Summary:
Ref T5861. Currently, mail tags are hard-coded; move them into applications. Each Editor defines its own tags.
This has zero impact on the UI or behavior.
Test Plan:
- Checked/unchecked some options, saved form.
- Swapped back to `master` and saw exactly the same values.
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5861
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10238
Summary: Ref T5861. Adds an option to opt out of all notification email. We'll still send you password resets, email verifications, etc.
Test Plan:
{F189484}
- Added unit tests.
- With preference set to different things, tried to send myself mail. Mail respected preferences.
- Sent password reset email, which got through the preference.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: rush898, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5861
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10237
Summary:
Via HackerOne. If a user adds an email address and typos it, entering `alinculne@gmailo.com`, and it happens to be a valid address which an evil user controls, the evil user can request a password reset and compromise the account.
This strains the imagination, but we can implement a better behavior cheaply.
- If an account has any verified addresses, only send to verified addresses.
- If an account has no verified addresses (e.g., is a new account), send to any address.
We've also received several reports about reset links not being destroyed as aggressively as researchers expect. While there's no specific scenario where this does any harm, revoke all outstanding reset tokens when a reset link is used to improve the signal/noise ratio of the reporting channel.
Test Plan:
- Tried to send a reset link to an unverified address on an account with a verified address (got new error).
- Tried to send a reset link to a verified adddress on an account with a verified address (got email).
- Tried to send a reset link to an invalid address (got old error).
- Tried to send a reset link to an unverified address on an account with only unverified addresses -- a new user (got email).
- Requested several reset links, used one, verified all the others were revoked.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10206
Summary:
CanCDN flag indicates that a file can be served + cached
via anonymous content distribution networks.
Once D10054 lands, any files that lack the CanCDN flag
will require a one-time-use token and headers will
prohibit cache to protect sensitive files from
unauthorized access.
This diff separates the CanCDN changes from the code that
enforces these restrictions in D10054 so that the changes
can be tested and refined independently.
Test Plan: Work in progress
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: rush898, qgil, epriestley, aklapper, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T5685
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10166
Summary: Fixes T5510. This purely reduces false positives from HackerOne: we currently rotate CSRF tokens, but do not bind them explicitly to specific sessions. Doing so has no real security benefit and may make some session rotation changes more difficult down the line, but researchers routinely report it. Just conform to expectations since the expected behavior isn't bad and this is less work for us than dealing with false positives.
Test Plan:
- With two browsers logged in under the same user, verified I was issued different CSRF tokens.
- Verified the token from one browser did not work in the other browser's session.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5510
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10136
Summary:
Fixes T5509. Currently, existing sessions live on even if you change your password.
Over the course of the program, we've recieved a lot of HackerOne reports that sessions do not terminate when users change their passwords. I hold that this isn't a security vulnerability: users can explicitly manage sessions, and this is more general and more powerful than tying session termination to password resets. In particular, many installs do not use a password provider at all (and no researcher has reported this in a general, application-aware way that discusses multiple authentication providers).
That said, dealing with these false positives is vaguely time consuming, and the "expected" behavior isn't bad for users, so just align behavior with researcher expectations: when passwords are changed, providers are removed, or multi-factor authentication is added to an account, terminate all other active login sessions.
Test Plan:
- Using two browsers, established multiple login sessions.
- In one browser, changed account password. Saw session terminate and logout in the second browser.
- In one browser, removed an authentication provider. Saw session terminate and logout in the second browser.
- In one browser, added MFA. Saw session terminate and logout in the second browser.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5509
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10135
Summary:
Fixes T5506. Depends on D10133. When users remove an email address or change their primary email address, invalidate any outstanding password reset links.
This is a very small security risk, but the current behavior is somewhat surprising, and an attacker could sit on a reset link for up to 24 hours and then use it to re-compromise an account.
Test Plan:
- Changed primary address and removed addreses.
- Verified these actions invalidated outstanding one-time login temporary tokens.
- Tried to use revoked reset links.
- Revoked normally from new UI panel.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5506
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10134
Summary:
Ref T5506. This makes it easier to understand and manage temporary tokens.
Eventually this could be more user-friendly, since it's relatively difficult to understand what this screen means. My short-term goal is just to make the next change easier to implement and test.
The next diff will close a small security weakness: if you change your email address, password reset links which were sent to the old address are still valid. Although an attacker would need substantial access to exploit this (essentially, it would just make it easier for them to re-compromise an already compromised account), it's a bit surprising. In the next diff, email address changes will invalidate outstanding password reset links.
Test Plan:
- Viewed outstanding tokens.
- Added tokens to the list by making "Forgot your password?" requests.
- Revoked tokens individually.
- Revoked all tokens.
- Tried to use a revoked token.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5506
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10133
Summary: Ref T4896. Instead of using custom stuff, use standard stuff.
Test Plan: Viewed a bunch of feed stories and published some over the Asana bridge.
Reviewers: joshuaspence, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4896
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10114
Summary: Ref T5655. Rename `PhabricatorPHIDType` subclasses for clarity (see discussion in D9839). I'm not too keen on some of the resulting class names, so feel free to suggest alternatives.
Test Plan: Ran unit tests.
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Maniphest Tasks: T5655
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9986
Summary: Provide an implementation for the `getName` method rather than automagically determining the application name.
Test Plan: Saw reasonable application names in the launcher.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10027
Summary: Ref T5655. Some discussion in D9839. Generally speaking, `Phabricator{$name}Application` is clearer than `PhabricatorApplication{$name}`.
Test Plan:
# Pinned and uninstalled some applications.
# Applied patch and performed migrations.
# Verified that the pinned applications were still pinned and that the uninstalled applications were still uninstalled.
# Performed a sanity check on the database contents.
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: hach-que, epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T5655
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9982
Summary: Instead of implementing the `getTypeConstant` method in all subclasses of `PhabricatorPHIDType`, provide a `final` implementation in the base class which uses reflection. See D9837 for a similar implementation.
Test Plan: Ran `arc unit`.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9985
Summary: Currently, the external accounts page can die in a fire if an OAuth2 link is bad. Instead of exploding, just fail the specific link.
Test Plan: Faked an error and got "invalid token" instead of an exception.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9937
Summary:
Fixes T3732. Ref T1205. Ref T3116.
External accounts (like emails used as identities, Facebook accounts, LDAP accounts, etc.) are stored in "ExternalAccount" objects.
Currently, we have a very restrictive `CAN_VIEW` policy for ExternalAccounts, to add an extra layer of protection to make sure users can't use them in unintended ways. For example, it would be bad if a user could link their Phabricator account to a Facebook account without proper authentication. All of the controllers which do sensitive things have checks anyway, but a restrictive CAN_VIEW provided an extra layer of protection. Se T3116 for some discussion.
However, this means that when grey/external users take actions (via email, or via applications like Legalpad) other users can't load the account handles and can't see anything about the actor (they just see "Restricted External Account" or similar).
Balancing these concerns is mostly about not making a huge mess while doing it. This seems like a reasonable approach:
- Add `CAN_EDIT` on these objects.
- Make that very restricted, but open up `CAN_VIEW`.
- Require `CAN_EDIT` any time we're going to do something authentication/identity related.
This is slightly easier to get wrong (forget CAN_EDIT) than other approaches, but pretty simple, and we always have extra checks in place anyway -- this is just a safety net.
I'm not quite sure how we should identify external accounts, so for now we're just rendering "Email User" or similar -- clearly not a bug, but not identifying. We can figure out what to render in the long term elsewhere.
Test Plan:
- Viewed external accounts.
- Linked an external account.
- Refreshed an external account.
- Edited profile picture.
- Viewed sessions panel.
- Published a bunch of stuff to Asana/JIRA.
- Legalpad signature page now shows external accounts.
{F171595}
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3732, T1205, T3116
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9767
Summary:
Ref T5096. Ref T4251. See D9202 for discussion.
- Twitter seems to accept either one (?!?!?!??).
- JIRA uses RSA-SHA1, which does not depend on the token secret.
- This change makes Bitbucket work.
Test Plan:
- OAuthed with Twitter.
- OAuthed with JIRA.
- OAuthed with some Bitbucket code I had partially laying around in a partial state, which works after this change.
Reviewers: csteipp, btrahan, 20after4
Reviewed By: 20after4
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4251, T5096
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9760
Summary: Applied some more linter fixes that I previously missed because my global `arc` install was out-of-date.
Test Plan: Will run `arc unit` on another host.
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9443
Summary: Ran `arc lint --apply-patches --everything` over rP, mainly to change double quotes to single quotes where appropriate. These changes also validate that the `ArcanistXHPASTLinter::LINT_DOUBLE_QUOTE` rule is working as expected.
Test Plan: Eyeballed it.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9431
Summary: Ref T5089. Adds a `security.require-multi-factor-auth` which forces all users to enroll in MFA before they can use their accounts.
Test Plan:
Config:
{F159750}
Roadblock:
{F159748}
After configuration:
{F159749}
- Required MFA, got roadblocked, added MFA, got unblocked.
- Removed MFA, got blocked again.
- Used `bin/auth strip` to strip MFA, got blocked.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5089
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9285
Summary: Both email verify and welcome links now verify email, centralize them and record them in the user activity log.
Test Plan:
- Followed a "verify email" link and got verified.
- Followed a "welcome" (verifying) link.
- Followed a "reset" (non-verifying) link.
- Looked in the activity log for the verifications.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9284
Summary:
This does some backend cleanup of the tile stuff, and some general cleanup of other application things:
- Users who haven't customized preferences get a small, specific set of pinned applications: Differential, Maniphest, Diffusion, Audit, Phriction, Projects (and, for administrators, Auth, Config and People).
- Old tile size methods are replaced with `isPinnnedByDefault()`.
- Shortened some short descriptions.
- `shouldAppearInLaunchView()` replaced by less ambiguous `isLaunchable()`.
- Added a marker for third-party / extension applications.
Test Plan: Faked away my preferences and viewed the home page, saw a smaller set of default pins.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9358
Summary:
This probably needs some tweaks, but the idea is to make it easier to browse and access applications without necessarily needing them to be on the homepage.
Open to feedback.
Test Plan:
(This screenshot merges "Organization", "Communication" and "Core" into a single "Core" group. We can't actually do this yet because it wrecks the homepage.)
{F160052}
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5176
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9297
Summary:
Ref T4398. This code hadn't been touched in a while and had a few crufty bits.
**One Time Resets**: Currently, password reset (and similar links) are valid for about 48 hours, but we always use one token to generate them (it's bound to the account). This isn't horrible, but it could be better, and it produces a lot of false positives on HackerOne.
Instead, use TemporaryTokens to make each link one-time only and good for no more than 24 hours.
**Coupling of Email Verification and One-Time Login**: Currently, one-time login links ("password reset links") are tightly bound to an email address, and using a link verifies that email address.
This is convenient for "Welcome" emails, so the user doesn't need to go through two rounds of checking email in order to login, then very their email, then actually get access to Phabricator.
However, for other types of these links (like those generated by `bin/auth recover`) there's no need to do any email verification.
Instead, make the email verification part optional, and use it on welcome links but not other types of links.
**Message Customization**: These links can come out of several workflows: welcome, password reset, username change, or `bin/auth recover`. Add a hint to the URI so the text on the page can be customized a bit to help users through the workflow.
**Reset Emails Going to Main Account Email**: Previously, we would send password reset email to the user's primary account email. However, since we verify email coming from reset links this isn't correct and could allow a user to verify an email without actually controlling it.
Since the user needs a real account in the first place this does not seem useful on its own, but might be a component in some other attack. The user might also no longer have access to their primary account, in which case this wouldn't be wrong, but would not be very useful.
Mitigate this in two ways:
- First, send to the actual email address the user entered, not the primary account email address.
- Second, don't let these links verify emails: they're just login links. This primarily makes it more difficult for an attacker to add someone else's email to their account, send them a reset link, get them to login and implicitly verify the email by not reading very carefully, and then figure out something interesting to do (there's currently no followup attack here, but allowing this does seem undesirable).
**Password Reset Without Old Password**: After a user logs in via email, we send them to the password settings panel (if passwords are enabled) with a code that lets them set a new password without knowing the old one.
Previously, this code was static and based on the email address. Instead, issue a one-time code.
**Jump Into Hisec**: Normally, when a user who has multi-factor auth on their account logs in, we prompt them for factors but don't put them in high security. You usually don't want to go do high-security stuff immediately after login, and it would be confusing and annoying if normal logins gave you a "YOU ARE IN HIGH SECURITY" alert bubble.
However, if we're taking you to the password reset screen, we //do// want to put the user in high security, since that screen requires high security. If we don't do this, the user gets two factor prompts in a row.
To accomplish this, we set a cookie when we know we're sending the user into a high security workflow. This cookie makes login finalization upgrade all the way from "partial" to "high security", instead of stopping halfway at "normal". This is safe because the user has just passed a factor check; the only reason we don't normally do this is to reduce annoyance.
**Some UI Cleanup**: Some of this was using really old UI. Modernize it a bit.
Test Plan:
- **One Time Resets**
- Used a reset link.
- Tried to reuse a reset link, got denied.
- Verified each link is different.
- **Coupling of Email Verification and One-Time Login**
- Verified that `bin/auth`, password reset, and username change links do not have an email verifying URI component.
- Tried to tack one on, got denied.
- Used the welcome email link to login + verify.
- Tried to mutate the URI to not verify, or verify something else: got denied.
- **Message Customization**
- Viewed messages on the different workflows. They seemed OK.
- **Reset Emails Going to Main Account Email**
- Sent password reset email to non-primary email.
- Received email at specified address.
- Verified it does not verify the address.
- **Password Reset Without Old Password**
- Reset password without knowledge of old one after email reset.
- Tried to do that without a key, got denied.
- Tried to reuse a key, got denied.
- **Jump Into Hisec**
- Logged in with MFA user, got factor'd, jumped directly into hisec.
- Logged in with non-MFA user, no factors, normal password reset.
- **Some UI Cleanup**
- Viewed new UI.
- **Misc**
- Created accounts, logged in with welcome link, got verified.
- Changed a username, used link to log back in.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9252
Summary:
Ref T4398. We have several auth-related systems which require (or are improved by) the ability to hand out one-time codes which expire after a short period of time.
In particular, these are:
- SMS multi-factor: we need to be able to hand out one-time codes for this in order to prove the user has the phone.
- Password reset emails: we use a time-based rotating token right now, but we could improve this with a one-time token, so once you reset your password the link is dead.
- TOTP auth: we don't need to verify/invalidate keys, but can improve security by doing so.
This adds a generic one-time code storage table, and strengthens the TOTP enrollment process by using it. Specifically, you can no longer edit the enrollment form (the one with a QR code) to force your own key as the TOTP key: only keys Phabricator generated are accepted. This has no practical security impact, but generally helps raise the barrier potential attackers face.
Followup changes will use this for reset emails, then implement SMS multi-factor.
Test Plan:
- Enrolled in TOTP multi-factor auth.
- Submitted an error in the form, saw the same key presented.
- Edited the form with web tools to provide a different key, saw it reject and the server generate an alternate.
- Change the expiration to 5 seconds instead of 1 hour, submitted the form over and over again, saw it cycle the key after 5 seconds.
- Looked at the database and saw the tokens I expected.
- Ran the GC and saw all the 5-second expiry tokens get cleaned up.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9217
Summary: This is useful when you're trying to onboard an entire office and you end up using the Google OAuth anyway.
Test Plan: tested locally. Maybe I should write some tests?
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9150
Summary: Did a more exhaustive grep on setIcon and found 99.9% of the icons.
Test Plan: I verified icon names on UIExamples, but unable to test some of the more complex flows visually. Mostly a read and replace.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9088
Summary: The removes the sprite sheet 'icons' and replaces it with FontAwesome fonts.
Test Plan:
- Grep for SPRITE_ICONS and replace
- Grep for sprite-icons and replace
- Grep for PhabricatorActionList and choose all new icons
- Grep for Crumbs and fix icons
- Test/Replace PHUIList Icon support
- Test/Replace ObjectList Icon support (foot, epoch, etc)
- Browse as many pages as I could get to
- Remove sprite-icons and move remarkup to own sheet
- Review this diff in Differential
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9052
Summary: Fixes T4728, first pass, Make real name optional on user accounts
Test Plan: Default real name config should be false (not required). Create new user, real name should not be required. Toggle config, real name should be required. Users with no real name should be always listed by their usernames.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T4728
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9027
Summary:
This plugin provides an OAuth authentication provider to authenticate users using WordPress.com Connect.
This diff corresponds to github pull request https://github.com/facebook/phabricator/pull/593/ and had its libphutil counterpart reviewed in D9004.
Test Plan: Configured WordPress.com as an authentication provider, saw it show up on the login screen, registered a new account, got expected defaults for my username/name/email/profile picture.
Reviewers: chad, #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9019
Summary: Ref T4398. Add some documentation and use `phutil_units()`.
Test Plan:
- Established a web session.
- Established a conduit session.
- Entered and exited hisec.
- Used "Sessions" panel to examine results.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8924
Summary: Ref T4398. I found a reasonable-ish LGPLv3 library for doing this, which isn't too huge or unwieldy.
Test Plan:
- Scanned QR code with Authy.
- Scanned QR code with Google Authenticator.
{F149317}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8923
Summary:
Ref T4398. This prompts users for multi-factor auth on login.
Roughly, this introduces the idea of "partial" sessions, which we haven't finished constructing yet. In practice, this means the session has made it through primary auth but not through multi-factor auth. Add a workflow for bringing a partial session up to a full one.
Test Plan:
- Used Conduit.
- Logged in as multi-factor user.
- Logged in as no-factor user.
- Tried to do non-login-things with a partial session.
- Reviewed account activity logs.
{F149295}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8922
Summary:
Ref T4843. This adds support to `javelin_tag()` for an `aural` attribute. When specified, `true` values mean "this content is aural-only", while `false` values mean "this content is not aural".
- I've attempted to find the best modern approaches for marking this content, but the `aural` attribute should let us change the mechanism later.
- Make the "beta" markers on application navigation visual only (see T4843). This information is of very low importance, the application navigation is accessed frequently, and the information is available on the application list.
- Partially convert the main navigation. This is mostly to test things, since I want to get more concrete feedback about approaches here.
- Add a `?__aural__=1` attribute, which renders the page with aural-only elements visible and visual-only elements colored.
Test Plan: {F146476}
Reviewers: btrahan, scp, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: aklapper, qgil, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4843
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8830
Summary: Ref T4398. Prevent users from brute forcing multi-factor auth by rate limiting attempts. This slightly refines the rate limiting to allow callers to check for a rate limit without adding points, and gives users credit for successfully completing an auth workflow.
Test Plan: Tried to enter hisec with bad credentials 11 times in a row, got rate limited.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8911
Summary:
Ref T4398. The major goals here is to let administrators strip auth factors in two cases:
- A user lost their phone and needs access restored to their account; or
- an install previously used an API-based factor like SMS, but want to stop supporting it (this isn't possible today).
Test Plan:
- Used `bin/auth list-factors` to show installed factors.
- Used `bin/auth strip` with various mixtures of flags to selectively choose and strip factors from accounts.
- Also ran `bin/auth refresh` to verify refreshing OAuth tokens works (small `OAuth` vs `OAuth2` tweak).
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8909
Summary:
Ref T4398. Allows auth factors to render and validate when prompted to take a hi-sec action.
This has a whole lot of rough edges still (see D8875) but does fundamentally work correctly.
Test Plan:
- Added two different TOTP factors to my account for EXTRA SECURITY.
- Took hisec actions with no auth factors, and with attached auth factors.
- Hit all the error/failure states of the hisec entry process.
- Verified hisec failures appear in activity logs.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8886
Summary:
Ref T4398. This is still pretty rough and isn't exposed in the UI yet, but basically works. Some missing features / areas for improvement:
- Rate limiting attempts (see TODO).
- Marking tokens used after they're used once (see TODO), maybe. I can't think of ways an attacker could capture a token without also capturing a session, offhand.
- Actually turning this on (see TODO).
- This workflow is pretty wordy. It would be nice to calm it down a bit.
- But also add more help/context to help users figure out what's going on here, I think it's not very obvious if you don't already know what "TOTP" is.
- Add admin tool to strip auth factors off an account ("Help, I lost my phone and can't log in!").
- Add admin tool to show users who don't have multi-factor auth? (so you can pester them)
- Generate QR codes to make the transfer process easier (they're fairly complicated).
- Make the "entering hi-sec" workflow actually check for auth factors and use them correctly.
- Turn this on so users can use it.
- Adding SMS as an option would be nice eventually.
- Adding "password" as an option, maybe? TOTP feels fairly good to me.
I'll post a couple of screens...
Test Plan:
- Added TOTP token with Google Authenticator.
- Added TOTP token with Authy.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8875
Summary:
Ref T4398. This adds a settings panel for account activity so users can review activity on their own account. Some goals are:
- Make it easier for us to develop and support auth and credential information, see T4398. This is the primary driver.
- Make it easier for users to understand and review auth and credential information (see T4842 for an example -- this isn't there yet, but builds toward it).
- Improve user confidence in security by making logging more apparent and accessible.
Minor corresponding changes:
- Entering and exiting hisec mode is now logged.
- This, sessions, and OAuth authorizations have moved to a new "Sessions and Logs" area, since "Authentication" was getting huge.
Test Plan:
- Viewed new panel.
- Viewed old UI.
- Entered/exited hisec and got prompted.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8871
Summary:
Ref T4398. This is roughly a "sudo" mode, like GitHub has for accessing SSH keys, or Facebook has for managing credit cards. GitHub actually calls theirs "sudo" mode, but I think that's too technical for big parts of our audience. I've gone with "high security mode".
This doesn't actually get exposed in the UI yet (and we don't have any meaningful auth factors to prompt the user for) but the workflow works overall. I'll go through it in a comment, since I need to arrange some screenshots.
Test Plan: See guided walkthrough.
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8851
Summary: Throwing this up for testing, swapped out all icons in timeline for their font equivelants. Used better icons where I could as well. We should feel free to use more / be fun with the icons when possible since there is no penalty anymore.
Test Plan: I browsed many, not all, timelines in my sandbox and in IE8. Some of these were just swagged, but I'm expecting we'll do more SB testing before landing.
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8827
Summary: Fixes T4755. This also includes putting in a note that Google might ToS you to use the Google+ API. Lots of code here as there was some repeated stuff between OAuth1 and OAuth2 so I made a base OAuth with less-base OAuth1 and OAuth2 inheriting from it. The JIRA provider remains an independent mess and didn't get the notes field thing.
Test Plan: looked at providers and read pretty instructions.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T4755
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8726
Summary: Fixes T3208. This forces us to bind+search even if there are no anonymous credentials.
Test Plan: Checked the box, saved the form. Unchecked the box, saved the form. LDAP??
Reviewers: Firehed
Reviewed By: Firehed
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3208
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8723
