Summary:
Depends on D20010. Ref T920. Allow users to designate which contact number is "primary": the number we'll actually send stuff to.
Since this interacts in weird ways with "disable", just do a "when any number is touched, put all of the user's rows into the right state" sort of thing.
Test Plan:
- Added numbers, made numbers primary, disabled a primary number, un-disabled a number with no primaries. Got sensible behavior in all cases.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T920
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D20011
Summary: Depends on D20008. Ref T920. Continue fleshing out contact number behaviors.
Test Plan:
- Enabled and disabled a contact number.
- Saw list, detail views reflect change.
- Added number X, disabled it, added it again (allowed), enabled the disabled one ("already in use" exception).
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T920
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D20010
Summary:
Depends on D20006. Ref T13222. Currently, the "MFA Is Required" gate doesn't let you do anything else, but you'll need to be able to access "Contact Numbers" if an install provides SMS MFA.
Tweak this UI to give users limited access to settings, so they can set up contact numbers and change their language.
(This is a little bit fiddly, and I'm doing it early on partly so it can get more testing as these changes move forward.)
Test Plan: {F6146136}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D20008
Summary:
Ref T920. To send you SMS messages, we need to know your phone number.
This adds bare-bone basics (transactions, storage, editor, etc).
From here:
**Disabling Numbers**: I'll let you disable numbers in an upcoming diff.
**Primary Number**: I think I'm just going to let you pick a number as "primary", similar to how email works. We could imagine a world where you have one "MFA" number and one "notifications" number, but this seems unlikely-ish?
**Publishing Numbers (Profile / API)**: At some point, we could let you say that a number is public / "show on my profile" and provide API access / directory features. Not planning to touch this for now.
**Non-Phone Numbers**: Eventually this could be a list of other similar contact mechanisms (APNS/GCM devices, Whatsapp numbers, ICQ number, twitter handle so MFA can slide into your DM's?). Not planning to touch this for now, but the path should be straightforward when we get there. This is why it's called "Contact Number", not "Phone Number".
**MFA-Required + SMS**: Right now, if the only MFA provider is SMS and MFA is required on the install, you can't actually get into Settings to add a contact number to configure SMS. I'll look at the best way to deal with this in an upcoming diff -- likely, giving you partial access to more of Setings before you get thorugh the MFA gate. Conceptually, it seems reasonable to let you adjust some other settings, like "Language" and "Accessibility", before you set up MFA, so if the "you need to add MFA" portal was more like a partial Settings screen, maybe that's pretty reasonable.
**Verifying Numbers**: We'll probably need to tackle this eventually, but I'm not planning to worry about it for now.
Test Plan: {F6137174}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: avivey, PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T920
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19988
Summary:
Ref T13222. This updates the CLI tools and documentation for the changes in D19975.
The flags `--type` and `--all-types` retain their current meaning. In most cases, `bin/auth strip --type totp` is sufficient and you don't need to bother looking up the relevant provider PHID. The existing `bin/auth list-factors` is also unchanged.
The new `--provider` flag allows you to select configs from a particular provider in a more granular way. The new `bin/auth list-mfa-providers` provides an easy way to get PHIDs.
(In the Phacility cluster, the "Strip MFA" action just reaches into the database and deletes rows manually, so this isn't terribly important. I verified that the code should still work properly.)
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/auth list-mfa-providers`.
- Stripped by user / type / provider.
- Grepped for `list-factors` and `auth strip`.
- Hit all (?) of the various possible error cases.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19976
Summary:
Ref T13222. Users configure "Factor Configs", which say "I have an entry on my phone for TOTP secret key XYZ".
Currently, these point at raw implementations -- always "TOTP" in practice.
To support configuring available MFA types (like "no MFA") and adding MFA types that need some options set (like "Duo", which needs API keys), bind "Factor Configs" to a "Factor Provider" instead.
In the future, several "Factors" will be available (TOTP, SMS, Duo, Postal Mail, ...). Administrators configure zero or more "MFA Providers" they want to use (e.g., "Duo" + here's my API key). Then users can add configs for these providers (e.g., "here's my Duo account").
Upshot:
- Factor: a PHP subclass, implements the technical details of a type of MFA factor (TOTP, SMS, Duo, etc).
- FactorProvider: a storage object, owned by administrators, configuration of a Factor that says "this should be available on this install", plus provides API keys, a human-readable name, etc.
- FactorConfig: a storage object, owned by a user, says "I have a factor for provider X on my phone/whatever with secret key Q / my duo account is X / my address is Y".
Couple of things not covered here:
- Statuses for providers ("Disabled", "Deprecated") don't do anything yet, but you can't edit them anyway.
- Some `bin/auth` tools need to be updated.
- When no providers are configured, the MFA panel should probably vanish.
- Documentation.
Test Plan:
- Ran migration with providers, saw configs point at the first provider.
- Ran migration without providers, saw a provider created and configs pointed at it.
- Added/removed factors and providers. Passed MFA gates. Spot-checked database for general sanity.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19975
Summary: See https://secure.phabricator.com/D18901#249481. Update the docs and a warning string to reflect the new reality that `bin/auth recover` is now able to recover any account, not just administrators.
Test Plan: Mk 1 eyeball
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D20007
Summary:
Depends on D19994. See PHI1027. If an install has customized the "Welcome Mail" message, include it in welcome mail. A special custom message from the profile screen overrides it, if provided.
(I fiddled with putting the custom message as "placeholder" text in the remarkup area as a hint, but newlines in "placeholder" text appear to have issues in Safari and Firefox. I think this is probably reasonably clear as-is.)
Make both render remarkup-into-text so things like links work properly, as it's reasonably likely that installs will want to link to things.
Test Plan:
- With custom "Welcome Mail" text, sent mail with no custom override (got custom text) and a custom override (got overridden text).
- Linked to some stuff, got sensible links in the mail (`bin/mail show-outbound`).
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19995
Summary: Depends on D19992. Ref T13222. If administrators provide a custom login message, show it on the login screen.
Test Plan:
{F6137930}
- Viewed login screen with and without a custom message.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19994
Summary:
Ref T13222. Long ago, we had a Config option (`welcome.html`) to let you dump HTML onto the login screen, but this was relatively hard to use and not good from a security perspective.
In some cases this was obsoleted by Dashboards, but there's at least some remaining set of use cases for actual login instructions on the login screen. For example, WMF has some guidance on //which// SSO mechanism to use based on what types of account you have. On `secure`, users assume they can register by clicking "Log In With GitHub" or whatever, and it might reduce frustration to tell them upfront that registration is closed.
Some other types of auth messaging could also either use customization or defaults (e.g., the invite/welcome/approve mail).
We could do this with a bunch of Config options, but I'd generally like to move to a world where there's less stuff in Config and more configuration is contextual. I think it tends to be easier to use, and we get a lot of fringe benefits (granular permissions, API, normal transaction logs, more abililty to customize workflows and provide contextual help/hints, etc). Here, for example, we can provide a remarkup preview, which would be trickier with Config.
This does not actually do anything yet.
Test Plan: {F6137541}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19992
Summary:
Ref T13222. Currently, if a remote address fails a few login attempts (5) in a short period of time (15 minutes) we require a CAPTCHA for each additional attempt.
This relies on:
- Administrators configuring ReCAPTCHA, which they may just not bother with.
- Administrators being comfortable with Google running arbitrary trusted Javascript, which they may not be comfortable with.
- ReCAPTCHA actually being effective, which seems likely true for unsophisticated attackers but perhaps less true for more sophisticated attackers (see <https://github.com/ecthros/uncaptcha2>, for example).
(For unsophisticated attackers and researchers, "Rumola" has been the standard CAPTCHA bypass tool for some time. This is an extension that pays humans to solve CAPTCHAs for you. This is not practical at "brute force a strong password" scale. Google appears to have removed it from the Chrome store. The "submit the captcha back to Google's APIs" trick probably isn't practical at brute-force-scale either, but it's easier to imagine weaponizing that than weaponizing human solvers.)
Add a hard gate behind the CAPTHCA wall so that we fail into a secure state if there's no CAPTCHA or the attacker can defeat CAPTCHAs at a very low cost.
The big downside to this is that an attacker who controls your remote address (e.g., is behind the same NAT device you're behind on corpnet) can lock you out of your account. However:
- That //should// be a lot of access (although maybe this isn't that high of a barrier in many cases, since compromising a "smart fridge" or "smart water glass" or whatever might be good enough).
- You can still do "Forgot password?" and login via email link, although this may not be obvious.
Test Plan:
- Logged in normally.
- Failed many many login attempts, got hard gated.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19997
Summary:
Ref T13222. Ref T13231. See PHI912. I'm planning to turn MFA providers into concrete objects, so you can disable and configure them.
Currently, we only support TOTP, which doesn't require any configuration, but other provider types (like Duo or Yubikey OTP) do require some configuration (server URIs, API keys, etc). TOTP //could// also have some configuration, like "bits of entropy" or "allowed window size" or whatever, if we want.
Add concrete objects for this and standard transaction / policy / query support. These objects don't do anything interesting yet and don't actually interact with MFA, this is just skeleton code for now.
Test Plan:
{F6090444}
{F6090445}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13231, T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19935
Summary:
Ref T12509.
- Remove the "phabricator.csrf-key" configuration option in favor of automatically generating an HMAC key.
- Upgrade two hasher callsites (one in CSRF itself, one in providing a CSRF secret for logged-out users) to SHA256.
- Extract the CSRF logic from `PhabricatorUser` to a standalone engine.
I was originally going to do this as two changes (extract logic, then upgrade hashes) but the logic had a couple of very silly pieces to it that made faithful extraction a little silly.
For example, it computed `time_block = (epoch + (offset * cycle_frequency)) / cycle_frequency` instead of `time_block = (epoch / cycle_frequency) + offset`. These are equivalent but the former was kind of silly.
It also computed `substr(hmac(substr(hmac(secret)).salt))` instead of `substr(hmac(secret.salt))`. These have the same overall effect but the former is, again, kind of silly (and a little bit materially worse, in this case).
This will cause a one-time compatibility break: pages loaded before the upgrade won't be able to submit contained forms after the upgrade, unless they're open for long enough for the Javascript to refresh the CSRF token (an hour, I think?). I'll note this in the changelog.
Test Plan:
- As a logged-in user, submitted forms normally (worked).
- As a logged-in user, submitted forms with a bad CSRF value (error, as expected).
- As a logged-out user, hit the success and error cases.
- Visually inspected tokens for correct format.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T12509
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19946
Summary:
Depends on D19906. Ref T13222. This isn't going to win any design awards, but make the "wait" and "answered" elements a little more clear.
Ideally, the icon parts could be animated Google Authenticator-style timers (but I think we'd need to draw them in a `<canvas />` unless there's some clever trick that I don't know) or maybe we could just have the background be like a "water level" that empties out. Not sure I'm going to actually write the JS for either of those, but the UI at least looks a little more intentional.
Test Plan:
{F6070914}
{F6070915}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19908
Summary:
Depends on D19905. Ref T13222. In D19843, I refactored this stuff but `$jump_into_hisec` was dropped.
This is a hint to keep the upgraded session in hisec mode, which we need to do a password reset when using a recovery link. Without it, we double prompt you for MFA: first to upgrade to a full session, then to change your password.
Pass this into the engine properly to avoid the double-prompt.
Test Plan:
- Used `bin/auth recover` to get a partial session with MFA enabled and a password provider.
- Before: double MFA prompt.
- After: session stays upgraded when it becomes full, no second prompt.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19906
Summary:
Depends on D19904. Ref T13226. Ref T13222. Currently, partial sessions (where you've provided a primary auth factor like a password, but not yet provided MFA) work like normal sessions: they're good for 30 days and extend indefinitely under regular use.
This behavior is convenient for full sessions, but normal users don't ever spend 30 minutes answering MFA, so there's no real reason to do it for partial sessions. If we add login alerts in the future, limiting partial sessions to a short lifetime will make them more useful, since an attacker can't get one partial session and keep extending it forever while waiting for an opportunity to get past your MFA.
Test Plan:
- Did a partial login (to the MFA prompt), checked database, saw a ~29 minute partial session.
- Did a full login, saw session extend to ~30 days.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13226, T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19905
Summary:
Depends on D19903. Ref T13222. This was a Facebook-specific thing from D6202 that I believe no other install ever used, and I'm generally trying to move away from the old "event" system (the more modern modular/engine patterns generally replace it).
Just drop support for this. Since the constant is being removed, anything that's actually using it should break in an obvious way, and I'll note this in the changelog.
There's no explicit replacement but I don't think this hook is useful for anything except "being Facebook in 2013".
Test Plan:
- Grepped for `TYPE_AUTH_WILLLOGIN`.
- Logged in.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19904
Summary:
Depends on D19902. Ref T13222. This is mostly a "while I'm in here..." change since MFA is getting touched so much anyway.
Doing cluster support, I sometimes need to log into user accounts on instances that have MFA. I currently accomplish this by doing `bin/auth recover`, getting a parital session, and then forcing it into a full session in the database. This is inconvenient and somewhat dangerous.
Instead, allow `bin/auth recover` to generate a link that skips the "partial session" stage: adding required MFA, providing MFA, and signing legalpad documents.
Anyone who can run `bin/auth recover` can do this anyway, this just reduces the chance I accidentally bypass MFA on the wrong session when doing support stuff.
Test Plan:
- Logged in with `bin/auth recover`, was prompted for MFA.
- Logged in with `bin/auth recover --force-full-session`, was not prompted for MFA.
- Did a password reset, followed reset link, was prompted for MFA.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19903
Summary:
Depends on D19899. Ref T13222. When we prompt you for one-shot MFA, we currently give you a lot of misleading text about your session staying in "high security mode".
Differentiate between one-shot and session upgrade MFA, and give the user appropriate cues and explanatory text.
Test Plan:
- Hit one-shot MFA on an "mfa" task in Maniphest.
- Hit session upgrade MFA in Settings > Multi-Factor.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19900
Summary:
Depends on D19897. Ref T13222. See some discussion in D19890.
- Only rate limit users if they're actually answering a challenge, not if they're just clicking "Wait Patiently".
- Reduce the number of allowed attempts per hour from 100 back to 10.
- Reduce the TOTP window from +/- 2 timesteps (allowing ~60 seconds of skew) to +/- 1 timestep (allowing ~30 seconds of skew).
- Change the window where a TOTP response remains valid to a flat 60 seconds instead of a calculation based on windows and timesteps.
Test Plan:
- Hit an MFA prompt.
- Without typing in any codes, mashed "submit" as much as I wanted (>>10 times / hour).
- Answered prompt correctly.
- Mashed "Wait Patiently" as much as I wanted (>>10 times / hour).
- Guessed random numbers, was rate limited after 10 attempts.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19898
Summary:
Depends on D19896. Ref T13222. See PHI873. Add a core "Sign With MFA" transaction type which prompts you for MFA and marks your transactions as MFA'd.
This is a one-shot gate and does not keep you in MFA.
Test Plan:
- Used "Sign with MFA", got prompted for MFA, answered MFA, saw transactions apply with MFA metadata and markers.
- Tried to sign alone, got appropriate errors.
- Tried to sign no-op changes, got appropriate errors.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19897
Summary:
Depends on D19919. Ref T11351. This method appeared in D8802 (note that "get...Object" was renamed to "get...Transaction" there, so this method was actually "new" even though a method of the same name had existed before).
The goal at the time was to let Harbormaster post build results to Diffs and have them end up on Revisions, but this eventually got a better implementation (see below) where the Harbormaster-specific code can just specify a "publishable object" where build results should go.
The new `get...Object` semantics ultimately broke some stuff, and the actual implementation in Differential was removed in D10911, so this method hasn't really served a purpose since December 2014. I think that broke the Harbormaster thing by accident and we just lived with it for a bit, then Harbormaster got some more work and D17139 introduced "publishable" objects which was a better approach. This was later refined by D19281.
So: the original problem (sending build results to the right place) has a good solution now, this method hasn't done anything for 4 years, and it was probably a bad idea in the first place since it's pretty weird/surprising/fragile.
Note that `Comment` objects still have an unrelated method with the same name. In that case, the method ties the `Comment` storage object to the related `Transaction` storage object.
Test Plan: Grepped for `getApplicationTransactionObject`, verified that all remaining callsites are related to `Comment` objects.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T11351
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19920
Summary:
Depends on D19918. Ref T11351. In D19918, I removed all calls to this method. Now, remove all implementations.
All of these implementations just `return $timeline`, only the three sites in D19918 did anything interesting.
Test Plan: Used `grep willRenderTimeline` to find callsites, found none.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T11351
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19919
Summary:
Depends on D19894. Ref T13222. See PHI873. When you provide a correct response to an MFA challenge, we mark it as "answered".
Currently, we never let you reuse an "answered" token. That's usually fine, but if you have 2+ factors on your account and get one or more (but fewer than all of them) right when you submit the form, you need to answer them all again, possibly after waiting for a lockout period. This is needless.
When you answer a challenge correctly, add a hidden input with a code proving you got it right so you don't need to provide another answer for a little while.
Why not just put your response in a form input, e.g. `<input type="hidden" name="totp-response" value="123456" />`?
- We may allow the "answered" response to be valid for a different amount of time than the actual answer. For TOTP, we currently allow a response to remain valid for 60 seconds, but the actual code you entered might expire sooner.
- In some cases, there's no response we can provide (with push + approve MFA, you don't enter a code, you just tap "yes, allow this" on your phone). Conceivably, we may not be able to re-verify a push+approve code if the remote implements one-shot answers.
- The "responseToken" stuff may end up embedded in normal forms in some cases in the future, and this approach just generally reduces the amount of plaintext MFA we have floating around.
Test Plan:
- Added 2 MFA tokens to my account.
- Hit the MFA prompt.
- Provided one good response and one bad response.
- Submitted the form.
- Old behavior: good response gets locked out for ~120 seconds.
- New behavior: good response is marked "answered", fixing the other response lets me submit the form.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19895
Summary:
Depends on D19893. Ref T13222. See PHI873. A challenge is "answered" if you provide a valid response. A challenge is "completed" if we let you through the MFA check and do whatever actual action the check is protecting.
If you only have one MFA factor, challenges will be "completed" immediately after they are "answered". However, if you have two or more factors, it's possible to "answer" one or more prompts, but fewer than all of the prompts, and end up with "answered" challenges that are not "completed".
In the future, it may also be possible to answer all the challenges but then have an error occur before they are marked "completed" (for example, a unique key collision in the transaction code). For now, nothing interesting happens between "answered" and "completed". This would take the form of the caller explicitly providing flags like "wait to mark the challenges as completed until I do something" and "okay, mark the challenges as completed now".
This change prevents all token reuse, even on the same workflow. Future changes will let the answered challenges "stick" to the client form so you don't have to re-answer challenges for a short period of time if you hit a unique key collision.
Test Plan:
- Used a token to get through an MFA gate.
- Tried to go through another gate, was told to wait for a long time for the next challenge window.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19894
Summary:
Depends on D19890. Ref T13222. See PHI873. Currently, we only validate TOTP responses against the current (realtime) timestep. Instead, also validate them against a specific challenge.
This mostly just moves us toward more specifically preventing responses from being reused, and supporting flows which must look more like this (SMS/push).
One rough edge here is that during the T+3 and T+4 windows (you request a prompt, then wait 60-120 seconds to respond) only past responses actually work (the current code on your device won't). For example:
- At T+0, you request MFA. We issue a T+0 challenge that accepts codes T-2, T-1, T+0, T+1, and T+2. The challenge locks out T+3 and T+4 to prevent the window from overlapping with the next challenge we may issue (see D19890).
- If you wait 60 seconds until T+3 to actually submit a code, the realtime valid responses are T+1, T+2, T+3, T+4, T+5. The challenge valid responses are T-2, T-1, T+0, T+1, and T+2. Only T+1 and T+2 are in the intersection. Your device is showing T+3 if the clock is right, so if you type in what's shown on your device it won't be accepted.
- This //may// get refined in future changes, but, in the worst case, it's probably fine if it doesn't. Beyond 120s you'll get a new challenge and a full [-2, ..., +2] window to respond, so this lockout is temporary even if you manage to hit it.
- If this //doesn't// get refined, I'll change the UI to say "This factor recently issued a challenge which has expired, wait N seconds." to smooth this over a bit.
Test Plan:
- Went through MFA.
- Added a new TOTP factor.
- Hit some error cases on purpose.
- Tried to use an old code a moment after it expired, got rejected.
- Waited 60+ seconds, tried to use the current displayed factor, got rejected (this isn't great, but currently expected).
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19893
Summary:
Depends on D19889. Ref T13222. Some of this logic is either not-quite-right or a little more complicated than it needs to be.
Currently, we TTL TOTP challenges after three timesteps -- once the current code could no longer be used. But we actually have to TTL it after five timesteps -- once the most-future acceptable code could no longer be used. Otherwise, you can enter the most-future code now (perhaps the attacker compromises NTP and skews the server clock back by 75 seconds) and then an attacker can re-use it in three timesteps.
Generally, simplify things a bit and trust TTLs more. This also makes the "wait" dialog friendlier since we can give users an exact number of seconds.
The overall behavior here is still a little odd because we don't actually require you to respond to the challenge you were issued (right now, we check that the response is valid whenever you submit it, not that it's a valid response to the challenge we issued), but that will change in a future diff. This is just moving us generally in the right direction, and doesn't yet lock everything down properly.
Test Plan:
- Added a little snippet to the control caption to list all the valid codes to make this easier:
```
$key = new PhutilOpaqueEnvelope($config->getFactorSecret());
$valid = array();
foreach ($this->getAllowedTimesteps() as $step) {
$valid[] = self::getTOTPCode($key, $step);
}
$control->setCaption(
pht(
'Valid Codes: '.implode(', ', $valid)));
```
- Used the most-future code to sign `L3`.
- Verified that `L4` did not unlock until the code for `L3` left the activation window.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19890
Summary:
Depends on D19888. Ref T13222. When we issue an MFA challenge, prevent the user from responding to it in the context of a different workflow: if you ask for MFA to do something minor (award a token) you can't use the same challenge to do something more serious (launch nukes).
This defuses highly-hypothetical attacks where the attacker:
- already controls the user's session (since the challenge is already bound to the session); and
- can observe MFA codes.
One version of this attack is the "spill coffee on the victim when the code is shown on their phone, then grab their phone" attack. This whole vector really strains the bounds of plausibility, but it's easy to lock challenges to a workflow and it's possible that there's some more clever version of the "spill coffee" attack available to more sophisticated social engineers or with future MFA factors which we don't yet support.
The "spill coffee" attack, in detail, is:
- Go over to the victim's desk.
- Ask them to do something safe and nonsuspicious that requires MFA (sign `L123 Best Friendship Agreement`).
- When they unlock their phone, spill coffee all over them.
- Urge them to go to the bathroom to clean up immediately, leaving their phone and computer in your custody.
- Type the MFA code shown on the phone into a dangerous MFA prompt (sign `L345 Eternal Declaration of War`).
- When they return, they may not suspect anything (it would be normal for the MFA token to have expired), or you can spill more coffee on their computer now to destroy it, and blame it on the earlier spill.
Test Plan:
- Triggered signatures for two different documents.
- Got prompted in one, got a "wait" in the other.
- Backed out of the good prompt, returned, still prompted.
- Answered the good prompt.
- Waited for the bad prompt to expire.
- Went through the bad prompt again, got an actual prompt this time.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19889
Summary:
Depends on D19886. Ref T13222. Clean up MFA challenges after they expire.
(There's maybe some argument to keeping these around for a little while for debugging/forensics, but I suspect it would never actually be valuable and figure we can cross that bridge if we come to it.)
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/garbage collect --collector ...` and saw old MFA challenges collected.
- Triggered a new challenge, GC'd again, saw it survive GC while still active.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19888
Summary:
Ref T13222. See PHI873. Ref T9770.
Currently, we support only TOTP MFA. For some MFA (SMS and "push-to-app"-style MFA) we may need to keep track of MFA details (e.g., the code we SMS'd you). There isn't much support for that yet.
We also currently allow free reuse of TOTP responses across sessions and workflows. This hypothetically enables some "spyglass" attacks where you look at someone's phone and type the code in before they do. T9770 discusses this in more detail, but is focused on an attack window starting when the user submits the form. I claim the attack window opens when the TOTP code is shown on their phone, and the window between the code being shown and being submitted is //much// more interesting than the window after it is submitted.
To address both of these cases, start tracking MFA "Challenges". These are basically a record that we asked you to give us MFA credentials.
For TOTP, the challenge binds a particular timestep to a given session, so an attacker can't look at your phone and type the code into their browser before (or after) you do -- they have a different session. For now, this means that codes are reusable in the same session, but that will be refined in the future.
For SMS / push, the "Challenge" would store the code we sent you so we could validate it.
This is mostly a step on the way toward one-shot MFA, ad-hoc MFA in comment action stacks, and figuring out what's going on with Duo.
Test Plan:
- Passed MFA normally.
- Passed MFA normally, simultaneously, as two different users.
- With two different sessions for the same user:
- Opened MFA in A, opened MFA in B. B got a "wait".
- Submitted MFA in A.
- Clicked "Wait" a bunch in B.
- Submitted MFA in B when prompted.
- Passed MFA normally, then passed MFA normally again with the same code in the same session. (This change does not prevent code reuse.)
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222, T9770
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19886
Summary:
Ref T13222. See PHI873. Currently, MFA implementations return this weird sort of ad-hoc dictionary from validation, which is later used to render form/control stuff.
I want to make this more formal to handle token reuse / session binding cases, and let MFA factors share more code around challenges. Formalize this into a proper object instead of an ad-hoc bundle of properties.
Test Plan:
- Answered a TOTP MFA prompt wrong (nothing, bad value).
- Answered a TOTP MFA prompt properly.
- Added new TOTP MFA, survived enrollment.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19885
Summary:
Ref T13222. Ref T12509. When you add a new MFA TOTP authenticator, we generate a temporary token to make sure you're actually adding the key we generated and not picking your own key.
That is, if we just put inputs in the form like `key=123, response=456`, users could pick their own keys by changing the value of `key` and then generating the correct `response`. That's probably fine, but maybe attackers could somehow force users to pick known keys in combination with other unknown vulnerabilities that might exist in the future. Instead, we generate a random key and keep track of it to make sure nothing funny is afoot.
As an additional barrier, we do the standard "store the digest, not the real key" sort of thing so you can't force a known value even if you can read the database (although this is mostly pointless since you can just read TOTP secrets directly if you can read the database). But it's pretty standard and doesn't hurt anything.
Update this from SHA1 to SHA256. This will break any TOTP factors which someone was in the middle of adding during a Phabricator upgrade, but that seems reasonable. They'll get a sensible failure mode.
Test Plan: Added a new TOTP factor.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222, T12509
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19884
Summary:
Ref T13222. Ref T13225. We store a digest of the session key in the session table (not the session key itself) so that users with access to this table can't easily steal sessions by just setting their cookies to values from the table.
Users with access to the database can //probably// do plenty of other bad stuff (e.g., T13134 mentions digesting Conduit tokens) but there's very little cost to storing digests instead of live tokens.
We currently digest session keys with HMAC-SHA1. This is fine, but HMAC-SHA256 is better. Upgrade:
- Always write new digests.
- We still match sessions with either digest.
- When we read a session with an old digest, upgrade it to a new digest.
In a few months we can throw away the old code. When we do, installs that skip upgrades for a long time may suffer a one-time logout, but I'll note this in the changelog.
We could avoid this by storing `hmac256(hmac1(key))` instead and re-hashing in a migration, but I think the cost of a one-time logout for some tiny subset of users is very low, and worth keeping things simpler in the long run.
Test Plan:
- Hit a page with an old session, got a session upgrade.
- Reviewed sessions in Settings.
- Reviewed user logs.
- Logged out.
- Logged in.
- Terminated other sessions individually.
- Terminated all other sessions.
- Spot checked session table for general sanity.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13225, T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19883
Summary:
Ref T13222. See PHI873. I'm preparing to introduce a new MFA "Challenge" table which stores state about challenges we've issued (to bind challenges to sessions and prevent most challenge reuse).
This table will reference sessions (since each challenge will be bound to a particular session) but sessions currently don't have PHIDs. Give them PHIDs and slightly modernize some related code.
Test Plan:
- Ran migrations.
- Verified table got PHIDs.
- Used `var_dump()` to dump an organic user session.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19881
Summary:
Ref T13222. See PHI873. Currently, when applications prompt users to enter MFA, their session upgrades as a side effect.
In some cases (like managing your email addresses) it makes sense to upgrade your session for a little while since it's common to make multiple edits in sequence (add a new address, make it primary, remove an old address). We generally want MFA to stay out of the way and not feel annoying.
In other cases, we don't expect multiple high-security actions in a row. Notably, PHI873 looks at more "one-shot" use cases where a prompt is answering a specific workflow. We already have at least one of these in the upstream: answering an MFA prompt when signing a Legalpad document.
Introduce a "token" workflow (in contrast to the existing "session") workflow that just does a one-shot prompt without upgrading your session statefully. Then, make Legalpad use this new workflow.
Note that this workflow has a significant problem: if the form submission is invalid for some other reason, we re-prompt you on resubmit. In Legalpad, this workflow looks like:
- Forget to check the "I agree" checkbox.
- Submit the form.
- Get prompted for MFA.
- Answer MFA prompt.
- Get dumped back to the form with an error.
- When you fix the error and submit again, you have to do another MFA check.
This isn't a fatal flaw in Legalpad, but would become a problem with wider adoption. I'll work on fixing this (so the MFA token sticks to the form) in the next set of changes.
Roughly, this is headed toward "MFA sticks to the form/workflow" instead of "MFA sticks to the user/session".
Test Plan:
- Signed a legalpad document with MFA enabled.
- Was prompted for MFA.
- Session no longer upgraded (no purple "session in high security" badge).
- Submitted form with error, answered MFA, fixed error, submitted form again.
- Bad behavior: got re-prompted for MFA. In the future, MFA should stick to the form.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13222
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19843
Summary:
Ref T6960. Ref T13217. Ref T13216. Depends on D19811. Use the recently-introduced "%P" conversion ("Password/Secret") to load sessions in SessionEngine.
This secret isn't critical to protect (it's the //hash// of the actual secret and not useful to attackers on its own) but it shows up on every page in DarkConsole and is an obvious case where `%P` is a more appropriate conversion.
Test Plan:
Note "*********" in the middle of the output here, instead of a session key hash:
{F6012805}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13217, T13216, T6960
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19812
Summary: Depends on D19789. Ref T13217. Continue updating things to use the new %Q-flavored conversions instead of smushing a bunch of strings together.
Test Plan: Browsed around, far fewer errors. These changes are largely mechanical in nature.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13217
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19790
Summary: Depends on D19785. Ref T13217. This converts many of the most common clause construction pathways to the new %Q / %LQ / %LO / %LA / %LJ semantics.
Test Plan: Browsed around a bunch, saw fewer warnings and no obvious behavioral errors. The transformations here are generally mechanical (although I did them by hand).
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: hach-que
Maniphest Tasks: T13217
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19789
Summary:
See <https://hackerone.com/reports/435648>. We currently use 80-bit TOTP keys. The RFC suggests 128 as a minimum and recommends 160.
The math suggests that doing the hashing for an 80-bit key is hard (slightly beyond the reach of a highly motivated state actor, today) but there's no reason not to use 160 bits instead to put this completely out of reach.
See some additional discussion on the HackerOne report about enormous key sizes, number of required observations, etc.
Test Plan: Added a new 160-bit TOTP factor to Google Authenticator without issue.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19792
Summary:
Ref T13216. We occasionally receive HackerOne reports concerned that you can select your username as a password. I suspect very few users actually do this and that this is mostly a compliance/checklist sort of issue, not a real security issue.
On this install, we have about 41,000 user accounts. Of these, 100 have their username as a password (account or VCS). A substantial subset of these are either explicitly intentional ("demo", "bugmenot") or obvious test accounts ("test" in name, or name is a nonsensical string of gibberish, or looks like "tryphab" or similar) or just a bunch of numbers (?), or clearly a "researcher" doing this on purpose (e.g., name includes "pentest" or "xss" or similar).
So I'm not sure real users are actually very inclined to do this, and we can't really ever stop them from picking awful passwords anyway. But we //can// stop researchers from reporting that this is an issue.
Don't allow users to select passwords which contain words in a blocklist: their username, real name, email addresses, or the install's domain name. These words also aren't allowed to contain the password (that is, neither your password nor your username may be a substring of the other one). We also do a little normalization to try to split apart email addresses, domains, and real names, so I can't have "evan1234" as my password.
Test Plan:
- Added unit tests and made them pass.
- Tried to set my password to a bunch of variations of my username / email / domain name / real name / etc, got rejected.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13216
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19776
Summary:
Ref T13202. See <https://discourse.phabricator-community.org/t/2fa-input-box-isnt-hinted-as-a-password-so-browsers-suggest-auto-fills/1959>.
If browsers are autofilling this, I think browser behavior here is bad, but behavior is probably better on the balance if we hint this as `autocomplete="off"` and this is a minor concesssion.
Test Plan:
- I couldn't immediately get any browser to try to autofill this field (perhaps I've disabled autofill, or just not enabled it aggressively?), but this change didn't break anything.
- After the change, answered a TOTP prompt normally.
- After the change, inspected page content and saw `autocomplete="off"` on the `<input />` node.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13202
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19722
Summary:
Ref T13197. See PHI873. Record when a user has MFA'd and add a little icon to the transaction, similar to the exiting "Silent" icon.
For now, this just makes this stuff more auditable. Future changes may add ways to require MFA for certain specific transactions, outside of the ones that already always require MFA (like revealing credentials).
Test Plan: {F5877960}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13197
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19665
Summary:
Depends on D19585. Ref T13164. This is a precursor for D19586, which causes Editors to start doing more explicit CAN_EDIT checks.
Passwords have an Editor, but don't actually define a CAN_EDIT capability. Define one (you can edit a password if you can edit the object the password is associated with).
(Today, this object is always a User -- this table just unified VCS passwords and Account passwords so they can be handled more consistently.)
Test Plan:
- With D19586, ran unit tests and got a pass.
- Edited my own password.
- Tried to edit another user's password and wasn't permitted to.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13164
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19592
Summary:
Fixes T12397. Ref T13164. See PHI801.
Several installs have hit various use cases where the path on disk where Phabricator lives changes at runtime. Currently, `bin/ssh-auth` caches a flat file which includes the path to `bin/ssh-exec`, so this may fall out of date if `phabricator/` moves.
These use cases have varying strengths of legitimacy, but "we're migrating to a new set of hosts and the pool is half old machines and half new machines" seems reasonably compelling and not a problem entirely of one's own making.
Test Plan:
- Compared output on `master` to output after change, found them byte-for-byte identical.
- Moved `phabricator/` to `phabricator2/`, ran `bin/ssh-auth`, got updated output.
- Added a new SSH key, saw it appear in the output.
- Grepped for `AUTHFILE_CACHEKEY` (no hits).
- Dropped the cache, verified that the file regenerates cleanly.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13164, T12397
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19568
Summary:
Ref T13065. `mailKey`s are a private secret for each object. In some mail configurations, they help us ensure that inbound mail is authentic: when we send you mail, the "Reply-To" is "T123+456+abcdef".
- The `T123` is the object you're actually replying to.
- The `456` is your user ID.
- The `abcdef` is a hash of your user account with the `mailKey`.
Knowing this hash effectively proves that Phabricator has sent you mail about the object before, i.e. that you legitimately control the account you're sending from. Without this, anyone could send mail to any object "From" someone else, and have comments post under their username.
To generate this hash, we need a stable secret per object. (We can't use properties like the PHID because the secret has to be legitimately secret.)
Today, we store these in `mailKey` properties on the actual objects, and manually generate them. This results in tons and tons and tons of copies of this same ~10 lines of code.
Instead, just store them in the Mail application and generate them on demand. This change also anticipates possibly adding flags like "must encrypt" and "original subject", which are other "durable metadata about mail transmission" properties we may have use cases for eventually.
Test Plan:
- See next change for additional testing and context.
- Sent mail about Herald rules (next change); saw mail keys generate cleanly.
- Destroyed a Herald rule with a mail key, saw the mail properties get nuked.
- Grepped for `getMailKey()` and converted all callsites I could which aren't the copy/pasted boilerplate present in 50 places.
- Used `bin/mail receive-test --to T123` to test normal mail receipt of older-style objects and make sure that wasn't broken.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13065
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19399
Summary:
Ref T4340. Some "Register/Login" and "Link External Account" buttons are forms which submit to third-party sites. Whitelist these targets when pages render an OAuth form.
Safari, at least, also prevents a redirect to a third-party domain after a form submission to the local domain, so when we first redirect locally (as with Twitter and other OAuth1 providers) we need to authorize an additional URI.
Test Plan: Clicked all my registration buttons locally without hitting CSP issues.
Maniphest Tasks: T4340
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19159
Summary:
Depends on D19155. Ref T13094. Ref T4340.
We can't currently implement a strict `form-action 'self'` content security policy because some file downloads rely on a `<form />` which sometimes POSTs to the CDN domain.
Broadly, stop generating these forms. We just redirect instead, and show an interstitial confirm dialog if no CDN domain is configured. This makes the UX for installs with no CDN domain a little worse and the UX for everyone else better.
Then, implement the stricter Content-Security-Policy.
This also removes extra confirm dialogs for downloading Harbormaster build logs and data exports.
Test Plan:
- Went through the plain data export, data export with bulk jobs, ssh key generation, calendar ICS download, Diffusion data, Paste data, Harbormaster log data, and normal file data download workflows with a CDN domain.
- Went through all those workflows again without a CDN domain.
- Grepped for affected symbols (`getCDNURI()`, `getDownloadURI()`).
- Added an evil form to a page, tried to submit it, was rejected.
- Went through the ReCaptcha and Stripe flows again to see if they're submitting any forms.
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Maniphest Tasks: T13094, T4340
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19156
Summary: See D19117. Instead of automatically figuring this out inside `phutil_tag()`, explicitly add rel="noreferrer" at the application level to all external links.
Test Plan:
- Grepped for `_blank`, `isValidRemoteURIForLink`, checked all callsites for user-controlled data.
- Created a link menu item, verified noreferrer in markup.
- Created a link custom field, verified no referrer in markup.
- Verified noreferrer for `{nav href=...}`.
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19118
Summary: Ref T13054. Fixes T12714. Applies read locks to all transactions instead of only a very select subset (chat messages in Conpherence).
Test Plan: See <T13054#235650> for discussion and testing.
Maniphest Tasks: T13054, T12714
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19059
Summary:
Depends on D19009. Ref T13053. For "Must Encrypt" mail, we must currently strip the "Thread-Topic" header because it sometimes contains sensitive information about the object.
I don't actually know if this header is useful or anyting uses it. My understanding is that it's an Outlook/Exchange thing, but we also implement "Thread-Index" which I think is what Outlook/Exchange actually look at. This header may have done something before we implemented "Thread-Index", or maybe never done anything. Or maybe older versions of Excel/Outlook did something with it and newer versions don't, or do less. So it's possible that an even better fix here would be to simply remove this, but I wasn't able to convince myself of that after Googling for 10 minutes and I don't think it's worth hours of installing Exchange/Outlook to figure out. Instead, I'm just trying to simplify our handling of this header for now, and maybe some day we'll learn more about Exchange/Outlook and can remove it.
In a number of cases we already use the object monogram or PHID as a "Thread-Topic" without users ever complaining, so I think that if this header is useful it probably isn't shown to users, or isn't shown very often (e.g., only in a specific "conversation" sub-view?). Just use the object PHID (which should be unique and stable) as a thread-topic, everywhere, automatically.
Then allow this header through for "Must Encrypt" mail.
Test Plan: Processed some local mail, saw object PHIDs for "Thread-Topic" headers.
Reviewers: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13053
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19012
Summary: Depends on D18928. Ref T13043. Add some automated test coverage for SSH revocation rules.
Test Plan: Ran tests, got a clean bill of health.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18929
Summary:
Ref T13043. In an earlier change I updated this langauge from "Deactivate" to "Revoke", but the behavior doesn't quite match.
This table has a unique key on `<isActive, keyBody>`, which enforces the rule that "a key can only be active for one unique user".
However, we set `isActive` to `null` when we revoke a key, and multiple rows are allowed to have the value `<null, "asdf">` (since a `null` column in a unique key basically means "don't enforce this unique key").
This is intentional, to support this workflow:
- You add key X to bot A.
- Whoops, wrong account.
- You revoke key X from bot A.
- You add key X to bot B.
This isn't necessarily a great workflow -- ideally, you'd throw key X away and go generate a new key after you realize you made a mistake -- but it's the sort of practical workflow that users are likely to expect and want to see work ("I don't want to generate a new key, it's already being used by 5 other services and cycling it is a ton of work and this is just a test install for my dog anyway."), and there's no technical reason we can't support it.
To prevent users from adding keys on the revocation list back to their account, just check explicitly.
(This is probably better in general anyway, because "cert-authority" support from PHI269 may mean that two keys are "equivalent" even if their text differs, and we may not be able to rely on a database test anyway.)
Test Plan:
- Added the key `ssh-rsa asdf` to my account.
- Revoked it.
- Tried to add it again.
- Before patch: worked.
- After patch: error, "this key has been revoked".
- Added it to a different account (the "I put it on the wrong bot" workflow).
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18928
Summary:
Depends on D18908. Ref T13043. Allow users to get information about what revokers do with a new `--list` flag.
You can use `--list --type <key>` to get information about a specfic revoker.
Test Plan: Ran `bin/auth revoke --list`, saw a list of revokers with useful information.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18910
Summary:
Depends on D18907. Ref T13043. Ref T12509. We have some weird old password digest behavior that isn't terribly concerning, but also isn't great.
Specifically, old passwords were digested in weird ways before being hashed. Notably, account passwords were digested with usernames, so your password stops working if your username is chagned. Not the end of the world, but silly.
Mark all existing hashes as "v1", and automatically upgrade then when they're used or changed. Some day, far in the future, we could stop supporting these legacy digests and delete the code and passwords and just issue upgrade advice ("Passwords which haven't been used in more than two years no longer work."). But at least get things on a path toward sane, modern behavior.
Test Plan: Ran migration. Spot-checked that everthing in the database got marked as "v1". Used an existing password to login successfully. Verified that it was upgraded to a `null` (modern) digest. Logged in with it again.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043, T12509
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18908
Summary:
Depends on D18906. Ref T13043. When SSH keys are edited, we normally include a warning that if you don't recognize the activity you might have problems in the mail body.
Currently, this warning is also shown for revocations with `bin/auth revoke --type ssh`. However, these revocations are safe (revocations are generally not dangerous anyway) and almost certainly legitimate and administrative, so don't warn users about them.
Test Plan:
- Created and revoked a key.
- Creation mail still had warning; revocation mail no longer did.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18907
Summary:
Depends on D18904. Ref T13043. If an attacker compromises a victim's session and bypasses their MFA, they can try to guess the user's current account password by making repeated requests to change it: if they guess the right "Old Password", they get a different error than if they don't.
I don't think this is really a very serious concern (the attacker already got a session and MFA, if configured, somehow; many installs don't use passwords anyway) but we get occasional reports about it from HackerOne. Technically, it's better policy to rate limit it, and this should reduce the reports we receive.
Test Plan: Tried to change password over and over again, eventually got rated limited. Used `bin/auth unlimit` to clear the limit, changed password normally without issues.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18906
Summary:
Ref T13043. This moves user account passwords to the new shared infrastructure.
There's a lot of code changes here, but essentially all of it is the same as the VCS password logic in D18898.
Test Plan:
- Ran migration.
- Spot checked table for general sanity.
- Logged in with an existing password.
- Hit all error conditions on "change password", "set password", "register new account" flows.
- Verified that changing password logs out other sessions.
- Verified that revoked passwords of a different type can't be selected.
- Changed passwords a bunch.
- Verified that salt regenerates properly after password change.
- Tried to login with the wrong password, which didn't work.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18903
Summary:
Ref T13043. We have ~4 copies of this logic (registration, lost password recovery, set password, set VCS password).
Currently it varies a bit from case to case, but since it's all going to be basically identical once account passwords swap to the new infrastructure, bring it into the Engine so it can live in one place.
This also fixes VCS passwords not being affected by `account.minimum-password-length`.
Test Plan: Hit all errors in "VCS Password" panel. Successfully changed password.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18902
Summary:
Ref T13043. This cleans some things up to prepare for moving account passwords to shared infrastructure.
Currently, the (very old, fairly unusual) `bin/accountadmin` tool can set account passwords. This is a bit weird, generally not great, and makes upgrading to shared infrastructure more difficult. Just get rid of this to simplify things. Many installs don't have passwords and this is pointless and unhelpful in those cases.
Instead, let `bin/auth recover` recover any account, not just administrator accounts. This was a guardrail against administrative abuse, but it has always seemed especially flimsy (since anyone who can run the tool can easily comment out the checks) and I use this tool in cluster support with some frequency, occasionally just commenting out the checks. This is generally a better solution than actually setting a password on accounts anyway. Just get rid of the check and give users enough rope to shoot themselves in the foot with if they truly desire.
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/accountadmin`, didn't get prompted to swap passwords anymore.
- Ran `bin/auth recover` to recover a non-admin account.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18901
Summary:
Ref T13043. In D18898 I moved VCS passwords to the new shared infrastructure.
Before account passwords can move, we need to make two changes:
- For legacy reasons, VCS passwords and Account passwords have different "digest" algorithms. Both are more complicated than they should be, but we can't easily fix it without breaking existing passwords. Add a `PasswordHashInterface` so that objects which can have passwords hashes can implement custom digest logic for each password type.
- Account passwords have a dedicated external salt (`PhabricatorUser->passwordSalt`). This is a generally reasonable thing to support (since not all hashers are self-salting) and we need to keep it around so existing passwords still work. Add salt support to `AuthPassword` and make it generate/regenerate when passwords are updated.
Then add a nice story about password digestion.
Test Plan: Ran migrations. Used an existing VCS password; changed VCS password. Tried to use a revoked password. Unit tests still pass. Grepped for callers to legacy `PhabricatorHash::digestPassword()`, found none.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18900
Summary:
Ref T13043. When we verify a password and a better hasher is available, we automatically upgrade the stored hash to the stronger hasher.
Add test coverage for this workflow and fix a few bugs and issues, mostly related to shuffling the old hasher name into the transaction.
This doesn't touch anything user-visible yet.
Test Plan: Ran unit tests.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18897
Summary:
Ref T13043. This provides a new piece of shared infrastructure that VCS passwords and account passwords can use to validate passwords that users enter.
This isn't reachable by anything yet.
The test coverage of the "upgrade" flow (where we rehash a password to use a stronger hasher) isn't great in this diff, I'll expand that in the next change and then start migrating things.
Test Plan: Added a bunch of unit tests.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18896
Summary: Ref T13043. I'd like to replace the manual credential revocation in the Phacility export workflow with shared code in `bin/auth revoke`, but we need it to run non-interactively. Add a `--force` flag purely to make our lives easier.
Test Plan: Ran `bin/auth revoke --everywhere ...` with and without `--force`. Got prompted without, got total annihilation with.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18895
Summary:
Ref T13043. Currently:
- Passwords are stored separately in the "VCS Passwords" and "User" tables and don't share as much code as they could.
- Because User objects are all over the place in the code, password hashes are all over the place too (i.e., often somewhere in process memory). This is a very low-severity, theoretical sort of issue, but it could make leaving a stray `var_dump()` in the code somewhere a lot more dangerous than it otherwise is. Even if we never do this, third-party developers might. So it "feels nice" to imagine separating this data into a different table that we rarely load.
- Passwords can not be //revoked//. They can be //deleted//, but users can set the same password again. If you believe or suspect that a password may have been compromised, you might reasonably prefer to revoke it and force the user to select a //different// password.
This change prepares to remedy these issues by adding a new, more modern dedicated password storage table which supports storing multiple password types (account vs VCS), gives passwords real PHIDs and transactions, supports DestructionEngine, supports revocation, and supports `bin/auth revoke`.
It doesn't actually make anything use this new table yet. Future changes will migrate VCS passwords and account passwords to this table.
(This also gives third party applications a reasonable place to store password hashes in a consistent way if they have some need for it.)
Test Plan: Added some basic unit tests to cover general behavior. This is just skeleton code for now and will get more thorough testing when applications move.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18894
Summary: Ref T13043. Adds CLI support for revoking SSH keys. Also retargets UI language from "Deactivate" to "Revoke" to make it more clear that this is a one-way operation. This operation is already correctly implemented as a "Revoke" operation.
Test Plan: Used `bin/auth revoke --type ssh` to revoke keys, verified they became revoked (with proper transactions) in the UI. Revoked keys from the web UI flow.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18893
Summary: Ref T13043. Allows CLI revocation of login sessions.
Test Plan: Used `bin/auth revoke --type session` with `--from` and `--everywhere` to revoke sessions. Saw accounts get logged out in web UI.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13043
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18892
Summary:
See PHI223. Ref T13024. There's a remaining registration/login order issue after the other changes in T13024: we lose track of the current URI when we go through the MFA flow, so we can lose "Set Password" at the end of the flow.
Specifically, the flow goes like this today:
- User clicks the welcome link in email.
- They get redirected to the "set password" settings panel.
- This gets pre-empted by Legalpad (although we'll potentially survive this with the URI intact).
- This also gets pre-empted by the "Set MFA" workflow. If the user completes this flow, they get redirected to a `/auth/multifactor/?id=123` sort of URI to highlight the factor they added. This causes us to lose the `/settings/panel/password/blah/blah?key=xyz` URI.
The ordering on this is also not ideal; it's preferable to start with a password, then do the other steps, so the user can return to the flow more easily if they are interrupted.
Resolve this by separating the "change your password" and "set/reset your password" flows onto two different pages. This copy/pastes a bit of code, but both flows end up simpler so it feels reasonable to me overall.
We don't require a full session for "set/reset password" (so you can do it if you don't have MFA/legalpad yet) and do it first.
This works better and is broadly simpler for users.
Test Plan:
- Required MFA + legalpad, invited a user via email, registered.
- Before: password set flow got lost when setting MFA.
- After: prompted to set password, then sign documents, then set up MFA.
- Reset password (with MFA confgiured, was required to MFA first).
- Tried to reset password without a valid reset key, wasn't successful.
- Changed password using existing flow.
- Hit various (all?) error cases (short password, common password, mismatch, missing password, etc).
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13024
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18840
Summary:
See <https://discourse.phabricator-community.org/t/activation-link-in-welcome-mail-only-works-if-new-user-isnt-semi-logged-in/740/7>.
In T13024, I rewrote the main menu bar to hide potentially sensitive items (like notification and message counts and saved search filters) until users fully log in.
However, the "Log In" item got caught in this too. For clarity, rename `shouldAllowPartialSessions()` to `shouldRequireFullSession()` (since logged-out users don't have any session at all, so it would be a bit misleading to say that "Log In" "allows" a partial session). Then let "Log In" work again for logged-out users.
(In most cases, users are prompted to log in when they take an action which requires them to be logged in -- like creating or editing an object, or adding comments -- so this item doesn't really need to exist. However, it aligns better with user expectations in many cases to have it present, and some reasonable operations like "Check if I have notifications/messages" don't have an obvious thing to click otherwise.)
Test Plan: Viewed site in an incognito window, saw "Log In" button again. Browsed normally, saw normal menu.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18818
Summary: Depends on D18791. Ref T13024. This clears up another initialization order issue, where an unverified address could prevent MFA enrollment.
Test Plan: Configured both verification required and MFA required, clicked "Add Factor", got a dialog for the workflow.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13024
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18792
Summary:
Depends on D18790. Ref T13024. Fixes T8335. Currently, "unapproved" and "disabled" users are bundled together. This prevents users from completing some registration steps (verification, legalpad documents, MFA enrollment) before approval.
Separate approval out and move it to the end so users can do all the required enrollment stuff on their end before we roadblock them.
Test Plan: Required approval, email verification, signatures, and MFA. Registered an account. Verified email, signed documents, enrolled in MFA, and then got prompted to wait for approval.
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Maniphest Tasks: T13024, T8335
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18791
Summary: Noticed a couple of typos in the docs, and then things got out of hand.
Test Plan:
- Stared at the words until my eyes watered and the letters began to swim on the screen.
- Consulted a dictionary.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, yelirekim, PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18693
Summary:
See PHI78. The user was getting this message and (reasonably) interpreted it to mean "reset mail can never be sent to unverified addresses".
Reword it to be more clear, albeit an entire paragraph long. I don't really have a good solution in these cases where we'd need a whole page to explain what's happening (this, plus "we can't tell you which address you should use because an attacker could get information if we did" and "this rule defuses the risk that an opportunistic attacker may try to compromise your account after you add an email you don't own by mistake"). We could write it up separately and link to it, but I feel like that stuff tends to get out of date.
Just land somewhere in the middle.
Test Plan: {F5189105}
Reviewers: amckinley
Reviewed By: amckinley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18630
Summary: Ref T12964. This feels like a cheat, but works well. Just redirect the user back to the form they came from instead of to the key page.
Test Plan: Add a key to a user profile, add a key to an Alamanac device. Grep for PhabricatorAuthSSHKeyTableView and check all locations.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T12964
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18445
Summary: Cursory research indicates that "login" is a noun, referring to a form, and "log in" is a verb, referring to the action of logging in. I went though every instances of 'login' I could find and tried to clarify all this language. Also, we have "Phabricator" on the registration for like 4-5 times, which is a bit verbose, so I tried to simplify that language as well.
Test Plan: Tested logging in and logging out. Pages feel simpler.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18322
Summary:
Ref M1476. Currently, `setColor('simple')` is meaningful. Instead, `setButtonType('simple')`.
Depends on D18047.
Test Plan: Looked at UI examples, Phame, Auth. Notifications mooted by D18047.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D18048
Summary:
Fixes T12554. The SSH key cache contains usernames, but is not currently dirtied on username changes.
An alternative solution would be to use user PHIDs instead of usernames in the file, which would make this unnecessary, but that would make debugging a bit harder. For now, I think this small added complexity is worth the easier debugging, but we could look at this again if cache management gets harder in the future.
Test Plan:
- Added a key as `ducksey`, ran `bin/ssh-auth`, saw key immediately.
- Renamed `ducksey` to `ducker`, ran `bin/ssh-auth`, saw username change immediately.
- Added another key as `ducker`, ran `bin/ssh-auth`, saw key immediately.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T12554
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17687
Summary: Ref T12509. This encourages code to move away from HMAC+SHA1 by making the method name more obviously undesirable.
Test Plan: `grep`, browsed around.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T12509
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17632
Summary:
Ref T12509. This adds support for HMAC+SHA256 (instead of HMAC+SHA1). Although HMAC+SHA1 is not currently broken in any sense, SHA1 has a well-known collision and it's good to look at moving away from HMAC+SHA1.
The new mechanism also automatically generates and stores HMAC keys.
Currently, HMAC keys largely use a per-install constant defined in `security.hmac-key`. In theory this can be changed, but in practice essentially no install changes it.
We generally (in fact, always, I think?) don't use HMAC digests in a way where it matters that this key is well-known, but it's slightly better if this key is unique per class of use cases. Principally, if use cases have unique HMAC keys they are generally less vulnerable to precomputation attacks where an attacker might generate a large number of HMAC hashes of well-known values and use them in a nefarious way. The actual threat here is probably close to nonexistent, but we can harden against it without much extra effort.
Beyond that, this isn't something users should really have to think about or bother configuring.
Test Plan:
- Added unit tests.
- Used `bin/files integrity` to verify, strip, and recompute hashes.
- Tampered with a generated HMAC key, verified it invalidated hashes.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T12509
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17630
Summary:
Ref T12464. This is a very old method which can return an existing file instead of creating a new one, if there's some existing file with the same content.
In the best case this is a bad idea. This being somewhat reasonable predates policies, temporary files, etc. Modern methods like `newFromFileData()` do this right: they share underlying data in storage, but not the actual `File` records.
Specifically, this is the case where we get into trouble:
- I upload a private file with content "X".
- You somehow generate a file with the same content by, say, viewing a raw diff in Differential.
- If the diff had the same content, you get my file, but you don't have permission to see it or whatever so everything breaks and is terrible.
Just get rid of this.
Test Plan:
- Generated an SSH key.
- Viewed a raw diff in Differential.
- (Did not test Phragment.)
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: hach-que
Maniphest Tasks: T12464
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17617
Summary:
Ref T11357. When creating a file, callers can currently specify a `ttl`. However, it isn't unambiguous what you're supposed to pass, and some callers get it wrong.
For example, to mean "this file expires in 60 minutes", you might pass either of these:
- `time() + phutil_units('60 minutes in seconds')`
- `phutil_units('60 minutes in seconds')`
The former means "60 minutes from now". The latter means "1 AM, January 1, 1970". In practice, because the GC normally runs only once every four hours (at least, until recently), and all the bad TTLs are cases where files are normally accessed immediately, these 1970 TTLs didn't cause any real problems.
Split `ttl` into `ttl.relative` and `ttl.absolute`, and make sure the values are sane. Then correct all callers, and simplify out the `time()` calls where possible to make switching to `PhabricatorTime` easier.
Test Plan:
- Generated an SSH keypair.
- Viewed a changeset.
- Viewed a raw diff.
- Viewed a commit's file data.
- Viewed a temporary file's details, saw expiration date and relative time.
- Ran unit tests.
- (Didn't really test Phragment.)
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: hach-que
Maniphest Tasks: T11357
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17616
Summary:
Ref T12313. This puts a UI on revoking credentials after a widespread compromise like Cloudbleed or a local one like copy/pasting a token into public chat.
For now, I'm only providing a revoker for conduit tokens since that's the immediate use case.
Test Plan:
- Revoked in user + type, everything + user, everywhere + type, and everything + everywhere modes.
- Verified that conduit tokens were destroyed in all cases.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T12313
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17458
Summary: Ref T10390. Simplifies dropdown by rolling out canUseInPanel in useless panels
Test Plan: Add a query panel, see less options.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T10390
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17341
Test Plan: attempted to create a new auth provider; observed that "enabled" ui element does not render. viewed existing auth provider and observed that "enabled" ui element still renders
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T12245
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17337
Summary:
Ref T12140. The major effect of this change is that uninstalling "Home" (as we do on admin.phacility.com) no longer uninstalls the user menu (which is required to access settings or log out).
This also simplifies the code a bit, by consolidating how menus are built into MenuBarExtensions instead of some in Applications and some in Extensions.
Test Plan:
- While logged in and logged out, saw main menus in the correct order.
- Uninstalled Favorites, saw the menu vanish.
- Uninstalled Home, still had a user menu.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T12140
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17239
Summary:
Still lots to fix here, punting up since I'm running into a few roadblocks.
TODO:
[] Sort Personal/Global correctly
[] Quicksand in Help Items correctly on page changes
Test Plan: Verify new menus work on desktop, tablet, mobile. Test logged in menus, logged out menus. Logging out via a menu, verify each link works as expected. Help menus get build when using an app like Maniphest, Differential. Check that search works, preferences still save.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T12107
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17209
Summary: Fixes T11982. If an install is not public, the registering user may not be able to see the inviting user.
Test Plan: {F2097656}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T11982
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17015
Summary:
Persona is going to be decommed November 30th, 2016.
It is highly unlikely that anyone is currently using persona as a real
login method at this point.
Test Plan: tried locally to add auth adapter.
Reviewers: chad, #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16371
Summary: This supports doing a bunch of sales funnel tracking on Phacility.
Test Plan: See next diff.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16890
Summary:
Ref T9304. This adds a "GuidanceEngine" which can generate "Guidance".
In practice, this lets third-party code (rSERVICES) remove and replace instructions in the UI, which is basically only usefulf or us to tell users to go read the documentation in the Phacility cluster.
The next diff tailors the help on the "Auth Providers" and "Create New User" pages to say "PHACILITY PHACILITY PHACILITY PHACILITY".
Test Plan: Browed to "Auth Providers" and "Create New User" on instanced and non-instanced installs, saw appropriate guidance.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9304
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16861
Summary:
This has been replaced by `PolicyCodex` after D16830. Also:
- Rebuild Celerity map to fix grumpy unit test.
- Fix one issue on the policy exception workflow to accommodate the new code.
Test Plan:
- `arc unit --everything`
- Viewed policy explanations.
- Viewed policy errors.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: hach-que, PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16831
Summary:
Ref T11469. This isn't directly related, but has been on my radar for a while: building SSH keyfiles (particular for installs with a lot of keys, like ours) can be fairly slow.
At least one cluster instance is making multiple clone requests per second. While that should probably be rate limited separately, caching this should mitigate the impact of these requests.
This is pretty straightforward to cache since it's exactly the same every time, and only changes when users modify SSH keys (which is rare).
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/auth-ssh`, saw authfile generate.
- Ran it again, saw it read from cache.
- Changed an SSH key.
- Ran it again, saw it regenerate.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T11469
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16744
Summary:
Fixes T11586. First pass at a class for displaying invisible characters. Still need to:
- Write a couple unit tests
- Add some styling to the .invisible-special spans
- Actually start using the class when displaying form errors to users
Currently this makes the string `"\nab\x00c\x01d\te\nf"` look like:
{F1812711}
Test Plan:
Unit tests all pass and run in <1ms:
{F1812998}
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers, chad
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley, yelirekim
Maniphest Tasks: T11586
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16541
Summary: For phabricator. Adds a Slack auth adapater and icon.
Test Plan:
Create a new Slack Application for login, generate id and secret. Activate login and registration for Slack. Create a new account with Slack credentials. Log out. Log in with Slack credentials. Set my avatar with Slack. Slack. Slack.
{F1802649}
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16496
Summary: Ref T11132, significantly cleans up the Config app, new layout, icons, spacing, etc. Some minor todos around re-designing "issues", mobile support, and maybe another pass at actual Group pages.
Test Plan: Visit and test every page in the config app, set new items, resolve setup issues, etc.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T11132
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16468
Summary: Switches over to new property UI boxes, splits core and apps into separate pages. Move Versions into "All Settings". I think there is some docs I likely need to update here as well.
Test Plan: Click on each item in the sidebar, see new headers.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16429
Summary: I don't think we use footicons, removing that CSS. States were added but only used in Auth, convert them to statusIcon instead.
Test Plan: Visit Auth, UIExamples, grep for `setState`
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16418
Summary:
Fixes T11480. This cleans up the error logs a little by quieting three common errors which are really malformed requests:
- The CSRF error happens when bots hit anything which does write checks.
- The "wrong cookie domain" errors happen when bots try to use the `security.alternate-file-domain` to browse stuff like `/auth/start/`.
- The "no phcid" errors happen when bots try to go through the login flow.
All of these are clearly communicated to human users, commonly encountered by bots, and not useful to log.
I collapsed the `CSRFException` type into a standard malformed request exception, since nothing catches it and I can't really come up with a reason why anything would ever care.
Test Plan:
Hit each error through some level of `curl -H ...` and/or fakery. Verified that they showed to users before/after, but no longer log.
Hit some other real errors, verified that they log.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T11480
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16402
Summary:
Finishes fixing T11365. rP28199bcb48 added the new numeric entry
control and used it for TOTP setup, but missed the case of entering
a factor when TOTP was already set up.
Test Plan:
Observe behaviour of TOTP setup and subsequent factor entry
in iOS browser, make sure they're consistent.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T11365
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16325
Summary:
Fixes T11365. I tested these variants:
- `<input type="number" />`
- `<input type="text" pattern="\d*" />`
Of these, this one (using `pattern`) appears to have the best behavior: it shows the correct keyboard on iOS mobile and does nothing on desktops.
Using `type="number"` causes unwanted sub-controls to appear in desktop Safari, and a numbers + symbols keyboard to appear on iOS (presumably so users can type "." and "-" and maybe ",").
Test Plan: Tested variants in desktop browsers and iOS simulator, see here and T11365 for discussion.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T11365
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16323
Summary: Fixes T11223. I missed a few of these; most of them kept working anyway because we have redirects in place, but make them a bit more modern/not-hard-coded.
Test Plan:
- Generated and revoked API tokens for myself.
- Generated and revoked API tokens for bots.
- Revoked temporary tokens for myself.
- Clicked the link to the API tokens panel from the Conduit console.
- Clicked all the cancel buttons in all the dialogs, too.
In all cases, everything now points at the correct URIs. Previously, some things pointed at the wrong URIs (mostly dealing with stuff for bots).
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T11223
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16185
Summary:
Ref T11179. This splits "Edit Blocking Tasks" into two options now that we have more room ("Edit Parent Tasks", "Edit Subtasks").
This also renames "Blocking" tasks to "Subtasks", and "Blocked" tasks to "Parent" tasks. My goals here are:
- Make the relationship direction more clear: it's more clear which way is up with "parent" and "subtask" at a glance than with "blocking" and "blocked" or "dependent" and "dependency".
- Align language with "Create Subtask".
- To some small degree, use more flexible/general-purpose language, although I haven't seen any real confusion here.
Fixes T6815. I think I narrowed this down to two issues:
- Just throwing a bare exeception (we now return a dialog explicitly).
- Not killing open transactions when the cyclec check fails (we now kill them).
Test Plan:
- Edited parent tasks.
- Edited subtasks.
- Tried to introduce graph cycles, got a nice error dialog.
{F1697087}
{F1697088}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T6815, T11179
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16166
Summary: Fixes T11156. These were never correct, but also never actually used until I made timelines load object handles unconditionally in D16111.
Test Plan: Viewed an auth provider with transactions, no more fatal.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T11156
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16128
Summary:
Via HackerOne. This page fatals if accessed directly while logged out.
The "shouldRequireLogin()" check is wrong; this is a logged-in page.
Test Plan:
Viewed the page while logged out, no more fatal.
Faked my way through the actual verification flow.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16077
Summary: Fixes T11107. The URI change here meant we were dropping the "key" parameter, which allows you to set a new password without knowing your old one.
Test Plan: Reset password, didn't need to provide old one anymore.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T11107
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16075
Summary:
Ref T11098. This primarily fixes Conduit calls to `*.edit` methods failing when trying to access user preferences.
(The actual access is a little weird, since it seems like we're building some UI stuff inside a policy query, but that's an issue for another time.)
To fix this, consolidate the "we're about to run some kind of request with this user" code and run it consistently for web, conduit, and SSH sessions.
Additionally, make sure we swap things to the user's translation.
Test Plan:
- Ran `maniphest.edit` via `arc call-conduit`, no more settings exception.
- Set translation to ALL CAPS, got all caps output from `ssh` and Conduit.
Reviewers: avivey, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T11098
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16066
Summary:
Ref T10785. Around the time we launched Phacility SAAS we implemented this weird autologin hack. It works fine, so clean it up, get rid of the `instanceof` stuff, and support it for any OAuth2 provider.
(We could conceivably support OAuth1 as well, but no one has expressed an interest in it and I don't think I have any OAuth1 providers configured correctly locally so it would take a little bit to set up and test.)
Test Plan:
- Configured OAuth2 adapters (Facebook) for auto-login.
- Saw no config option on other adapters (LDAP).
- Nuked all options but one, did autologin with Facebook and Phabricator.
- Logged out, got logout screen.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10785
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16060
Summary:
Ref T4103. Ref T10078. This moves profile image caches to new usercache infrastructure.
These dirty automatically based on configuration and User properties, so add some stuff to make that happen.
This reduces the number of queries issued on every page by 1.
Test Plan: Browsed around, changed profile image, viewed as self, viewed as another user, verified no more query to pull this information on every page
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T4103, T10078
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16040
Summary:
Ref T4103. Ref T10078. Currently, when a user misses a cache we just build it for them.
This is the behavior we want for the the viewer (so we don't have to build every cache up front if we don't actually need them), but not the right behavior for other users (since it allows performance problems to go undetected).
Make inline cache generation strict by default, then make sure all the things that rely on cache data request the correct data (well, all of the things identified by unit tests, at least: there might be some more stuff I haven't hit yet).
This fixes test failures in D16040, and backports a piece of that change.
Test Plan: Identified and then fixed failures with `arc unit --everything`.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T4103, T10078
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16042
Summary:
Ref T4103. Currently, we issue a `SELECT * FROM user_preferences ... WHERE userPHID = ...` on every page to load the viewer's settings.
There are several other questionable data accesses on every page too, most of which could benefit from improved caching strategies (see T4103#178122).
This query will soon get more expensive, since it may need to load several objects (e.g., the user's settings and their "role profile" settings). Although we could put that data on the User and do both in one query, it's nicer to put it on the Preferences object ("This inherits from profile X") which means we need to do several queries.
Rather than paying a greater price, we can cheat this stuff into the existing query where we load the user's session by providing a user cache table and doing some JOIN magic. This lets us issue one query and try to get cache hits on a bunch of caches cheaply (well, we'll be in trouble at the MySQL JOIN limit of 61 tables, but have some headroom).
For now, just get it working:
- Add the table.
- Try to get user settings "for free" when we load the session.
- If we miss, fill user settings into the cache on-demand.
- We only use this in one place (DarkConsole) for now. I'll use it more widely in the next diff.
Test Plan:
- Loaded page as logged-in user.
- Loaded page as logged-out user.
- Examined session query to see cache joins.
- Changed settings, saw database cache fill.
- Toggled DarkConsole on and off.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T4103
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16001
Summary: Ref T10917. This is getting added as a link right now, which causes it to get `<a href>`'d in HTML mail. Add it as text instead.
Test Plan: Edited a key, examined HTML mail body carefully.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15952
Summary:
Ref T10917. This cheats fairly heavily to generate SSH key mail:
- Generate normal transaction mail.
- Force it to go to the user.
- Use `setForceDelivery()` to force it to actually be delivered.
- Add some warning language to the mail body.
This doesn't move us much closer to Glorious Infrastructure for this whole class of events, but should do what it needs to for now and doesn't really require anything sketchy.
Test Plan: Created and edited SSH keys, got security notice mail.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15948
Summary:
Ref T10917. Converts web UI edits to transactions.
This is about 95% "the right way", and then I cheated on the last 5% instead of building a real EditEngine. We don't need it for anything else right now and some of the dialog workflows here are a little weird so I'm just planning to skip it for the moment unless it ends up being easier to do after the next phase (mail notifications) or something like that.
Test Plan: {F1652160}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15947
Summary:
Ref T10917. This primarily prepares these for transactions by giving us a place to:
- review old deactivated keys; and
- review changes to keys.
Future changes will add transactions and a timeline so key changes are recorded exhaustively and can be more easily audited.
Test Plan:
{F1652089}
{F1652090}
{F1652091}
{F1652092}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15946
Summary:
Ref T10917. Currently, when you delete an SSH key, we really truly delete it forever.
This isn't very consistent with other applications, but we built this stuff a long time ago before we were as rigorous about retaining data and making it auditable.
In partiular, destroying data isn't good for auditing after security issues, since it means we can't show you logs of any changes an attacker might have made to your keys.
To prepare to improve this, stop destoying data. This will allow later changes to become transaction-oriented and show normal transaction logs.
The tricky part here is that we have a `UNIQUE KEY` on the public key part of the key.
Instead, I changed this to `UNIQUE (key, isActive)`, where `isActive` is a nullable boolean column. This works because MySQL does not enforce "unique" if part of the key is `NULL`.
So you can't have two rows with `("A", 1)`, but you can have as many rows as you want with `("A", null)`. This lets us keep the "each key may only be active for one user/object" rule without requiring us to delete any data.
Test Plan:
- Ran schema changes.
- Viewed public keys.
- Tried to add a duplicate key, got rejected (already associated with another object).
- Deleted SSH key.
- Verified that the key was no longer actually deleted from the database, just marked inactive (in future changes, I'll update the UI to be more clear about this).
- Uploaded a new copy of the same public key, worked fine (no duplicate key rejection).
- Tried to upload yet another copy, got rejected.
- Generated a new keypair.
- Tried to upload a duplicate to an Almanac device, got rejected.
- Generated a new pair for a device.
- Trusted a device key.
- Untrusted a device key.
- "Deleted" a device key.
- Tried to trust a deleted device key, got "inactive" message.
- Ran `bin/ssh-auth`, got good output with unique keys.
- Ran `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub | ./bin/ssh-auth-key`, got good output with one key.
- Used `auth.querypublickeys` Conduit method to query keys, got good active keys.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10917
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15943
Summary: This error message is pointless and dead-ends logged-in users needlessly if they're sent to the register page by documentation or Advanced Enterprise Sales Funnels.
Test Plan: Visited `/auth/register/` while logged in, was sent home.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15739
Summary: Ref T7673. This is really just so I can force admin.phacility.com logout when you log out of an instance, but there are a few other things we could move here eventually, like the WILLREGISTERUSER event.
Test Plan: Logged out of an instance, got logged out of parent (see next change).
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T7673
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15629
Summary:
Ref T7303. Ref T7673. This implements an "auth.logout" which:
- terminates all web sessions;
- terminates the current OAuth token if called via OAuth; and
- may always be called via OAuth.
(Since it consumes an OAuth token, even a "malicious" OAuth application can't really be that much of a jerk with this: it can't continuously log you out, since calling the method once kills the token. The application would need to ask your permission again to get a fresh token.)
The primary goal here is to let Phacility instances call this against the Phacility upstream, so that when you log out of an instance it also logs you out of your Phacility account (possibly with a checkbox or something).
This also smooths over the session token code. Before this change, your sessions would get logged out but when you reloaded we'd tell you your session was invalid.
Instead, try to clear the invalid session before telling the user there's an issue. I think that ssentially 100% of invalid sessions are a result of something in this vein (e.g., forced logout via Settings) nowadays, since the session code is generally stable and sane and has been for a long time.
Test Plan:
- Called `auth.logout` via console, got a reasonable logout experience.
- Called `auth.logout` via OAuth.
- Tried to make another call, verified OAuth token had been invalidated.
- Verified web session had been invalidated.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T7303, T7673
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15594
Summary: [WIP] Tossing this up for safety and to read through it. Need to test, update some of the other flows. This updates everything in Auth for new UI and modern conventions.
Test Plan: Loooots of random testing, new providers, edit providers, logging out, forgot password... more coming.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15550
Summary: Ref T10603. Swap these over and give them nice UI strings.
Test Plan:
- Refreshed a Twitter OAuth link.
- Unlinked and re-linked a Twitter account.
- Viewed the new type in {nav Config > Temporary Tokens}.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15480
Summary:
Ref T10603. We have a couple of sort of ad-hoc tokens, so start formalizing them. First up is MFA tokens.
Also adds a new config module panel for these.
Test Plan:
- Added MFA.
- Added MFA, intentionally fumbled the input, completed the workflow.
- Removed MFA.
- Viewed tokens, saw MFA sync tokens.
- Viewed new module config panel.
{F1177014}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15479
Summary:
Ref T10603. This makes minor updates to temporary tokens:
- Rename `objectPHID` (which is sometimes used to store some other kind of identifier instead of a PHID) to `tokenResource` (i.e., which resource does this token permit access to?).
- Add a `userPHID` column. For LFS tokens and some other types of tokens, I want to bind the token to both a resource (like a repository) and a user.
- Add a `properties` column. This makes tokens more flexible and supports custom behavior (like scoping LFS tokens even more tightly).
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/storage upgrade -f`, got a clean upgrade.
- Viewed one-time tokens.
- Revoked one token.
- Revoked all tokens.
- Performed a one-time login.
- Performed a password reset.
- Added an MFA token.
- Removed an MFA token.
- Used a file token to view a file.
- Verified file token was removed after viewing file.
- Linked my account to an OAuth1 account (Twitter).
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15478
Summary:
Ref T10603. This converts existing hard-codes to modular constants.
Also removes one small piece of code duplication.
Test Plan:
- Performed one-time logins.
- Performed a password reset.
- Verified temporary tokens were revoked properly.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15476
Summary:
Ref T10603. For LFS, we need to issue a new type of temporary token.
This makes the temporary token code modular so applications can add new token types without modifying the Auth application.
(I'm moving slowly here because it impacts authentication.)
Test Plan:
- Used `bin/auth recover` to get a one-time token from the CLI.
- Used "Forgot your password?" to get a one-time token from the web UI.
- Followed the web UI token to initiate a password reset, prompting generation of a password token.
- Viewed these tokens in the web UI:
{F1176908}
- Revoked a token.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15475
Summary: Mostly for consistency, we're not using other forms of icons and this makes all classes that use an icon call it in the same way.
Test Plan: tested uiexamples, lots of other random pages.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15125
Summary:
Ref T10077. Ref T8918. The way the main menu is built is not very modular and fairly hacky.
It assumes menus are provided by applications, but this isn't exactly true. Notably, the "Quick Create" menu is not per-application.
The current method of building this menu is very inefficient (see T10077). Particularly, we have to build it //twice// because we need to build it once to render the item and then again to render the dropdown options.
Start cleaning this up. This diff doesn't actually have any behavioral changes, since I can't swap the menu over until we get rid of all the other items and I haven't extended this to Notifications/Conpherence yet so it doesn't actually fix T8918.
Test Plan: Viewed menus while logged in, logged out, in different applications, in desktop/mobile. Nothing appeared different.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T8918, T10077
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14922
Summary: Ref T9967
Test Plan:
Ran migrations.
Verified database populated properly with PHIDs (SELECT * FROM auth_sshkey;).
Ran auth.querypublickeys conduit method to see phids show up
Ran bin/remove destroy <phid>.
Viewed the test key was gone.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T9967
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14823
Summary:
Ref T10004. Currently, when a logged-out user visits an application like Maniphest, we show them a disabled "Create Task" button with no dropdown menu.
This is technically correct in some sense because none of the items in the menu will work, but we can be more helpful and show the items, just in a disabled state:
{F1028903}
When the user clicks these, they'll be pushed through the login flow and (after D14804) end up on the same page they were on when they selected the item. From here, they can proceed normally.
I changed "...to continue." to "...to take this action." to hopefully be a little more clear. In particular, we do not //continue// the action after you log in: you end up back on the same page you started on. For example, if you clicked "Create New Bug" from the list view, you end up back on the list view and need to click "Create New Bug" again. If you clicked "Edit Task" from some task detail page, you end up on the task detail page and have to click "Edit Task" again.
I think this behavior is always very good. I think it is often the best possible behavior: for actions like "Edit Blocking Tasks" and "Merge Duplicates In", the alternatives I can see are:
- Send user back to task page (best?)
- Send user to standalone page with weird dialog on it and no context (underlying problem behavior all of this is tackling, clearly not good)
- Send user back to task page, but with dialog open (very complicated, seems kind of confusing/undesirable?)
For actions like "Create New Bug" or "Edit Task", we have slightly better options:
- Send user back to task page (very good?)
- Send user to edit/create page (slightly better?)
However, we have no way to tell if a Workflow "makes sense" to complete in a standalone way. That is, we can't automatically determine which workflows are like "Edit Task" and which workflows are like "Merge Duplicates In".
Even within an action, this distinction is not straightforward. For example, "Create Task" can standalone from the Maniphest list view, but should not from a Workboard. "Edit Task" can standalone from the task detail page, but should not from an "Edit" pencil action on a list or a workboard.
Since the simpler behavior is easy, very good in all cases, often the best behavior, and never (I think?) confusing or misleading, I don't plan to puruse the "bring you back to the page, with the dialog open" behavior at any point. I'm theoretically open to discussion here if you REALLY want the dialogs to pop open magically but I think it's probably a lot of work.
Test Plan: As a logged out user, clicked "Create Task". Got a dropdown showing the options available to me if I log in. Clicked one, logged in, ended up in a reasonable place (the task list page where I'd started).
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10004
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14806
Summary:
Ref T10004. After a user logs in, we send them to the "next" URI cookie if there is one, but currently don't always do a very good job of selecting a "next" URI, especially if they tried to do something with a dialog before being asked to log in.
In particular, if a logged-out user clicks an action like "Edit Blocking Tasks" on a Maniphest task, the default behavior is to send them to the standalone page for that dialog after they log in. This can be pretty confusing.
See T2691 and D6416 for earlier efforts here. At that time, we added a mechanism to //manually// override the default behavior, and fixed the most common links. This worked, but I'd like to fix the //default// beahvior so we don't need to remember to `setObjectURI()` correctly all over the place.
ApplicationEditor has also introduced new cases which are more difficult to get right. While we could get them right by using the override and being careful about things, this also motivates fixing the default behavior.
Finally, we have better tools for fixing the default behavior now than we did in 2013.
Instead of using manual overrides, have JS include an "X-Phabricator-Via" header in Ajax requests. This is basically like a referrer header, and will contain the page the user's browser is on.
In essentially every case, this should be a very good place (and often the best place) to send them after login. For all pages currently using `setObjectURI()`, it should produce the same behavior by default.
I'll remove the `setObjectURI()` mechanism in the next diff.
Test Plan: Clicked various workflow actions while logged out, saw "next" get set to a reasonable value, was redirected to a sensible, non-confusing page after login (the page with whatever button I clicked on it).
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10004
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14804
Summary:
Fixes T9997. This was in the database since v0, I just never hooked up the UI since it wasn't previously meaningful.
However, it now makes sense to have a provider like Asana with login disabled and use it only for integrations.
Test Plan: Disabled login on a provider, verified it was no longer available for login/registration but still linkable.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9997
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14794
Summary:
Fixes T9874.
- Stop using the phrase "restart your webserver". Instead, say "restart Phabricator".
- Write a document explaining that "Restart Phabricator" means to restart all of the server processes, depending on how your configuration is set up, and approximately how to do that.
- Link to this document.
- In places where we are not specifically giving instructions and the user isn't expected to do anything, be intentionally vague so as to avoid being misleading.
Test Plan:
- Read document.
- Hit "exetnsion" and "PHP config" setup checks, got "restart Phabricator" with documentation links in both cases.
Reviewers: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9874
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14636
Summary:
Current JIRA integration is quite noisy in terms of email, and makes users hunt and peck for the related revisions.
Teach it to create an Issue Link on the JIRA side, and allow to disable commenting.
Test Plan: comment on revision in each of the 4 settings, check JIRA end for expected result.
Reviewers: btrahan, eMxyzptlk, epriestley, #blessed_reviewers, avivey
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: avivey, vhbit, jra3, eMxyzptlk, frenchs, aik099, svemir, rmuslimov, cpa199, waynea, epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Projects: #doorkeeper
Maniphest Tasks: T5422
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9858
Summary: Ref T9690. I wanted to do an example of how to do these but it looks like most of them are trivial (no callsites) and the rest are a little tricky (weird interaction with frames, or in Releeph).
Test Plan:
- Used `grep` to look for callsites.
- Hit all applications locally, everything worked.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9690
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14385
Summary:
Fixes T9610.
- We currently permit you to `bin/auth recover` users who can not establish web sessions (but this will never work). Prevent this.
- We don't emit a tailored error if you follow one of these links. Tailor the error.
Even with the first fix, you can still hit the second case by doing something like:
- Recover a normal user.
- Make them a mailing list in the DB.
- Follow the recovery link.
The original issue here was an install that did a large migration and set all users to be mailing lists. Normal installs should never encounter this, but it's not wholly unreasonable to have daemons or mailing lists with the administrator flag.
Test Plan:
- Tried to follow a recovery link for a mailing list.
- Tried to generate a recovery link for a mailing list.
- Generated and followed a recovery link for a normal administrator.
{F906342}
```
epriestley@orbital ~/dev/phabricator $ ./bin/auth recover tortise-list
Usage Exception: This account ("tortise-list") can not establish web sessions, so it is not possible to generate a functional recovery link. Special accounts like daemons and mailing lists can not log in via the web UI.
```
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9610
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14325
Summary:
Fixes T6707. Users can currently do this:
- Log in to a service (like Facebook or Google) with account "A".
- Link their Phabricator account to that account.
- Log out of Facebook, log back in with account "B".
- Refresh the account link from {nav Settings > External Accounts}.
When they do this, we write a second account link (between their Phabricator account and account "B"). However, the rest of the codebase assumes accounts are singly-linked, so this breaks down elsewhere.
For now, decline to link the second account. We'll permit this some day, but need to do more work to allow it, and the need is very rare.
Test Plan:
- Followed the steps above, hit the new error.
- Logged back in to the proper account and did a link refresh (which worked).
{F905562}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T6707
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14319
Summary:
Fixes T9494. This:
- Removes all the random GC.x.y.z config.
- Puts it all in one place that's locked and which you use `bin/garbage set-policy ...` to adjust.
- Makes every TTL-based GC configurable.
- Simplifies the code in the actual GCs.
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/garbage collect` to collect some garbage, until it stopped collecting.
- Ran `bin/garbage set-policy ...` to shorten policy. Saw change in web UI. Ran `bin/garbage collect` again and saw it collect more garbage.
- Set policy to indefinite and saw it not collect garabge.
- Set policy to default and saw it reflected in web UI / `collect`.
- Ran `bin/phd debug trigger` and saw all GCs fire with reasonable looking queries.
- Read new docs.
{F857928}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9494
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14219
Summary:
I stumbled across this TODO and was worried that there was a glaring hole in MFA that I'd somehow forgotten about, but the TODO is just out of date.
These actions are rate limited properly by `PhabricatorAuthTryFactorAction`, which permits a maximum of 10 actions per hour.
- Remove the TODO.
- Add `bin/auth unlimit` to make it easier to reset rate limits if someone needs to do that for whatever reason.
Test Plan:
- Tried to brute force through MFA.
- Got rate limited properly after 10 failures.
- Reset rate limit with `bin/auth unlimit`.
- Saw the expected number of actions clear.
{F805288}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: joshuaspence
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14105
Summary:
Ref T9346. This mostly allows us to give users additional advice based on which instance they are trying to log in to in the Phacility cluster.
It's also slightly more flexible than `auth.login-message` was, and maybe we'll add some more hooks here eventually.
This feels like it's a sidegrade in complexity rather than really an improvement, but not too terrible.
Test Plan:
- Wrote the custom handler in T9346 to replicate old config functionality.
- Wrote a smart handler for Phacility that can provide context-sensitive messages based on which OAuth client you're trying to use.
See new message box at top (implementation in next diff):
{F780375}
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9346
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14057
Summary: See D14025. In all cases where we compare hashes, use strict, constant-time comparisons.
Test Plan: Logged in, logged out, added TOTP, ran Conduit, terminated sessions, submitted forms, changed password. Tweaked CSRF token, got rejected.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: chenxiruanhai
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14026
Summary: Fixes T9046. These got swapped around during refactoring.
Test Plan:
- Used `bin/auth recover` prior to patch (failed).
- Used `bin/auth recover` after patch (worked).
Reviewers: joshuaspence, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T9046
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D13778
Summary: Updates Auth app for handleRequest
Test Plan: Tested what I could, Log in, Log out, Change Password, New account, Verify account... but extra eyes very helpful here.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T8628
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D13748
