diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index e62f762b..6de086be 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1246,7 +1246,8 @@ if(NOT MSVC OR MSVC_VERSION GREATER_EQUAL 1900)
     # OFF       Disable sandboxing.
     # capsicum  Require Capsicum (FreeBSD >= 10.2) and fail if not found.
     # pledge    Require pledge(2) (OpenBSD >= 5.9) and fail if not found.
-    set(SUPPORTED_SANDBOX_METHODS ON OFF capsicum pledge)
+    # landlock  Require Landlock (Linux >= 5.13) and fail if not found.
+    set(SUPPORTED_SANDBOX_METHODS ON OFF capsicum pledge landlock)
 
     set(ENABLE_SANDBOX ON CACHE STRING "Sandboxing method to use in 'xz'")
 
@@ -1285,6 +1286,15 @@ if(NOT MSVC OR MSVC_VERSION GREATER_EQUAL 1900)
         endif()
     endif()
 
+    # Sandboxing: Landlock
+    if(NOT SANDBOX_FOUND AND ENABLE_SANDBOX MATCHES "^ON$|^landlock$")
+        check_include_file(linux/landlock.h HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H)
+        if(HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H)
+            target_compile_definitions(xz PRIVATE HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H)
+            set(SANDBOX_FOUND ON)
+        endif()
+    endif()
+
     if(NOT SANDBOX_FOUND AND NOT ENABLE_SANDBOX MATCHES "^ON$|^OFF$")
         message(SEND_ERROR "ENABLE_SANDBOX=${ENABLE_SANDBOX} was used but "
                            "support for the sandboxing method wasn't found.")
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 9d35071a..00a9e3c0 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL([COND_DOC], [test x$enable_doc != xno])
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([if sandboxing should be used])
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([sandbox], [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-sandbox=METHOD],
 		[Sandboxing METHOD can be
-		'auto', 'no', 'capsicum', or 'pledge'.
+		'auto', 'no', 'capsicum', 'pledge', or 'landlock'.
 		The default is 'auto' which enables sandboxing if
 		a supported sandboxing method is found.])],
 	[], [enable_sandbox=auto])
@@ -527,12 +527,12 @@ case $enable_sandbox in
 	auto)
 		AC_MSG_RESULT([maybe (autodetect)])
 		;;
-	no | capsicum | pledge)
+	no | capsicum | pledge | landlock)
 		AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_sandbox])
 		;;
 	*)
 		AC_MSG_RESULT([])
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-sandbox only accepts 'auto', 'no', 'capsicum', or 'pledge'.])
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-sandbox only accepts 'auto', 'no', 'capsicum', 'pledge', or 'landlock'.])
 		;;
 esac
 
@@ -1059,6 +1059,11 @@ AS_CASE([$enable_sandbox],
 		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pledge], [enable_sandbox=found])
 	]
 )
+AS_CASE([$enable_sandbox],
+	[auto | landlock], [
+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/landlock.h], [enable_sandbox=found])
+	]
+)
 
 # If a specific sandboxing method was explicitly requested and it wasn't
 # found, give an error.
diff --git a/src/xz/file_io.c b/src/xz/file_io.c
index 5a7d317f..70fb0772 100644
--- a/src/xz/file_io.c
+++ b/src/xz/file_io.c
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ static bool warn_fchown;
 #	include <sys/capsicum.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
+#	include <linux/landlock.h>
+#	include <sys/syscall.h>
+#endif
+
 #include "tuklib_open_stdxxx.h"
 
 #ifdef _MSC_VER
@@ -253,6 +258,59 @@ io_sandbox_enter(int src_fd)
 
 	(void)src_fd;
 
+#elif defined(HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H)
+	int landlock_abi = syscall(SYS_landlock_create_ruleset,
+			(void *)NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
+
+	if (landlock_abi > 0) {
+		// We support ABI versions 1-3.
+		if (landlock_abi > 3)
+			landlock_abi = 3;
+
+		// We want to set all supported flags in handled_access_fs.
+		// This way the ruleset will initially forbid access to all
+		// actions that the available Landlock ABI version supports.
+		// Exceptions can be added using landlock_add_rule(2) to
+		// allow certain actions on certain files or directories.
+		//
+		// The same flag values are used on all archs. ABI v2 and v3
+		// both add one new flag.
+		//
+		// First in ABI v1: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE = 1ULL << 0
+		// Last in ABI v1: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM = 1ULL << 12
+		// Last in ABI v2: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER = 1ULL << 13
+		// Last in ABI v3: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE = 1ULL << 14
+		//
+		// This makes it simple to set the mask based on the ABI
+		// version and we don't need to care which flags are #defined
+		// in the installed <linux/landlock.h>.
+		const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
+			.handled_access_fs = (1ULL << (12 + landlock_abi)) - 1
+		};
+
+		const int ruleset_fd = syscall(SYS_landlock_create_ruleset,
+				&attr, sizeof(attr), 0U);
+		if (ruleset_fd < 0)
+			goto error;
+
+		// All files we need should have already been openend. Thus,
+		// we don't need to add any rules using landlock_add_rule(2)
+		// before activating the sandbox.
+		//
+		// NOTE: It's possible that the hack at the beginning of this
+		// function isn't be good enough. It tries to get translations
+		// and libc-specific files loaded but if it's not good enough
+		// then perhaps a Landlock rule to allow reading from /usr
+		// and/or the xz installation prefix would be needed.
+		//
+		// prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, ...) was already called in
+		// main() so we don't do it here again.
+		if (syscall(SYS_landlock_restrict_self, ruleset_fd, 0U) != 0)
+			goto error;
+	}
+
+	(void)src_fd;
+
 #else
 #	error ENABLE_SANDBOX is defined but no sandboxing method was found.
 #endif
diff --git a/src/xz/main.c b/src/xz/main.c
index f0c2194c..9c902833 100644
--- a/src/xz/main.c
+++ b/src/xz/main.c
@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@
 #include "private.h"
 #include <ctype.h>
 
+// prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, ...) is required with Landlock but it can be
+// activated even when conditions for strict sandboxing aren't met.
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
+#	include <sys/prctl.h>
+#endif
+
+
 /// Exit status to use. This can be changed with set_exit_status().
 static enum exit_status_type exit_status = E_SUCCESS;
 
@@ -156,6 +163,18 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	}
 #endif
 
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
+	// Prevent the process from gaining new privileges. This must be done
+	// before landlock_restrict_self(2) in file_io.c but since we will
+	// never need new privileges, this call can be done here already.
+	//
+	// This is supported since Linux 3.5. Ignore the return value to
+	// keep compatibility with old kernels. landlock_restrict_self(2)
+	// will fail if the no_new_privs attribute isn't set, thus if prctl()
+	// fails here the error will still be detected when it matters.
+	(void)prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+#endif
+
 #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
 	InitializeCriticalSection(&exit_status_cs);
 #endif
diff --git a/src/xz/private.h b/src/xz/private.h
index ddcc103c..b822b944 100644
--- a/src/xz/private.h
+++ b/src/xz/private.h
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@
 #	define STDERR_FILENO (fileno(stderr))
 #endif
 
-#if defined(HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT) || defined(HAVE_PLEDGE)
+#if defined(HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT) || defined(HAVE_PLEDGE) \
+		|| defined(HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H)
 #	define ENABLE_SANDBOX 1
 #endif