Summary:
Ref T10917. This cheats fairly heavily to generate SSH key mail:
- Generate normal transaction mail.
- Force it to go to the user.
- Use `setForceDelivery()` to force it to actually be delivered.
- Add some warning language to the mail body.
This doesn't move us much closer to Glorious Infrastructure for this whole class of events, but should do what it needs to for now and doesn't really require anything sketchy.
Test Plan: Created and edited SSH keys, got security notice mail.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15948
Summary:
Ref T10917. Converts web UI edits to transactions.
This is about 95% "the right way", and then I cheated on the last 5% instead of building a real EditEngine. We don't need it for anything else right now and some of the dialog workflows here are a little weird so I'm just planning to skip it for the moment unless it ends up being easier to do after the next phase (mail notifications) or something like that.
Test Plan: {F1652160}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15947
Summary:
Ref T10917. This primarily prepares these for transactions by giving us a place to:
- review old deactivated keys; and
- review changes to keys.
Future changes will add transactions and a timeline so key changes are recorded exhaustively and can be more easily audited.
Test Plan:
{F1652089}
{F1652090}
{F1652091}
{F1652092}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15946
Summary:
Ref T10917. Currently, when you delete an SSH key, we really truly delete it forever.
This isn't very consistent with other applications, but we built this stuff a long time ago before we were as rigorous about retaining data and making it auditable.
In partiular, destroying data isn't good for auditing after security issues, since it means we can't show you logs of any changes an attacker might have made to your keys.
To prepare to improve this, stop destoying data. This will allow later changes to become transaction-oriented and show normal transaction logs.
The tricky part here is that we have a `UNIQUE KEY` on the public key part of the key.
Instead, I changed this to `UNIQUE (key, isActive)`, where `isActive` is a nullable boolean column. This works because MySQL does not enforce "unique" if part of the key is `NULL`.
So you can't have two rows with `("A", 1)`, but you can have as many rows as you want with `("A", null)`. This lets us keep the "each key may only be active for one user/object" rule without requiring us to delete any data.
Test Plan:
- Ran schema changes.
- Viewed public keys.
- Tried to add a duplicate key, got rejected (already associated with another object).
- Deleted SSH key.
- Verified that the key was no longer actually deleted from the database, just marked inactive (in future changes, I'll update the UI to be more clear about this).
- Uploaded a new copy of the same public key, worked fine (no duplicate key rejection).
- Tried to upload yet another copy, got rejected.
- Generated a new keypair.
- Tried to upload a duplicate to an Almanac device, got rejected.
- Generated a new pair for a device.
- Trusted a device key.
- Untrusted a device key.
- "Deleted" a device key.
- Tried to trust a deleted device key, got "inactive" message.
- Ran `bin/ssh-auth`, got good output with unique keys.
- Ran `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub | ./bin/ssh-auth-key`, got good output with one key.
- Used `auth.querypublickeys` Conduit method to query keys, got good active keys.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15943
Summary: [WIP] Tossing this up for safety and to read through it. Need to test, update some of the other flows. This updates everything in Auth for new UI and modern conventions.
Test Plan: Loooots of random testing, new providers, edit providers, logging out, forgot password... more coming.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15550
Summary:
Ref T10603. This makes minor updates to temporary tokens:
- Rename `objectPHID` (which is sometimes used to store some other kind of identifier instead of a PHID) to `tokenResource` (i.e., which resource does this token permit access to?).
- Add a `userPHID` column. For LFS tokens and some other types of tokens, I want to bind the token to both a resource (like a repository) and a user.
- Add a `properties` column. This makes tokens more flexible and supports custom behavior (like scoping LFS tokens even more tightly).
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/storage upgrade -f`, got a clean upgrade.
- Viewed one-time tokens.
- Revoked one token.
- Revoked all tokens.
- Performed a one-time login.
- Performed a password reset.
- Added an MFA token.
- Removed an MFA token.
- Used a file token to view a file.
- Verified file token was removed after viewing file.
- Linked my account to an OAuth1 account (Twitter).
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15478
Summary:
Ref T10603. For LFS, we need to issue a new type of temporary token.
This makes the temporary token code modular so applications can add new token types without modifying the Auth application.
(I'm moving slowly here because it impacts authentication.)
Test Plan:
- Used `bin/auth recover` to get a one-time token from the CLI.
- Used "Forgot your password?" to get a one-time token from the web UI.
- Followed the web UI token to initiate a password reset, prompting generation of a password token.
- Viewed these tokens in the web UI:
{F1176908}
- Revoked a token.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15475
Summary: Ref T9967
Test Plan:
Ran migrations.
Verified database populated properly with PHIDs (SELECT * FROM auth_sshkey;).
Ran auth.querypublickeys conduit method to see phids show up
Ran bin/remove destroy <phid>.
Viewed the test key was gone.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T9967
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14823
Summary:
Fixes T9997. This was in the database since v0, I just never hooked up the UI since it wasn't previously meaningful.
However, it now makes sense to have a provider like Asana with login disabled and use it only for integrations.
Test Plan: Disabled login on a provider, verified it was no longer available for login/registration but still linkable.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9997
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14794
Summary: Fixes T7159.
Test Plan:
Created a legalpad document that needed a signature and I was required to sign it no matter what page I hit. Signed it and things worked! Added a new legalpad document and I had to sign again!
Ran unit tests and they passed!
Logged out as a user who was roadblocked into signing a bunch of stuff and it worked!
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7159
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11759
Summary:
Ref T7152. Ref T3554.
- When an administrator clicks "send invites", queue tasks to send the invites.
- Then, actually send the invites.
- Make the links in the invites work properly.
- Also provide `bin/worker execute` to make debugging one-off workers like this easier.
- Clean up some UI, too.
Test Plan:
We now get as far as the exception which is a placeholder for a registration workflow.
{F291213}
{F291214}
{F291215}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3554, T7152
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11736
Summary:
Ref T7152. This implements the administrative UI for the upstream email invite workflow.
Pieces of this will be reused in Instances to implement the instance invite workflow, although some of it is probably going to be a bit copy/pastey.
This doesn't actually create or send invites yet, and they still can't be carried through registration.
Test Plan:
{F290970}
{F290971}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7152
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11733
Summary:
Ref T7152. This builds the core of email invites and implements all the hard logic for them, covering it with a pile of tests.
There's no UI to create these yet, so users can't actually get invites (and administrators can't send them).
This stuff is a complicated mess because there are so many interactions between accounts, email addresses, email verification, email primary-ness, and user verification. However, I think I got it right and got test coverage everwhere.
The degree to which this is exception-driven is a little icky, but I think it's a reasonable way to get the testability we want while still making it hard for callers to get the flow wrong. In particular, I expect there to be at least two callers (one invite flow in the upstream, and one derived invite flow in Instances) so I believe there is merit in burying as much of this logic inside the Engine as is reasonably possible.
Test Plan: Unit tests only.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7152
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11723
Summary: Ref T7153. I am not sure if this is 100% correct because sometimes you have to POST vs GET and I don't know if the redirect response will / can do the right thing? I think options to fix this would be to 1) restrict this functionality to JUST the Phabricator OAuth provider type or 2) something really fancy with an HTTP(S) future. The other rub right now is when you logout you get half auto-logged in again... Thoughts on that?
Test Plan: setup my local instance to JUST have phabricator oauth available to login. was presented with the dialog automagically...!
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7153
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11701
Summary: Fixes T6693.
Test Plan:
Made a bunch of comments on a diff with differential, being sure to leave inlines here and there. This reproduced the issue in T6693. With this patch this issue no longer reproduces!
Successfully "showed older changes" in Maniphest too.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6693
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10931
Summary:
Ref T4712. Thus far, it seems that most "non-standard" things can be done pretty easily in the controller. Aside from deploying, this diff had to fix a few bugs / missing implementations of stuff.
(Notably, PhabricatorAuthProviderConfig, HeraldRule, PhabricatorSlowvotePoll, and AlmanacNetwork needed to implement PhabricatorApplicationTransactionInterface, PhabricatorAuthAuthProviderPHIDType had to be added, and a rendering bug in transactions of type PhabricatorOAuth2AuthProvider had to be fixed.)
Test Plan: Almanac - looked at binding, device, network, and service view controllers and verified timeline displayed properly. Herald - looked at a rule and verified timeline. Slowvote - looked at a vote and verified timeline. Auth - looked at an auth provider (Facebook) and verified proper display of transactions within timeline.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4712
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10921
Summary:
Ref T6240. Some discussion in that task. In instance/cluster environments, daemons need to make Conduit calls that bypass policy checks.
We can't just let anyone add SSH keys with this capability to the web directly, because then an adminstrator could just add a key they own and start signing requests with it, bypassing policy checks.
Add a `bin/almanac trust-key --id <x>` workflow for trusting keys. Only trusted keys can sign requests.
Test Plan:
- Generated a user key.
- Generated a device key.
- Trusted a device key.
- Untrusted a device key.
- Hit the various errors on trust/untrust.
- Tried to edit a trusted key.
{F236010}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6240
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10878
Summary:
Ref T5833. I want to add SSH keys to Almanac devices, but the edit workflows for them are currently bound tightly to users.
Instead, decouple key management from users and the settings panel.
Test Plan:
- Uploaded, generated, edited and deleted SSH keys.
- Hit missing name, missing key, bad key format, duplicate key errors.
- Edited/generated/deleted/etc keys for a bot user as an administrator.
- Got HiSec'd on everything.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10824
Summary:
Ref T5833. This fixes a few weird things with this table:
- A bunch of columns were nullable for no reason.
- We stored an MD5 hash of the key (unusual) but never used it and callers were responsible for manually populating it.
- We didn't perform known-key-text lookups by using an index.
Test Plan:
- Ran migrations.
- Faked duplicate keys, saw them clean up correctly.
- Added new keys.
- Generated new keys.
- Used `bin/auth-ssh` and `bin/auth-ssh-key`.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10805
Summary: Ref T5833. Since these will no longer be bound specifically to users, bring them to a more central location.
Test Plan:
- Edited SSH keys.
- Ran `bin/ssh-auth` and `bin/ssh-auth-key`.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10791
Summary:
Ref T5833. Currently, SSH keys are associated only with users, and are a bit un-modern. I want to let Almanac Devices have SSH keys so devices in a cluster can identify to one another.
For example, with hosted installs, initialization will go something like this:
- A request comes in for `company.phacility.com`.
- A SiteSource (from D10787) makes a Conduit call to Almanac on the master install to check if `company` is a valid install and pull config if it is.
- This call can be signed with an SSH key which identifies a trusted Almanac Device.
In the cluster case, a web host can make an authenticated call to a repository host with similar key signing.
To move toward this, put a proper Query class on top of SSH key access (this diff). In following diffs, I'll:
- Rename `userPHID` to `objectPHID`.
- Move this to the `auth` database.
- Provide UI for device/key association.
An alternative approach would be to build some kind of special token layer in Conduit, but I think that would be a lot harder to manage in the hosting case. This gives us a more direct attack on trusting requests from machines and recognizing machines as first (well, sort of second-class) actors without needing things like fake user accounts.
Test Plan:
- Added and removed SSH keys.
- Added and removed SSH keys from a bot account.
- Tried to edit an unonwned SSH key (denied).
- Ran `bin/ssh-auth`, got sensible output.
- Ran `bin/ssh-auth-key`, got sensible output.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10790
Summary:
Ref T1191. Now that the whole database is covered, we don't need to do as much work to build expected schemata. Doing them database-by-database was helpful in converting, but is just reudndant work now.
Instead of requiring every application to build its Lisk objects, just build all Lisk objects.
I removed `harbormaster.lisk_counter` because it is unused.
It would be nice to autogenerate edge schemata, too, but that's a little trickier.
Test Plan: Database setup issues are all green.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley, hach-que
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10620
Summary:
Ref T1191.
- Adds definitions for missing keys and keys with wrong uniqueness. Generally, I defined these before fixing the key query to actually pull all keys and support uniqueness.
- Moves "key uniqueness" to note severity; this is fixable (probably?) and there are no remaining issues.
- Moves "Missing Key" to note severity; missing keys are fixable and all remaining missing keys are really missing (either missing edge keys, or missing PHID keys):
{F210089}
- Moves "Surplus Key" to note seveirty; surplus keys are fixable all remaining surplus keys are really surplus (duplicate key in Harbormaster, key on unused column in Worker):
{F210090}
Test Plan:
- Vetted missing/surplus/unique messages.
- 146 issues remaining.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10590
Summary:
Ref T1191. Some notes here:
- Drops the old LDAP and OAuth info tables. These were migrated to the ExternalAccount table a very long time ago.
- Separates surplus/missing keys from other types of surplus/missing things. In the long run, my plan is to have only two notice levels:
- Error: something we can't fix (missing database, table, or column; overlong key).
- Warning: something we can fix (surplus anything, missing key, bad column type, bad key columns, bad uniqueness, bad collation or charset).
- For now, retaining three levels is helpful in generating all the expected scheamta.
Test Plan:
- Saw ~200 issues resolve, leaving ~1,300.
- Grepped for removed tables.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10580
Summary:
Ref T1191. Notable:
- Allowed objects to remove default columns (some feed tables have no `id`).
- Added a "note" severity and moved all the charset stuff down to that to make progress more clear.
Test Plan:
Trying to make the whole thing blue...
{F205970}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10519
Summary: Ref T1191. This fills in some more features and gets audit and auth nearly generating reasonable expected schemata.
Test Plan: See screenshots.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10500
Summary:
Fixes T5506. Depends on D10133. When users remove an email address or change their primary email address, invalidate any outstanding password reset links.
This is a very small security risk, but the current behavior is somewhat surprising, and an attacker could sit on a reset link for up to 24 hours and then use it to re-compromise an account.
Test Plan:
- Changed primary address and removed addreses.
- Verified these actions invalidated outstanding one-time login temporary tokens.
- Tried to use revoked reset links.
- Revoked normally from new UI panel.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5506
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10134
Summary:
Ref T5506. This makes it easier to understand and manage temporary tokens.
Eventually this could be more user-friendly, since it's relatively difficult to understand what this screen means. My short-term goal is just to make the next change easier to implement and test.
The next diff will close a small security weakness: if you change your email address, password reset links which were sent to the old address are still valid. Although an attacker would need substantial access to exploit this (essentially, it would just make it easier for them to re-compromise an already compromised account), it's a bit surprising. In the next diff, email address changes will invalidate outstanding password reset links.
Test Plan:
- Viewed outstanding tokens.
- Added tokens to the list by making "Forgot your password?" requests.
- Revoked tokens individually.
- Revoked all tokens.
- Tried to use a revoked token.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5506
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10133
Summary: Ref T5655. Rename `PhabricatorPHIDType` subclasses for clarity (see discussion in D9839). I'm not too keen on some of the resulting class names, so feel free to suggest alternatives.
Test Plan: Ran unit tests.
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Maniphest Tasks: T5655
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9986
Summary:
Ref T5096. Ref T4251. See D9202 for discussion.
- Twitter seems to accept either one (?!?!?!??).
- JIRA uses RSA-SHA1, which does not depend on the token secret.
- This change makes Bitbucket work.
Test Plan:
- OAuthed with Twitter.
- OAuthed with JIRA.
- OAuthed with some Bitbucket code I had partially laying around in a partial state, which works after this change.
Reviewers: csteipp, btrahan, 20after4
Reviewed By: 20after4
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4251, T5096
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9760
Summary: Ran `arc lint --apply-patches --everything` over rP, mainly to change double quotes to single quotes where appropriate. These changes also validate that the `ArcanistXHPASTLinter::LINT_DOUBLE_QUOTE` rule is working as expected.
Test Plan: Eyeballed it.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9431
Summary:
Ref T4398. We have several auth-related systems which require (or are improved by) the ability to hand out one-time codes which expire after a short period of time.
In particular, these are:
- SMS multi-factor: we need to be able to hand out one-time codes for this in order to prove the user has the phone.
- Password reset emails: we use a time-based rotating token right now, but we could improve this with a one-time token, so once you reset your password the link is dead.
- TOTP auth: we don't need to verify/invalidate keys, but can improve security by doing so.
This adds a generic one-time code storage table, and strengthens the TOTP enrollment process by using it. Specifically, you can no longer edit the enrollment form (the one with a QR code) to force your own key as the TOTP key: only keys Phabricator generated are accepted. This has no practical security impact, but generally helps raise the barrier potential attackers face.
Followup changes will use this for reset emails, then implement SMS multi-factor.
Test Plan:
- Enrolled in TOTP multi-factor auth.
- Submitted an error in the form, saw the same key presented.
- Edited the form with web tools to provide a different key, saw it reject and the server generate an alternate.
- Change the expiration to 5 seconds instead of 1 hour, submitted the form over and over again, saw it cycle the key after 5 seconds.
- Looked at the database and saw the tokens I expected.
- Ran the GC and saw all the 5-second expiry tokens get cleaned up.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9217
Summary: This is useful when you're trying to onboard an entire office and you end up using the Google OAuth anyway.
Test Plan: tested locally. Maybe I should write some tests?
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9150
Summary: Ref T4398. Add some documentation and use `phutil_units()`.
Test Plan:
- Established a web session.
- Established a conduit session.
- Entered and exited hisec.
- Used "Sessions" panel to examine results.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8924
Summary:
Ref T4398. This prompts users for multi-factor auth on login.
Roughly, this introduces the idea of "partial" sessions, which we haven't finished constructing yet. In practice, this means the session has made it through primary auth but not through multi-factor auth. Add a workflow for bringing a partial session up to a full one.
Test Plan:
- Used Conduit.
- Logged in as multi-factor user.
- Logged in as no-factor user.
- Tried to do non-login-things with a partial session.
- Reviewed account activity logs.
{F149295}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8922
Summary:
Ref T4398. Allows auth factors to render and validate when prompted to take a hi-sec action.
This has a whole lot of rough edges still (see D8875) but does fundamentally work correctly.
Test Plan:
- Added two different TOTP factors to my account for EXTRA SECURITY.
- Took hisec actions with no auth factors, and with attached auth factors.
- Hit all the error/failure states of the hisec entry process.
- Verified hisec failures appear in activity logs.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8886
Summary:
Ref T4398. This is still pretty rough and isn't exposed in the UI yet, but basically works. Some missing features / areas for improvement:
- Rate limiting attempts (see TODO).
- Marking tokens used after they're used once (see TODO), maybe. I can't think of ways an attacker could capture a token without also capturing a session, offhand.
- Actually turning this on (see TODO).
- This workflow is pretty wordy. It would be nice to calm it down a bit.
- But also add more help/context to help users figure out what's going on here, I think it's not very obvious if you don't already know what "TOTP" is.
- Add admin tool to strip auth factors off an account ("Help, I lost my phone and can't log in!").
- Add admin tool to show users who don't have multi-factor auth? (so you can pester them)
- Generate QR codes to make the transfer process easier (they're fairly complicated).
- Make the "entering hi-sec" workflow actually check for auth factors and use them correctly.
- Turn this on so users can use it.
- Adding SMS as an option would be nice eventually.
- Adding "password" as an option, maybe? TOTP feels fairly good to me.
I'll post a couple of screens...
Test Plan:
- Added TOTP token with Google Authenticator.
- Added TOTP token with Authy.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8875
Summary:
Ref T4398. This is roughly a "sudo" mode, like GitHub has for accessing SSH keys, or Facebook has for managing credit cards. GitHub actually calls theirs "sudo" mode, but I think that's too technical for big parts of our audience. I've gone with "high security mode".
This doesn't actually get exposed in the UI yet (and we don't have any meaningful auth factors to prompt the user for) but the workflow works overall. I'll go through it in a comment, since I need to arrange some screenshots.
Test Plan: See guided walkthrough.
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8851
Summary: Throwing this up for testing, swapped out all icons in timeline for their font equivelants. Used better icons where I could as well. We should feel free to use more / be fun with the icons when possible since there is no penalty anymore.
Test Plan: I browsed many, not all, timelines in my sandbox and in IE8. Some of these were just swagged, but I'm expecting we'll do more SB testing before landing.
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8827
Summary:
Ref T4339. Ref T4310. Currently, sessions look like `"afad85d675fda87a4fadd54"`, and are only issued for logged-in users. To support logged-out CSRF and (eventually) external user sessions, I made two small changes:
- First, sessions now have a "kind", which is indicated by a prefix, like `"A/ab987asdcas7dca"`. This mostly allows us to issue session queries more efficiently: we don't have to issue a query at all for anonymous sessions, and can join the correct table for user and external sessions and save a query. Generally, this gives us more debugging information and more opportunity to recover from issues in a user-friendly way, as with the "invalid session" error in this diff.
- Secondly, if you load a page and don't have a session, we give you an anonymous session. This is just a secret with no special significance.
This does not implement CSRF yet, but gives us a client secret we can use to implement it.
Test Plan:
- Logged in.
- Logged out.
- Browsed around.
- Logged in again.
- Went through link/register.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4310, T4339
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8043
Summary:
Ref T3720. Ref T4310. Currently, we limit the maximum number of concurrent sessions of each type. This is primarily because sessions predate garbage collection and we had no way to prevent the session table from growing fairly quickly and without bound unless we did this.
Now that we have GC (and it's modular!) we can just expire unused sessions after a while and throw them away:
- Add a `sessionExpires` column to the table, with a key.
- Add a GC for old sessions.
- When we establish a session, set `sessionExpires` to the current time plus the session TTL.
- When a user uses a session and has used up more than 20% of the time on it, extend the session.
In addition to this, we could also rotate sessions, but I think that provides very little value. If we do want to implement it, we should hold it until after T3720 / T4310.
Test Plan:
- Ran schema changes.
- Looked at database.
- Tested GC:
- Started GC.
- Set expires on one row to the past.
- Restarted GC.
- Verified GC nuked the session.
- Logged in.
- Logged out.
- Ran Conduit method.
- Tested refresh:
- Set threshold to 0.0001% instead of 20%.
- Loaded page.
- Saw a session extension ever few page loads.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4310, T3720
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7976
Summary:
Ref T4310. Ref T3720. Two major things are going on here:
- I'm making this table work more like a standard table, which, e.g., makes `delete()` simpler to implement.
- Currently, the primary key is `(userPHID, type)`. I want to get rid of this, issue unlimited sessions, and GC old sessions. This means we can't have a unique key on `(userPHID, type)` anymore. This removes it as the primary key and adds it as a normal key instead. There's no functional change -- the code to generate sessions guarantees that it will never write duplicate rows or write additional rows -- but allows us to drop the `-1`, `-2` qualifiers in the future.
- Also of note, our task is made far simpler here because MySQL will automatically assign values to new `AUTO_INCREMENT` columns, so we don't have to migrate to get real IDs.
Test Plan: Ran migrations, verified table looked sane. Logged out, logged in.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T3720, T4310
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7975
Summary: Ref T4310. Ref T3720. We use bare strings to refer to session types in several places right now; use constants instead.
Test Plan: grep; logged out; logged in; ran Conduit commands.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4310, T3720
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7963
Summary: Ref T4310. Ref T3720. Session operations are currently part of PhabricatorUser. This is more tightly coupled than needbe, and makes it difficult to establish login sessions for non-users. Move all the session management code to a `SessionEngine`.
Test Plan:
- Viewed sessions.
- Regenerated Conduit certificate.
- Verified Conduit sessions were destroyed.
- Logged out.
- Logged in.
- Ran conduit commands.
- Viewed sessions again.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4310, T3720
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7962
Summary: Ref T4310. Ref T3720. Partly, this makes it easier for users to understand login sessions. Partly, it makes it easier for me to make changes to login sessions for T4310 / T3720 without messing anything up.
Test Plan: {F101512}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T3720, T4310
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7954
Summary:
Ref T603. Adds clarifying text which expands on policies and explains exceptions and rules. The goal is to provide an easy way for users to learn about special policy rules, like "task owners can always see a task".
This presentation might be a little aggressive. That's probably OK as we introduce policies, but something a little more tempered might be better down the road.
Test Plan: See screenshot.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7150
