert "Promote phutil-tag again"
This reverts commit 8fbabdc06d, reversing
changes made to 2dab1c1e42.
2013-02-13 14:08:57 -08:00
vrana
5ad526942b Convert AphrontPanelView to safe HTML (except children)
Summary: Fixes some double escaping and potential XSS.

Test Plan: Looked at homepage.

Reviewers: epriestley

Reviewed By: epriestley

CC: aran, Korvin

Maniphest Tasks: T2432

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D4917
2013-02-13 10:30:32 -08:00
Toby Hughes
1188876ea9 Fix exception in OAuthServerAuthController
Summary:
We've been building a Jenkins plugin that allows you to use your Phabricator login details in Jenkins using the inbuilt OAuthServer. I noticed that when making a request to /oauthserver/auth/?client_id=&response_type=code I get an error back from the server.

I've traced this down to two bugs in PhabricatorOAuthServerAuthController, the first causes a null value error on $access_token_uri, and the second fails on userHasAuthorizedClient without a $scope array.

Test Plan: Go to /oauthserver/auth/?client_id=<client_id>&response_type=code and get a valid authorization code back

Reviewers: epriestley, btrahan

Reviewed By: btrahan

CC: aran, Korvin

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D4808
2013-02-06 09:00:01 -08:00
vrana
ef85f49adc Delete license headers from files
Summary:
This commit doesn't change license of any file. It just makes the license implicit (inherited from LICENSE file in the root directory).

We are removing the headers for these reasons:

- It wastes space in editors, less code is visible in editor upon opening a file.
- It brings noise to diff of the first change of any file every year.
- It confuses Git file copy detection when creating small files.
- We don't have an explicit license header in other files (JS, CSS, images, documentation).
- Using license header in every file is not obligatory: http://www.apache.org/dev/apply-license.html#new.

This change is approved by Alma Chao (Lead Open Source and IP Counsel at Facebook).

Test Plan: Verified that the license survived only in LICENSE file and that it didn't modify externals.

Reviewers: epriestley, davidrecordon

Reviewed By: epriestley

CC: aran, Korvin

Maniphest Tasks: T2035

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D3886
2012-11-05 11:16:51 -08:00
vrana
6cc196a2e5 Move files in Phabricator one level up
Summary:
- `kill_init.php` said "Moving 1000 files" - I hope that this is not some limit in `FileFinder`.
- [src/infrastructure/celerity] `git mv utils.php map.php; git mv api/utils.php api.php`
- Comment `phutil_libraries` in `.arcconfig` and run `arc liberate`.

NOTE: `arc diff` timed out so I'm pushing it without review.

Test Plan:
/D1234
Browsed around, especially in `applications/repository/worker/commitchangeparser` and `applications/` in general.

Auditors: epriestley

Maniphest Tasks: T1103
2012-06-01 12:32:44 -07:00
Renamed from src/applications/oauthserver/controller/auth/PhabricatorOAuthServerAuthController.php (Browse further)