Summary:
Ref T7208. Now that we have approvals (new installs are safe by default), take those into account when generating this warning.
Try to soften the warning to cover the case discussed in T7208, hopefully without requiring additional measures.
Test Plan:
{F286014}
{F286015}
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7208
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11708
Summary: Uses more standard boxes for display, and icons!
Test Plan:
Test with all enabled, all disabled, and a mix.
{F285945}
{F285946}
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11707
Summary: Ref T7153. I am not sure if this is 100% correct because sometimes you have to POST vs GET and I don't know if the redirect response will / can do the right thing? I think options to fix this would be to 1) restrict this functionality to JUST the Phabricator OAuth provider type or 2) something really fancy with an HTTP(S) future. The other rub right now is when you logout you get half auto-logged in again... Thoughts on that?
Test Plan: setup my local instance to JUST have phabricator oauth available to login. was presented with the dialog automagically...!
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T7153
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11701
Summary: Clean up the error view styling.
Test Plan:
Tested as many as I could find, built additional tests in UIExamples
{F280452}
{F280453}
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: hach-que, Korvin, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11605
Summary: Ref T3404. The only mildly sketchy bit is these codepaths all load the application email directly, by-passing privacy. I think this is necessary because not getting to see an application doesn't mean you should be able to break the application by registering a colliding email address.
Test Plan:
Tried to add a registered application email to a user account via the web ui and got a pretty error.
Ran unit tests.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3404
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11565
Summary: Add a setBorder call to CrumbsView to be more deliberate when a border is drawn. Could not find any CSS hacks to set it conditionally CSS.
Test Plan: Browsed every application that called crumbs and make a design decision. Also fixed a few bad layouts.
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11533
Summary: Select a similar or better FontAwesome icon to represent each application
Test Plan: Visual inspection
Reviewers: epriestley, btrahan
Subscribers: hach-que, Korvin, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11489
Summary: Ref T6822. This method needs to be `public` because it is called from `PhabricatorApplicationSearchController::buildApplicationMenu()`.
Test Plan: I wouldn't expect //increasing// method visibility to break anything.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6822
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11416
Summary: Ref T6971. This fixes the error the user reported. Not sure what's up with the root cause of their issue.
Test Plan: Went to `/auth/config/new/asdfqwer/` and got a 404 instead of an exception.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6971
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11388
Summary: Ref T6947.
Test Plan: toggled setting in application settings and changes stuck. set policy to admin user a only and could not add a provider as a admin user b.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6947
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11356
Summary:
Ref T6870. Since it does not make sense to redirect the user to the login form after they log in, we try not to set the login form as the `next` cookie.
However, the current check is hard-coded to `/auth/start/`, and the form can also be served at `/login/`. This has no real effect on normal users, but did make debugging T6870 confusing.
Instead of using a hard-coded path check, test if the controller was delegated to. If it was, store the URI. If it's handling the request without delegation, don't.
Test Plan:
- Visited login form at `/login/` and `/auth/start/`, saw it not set a next URI.
- Visited login form at `/settings/` (while logged out), saw it set a next URI.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley, lpriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6870
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11292
Summary: So meta it hurts. Fixes T887.
Test Plan: created a second instance of phabricator locally. made an account on oauth server phabricator. set up my normal dev phabricator to use this new oauth phabricator. noted the form worked. created an account via the oauth method and it worked.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T887
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11287
Summary: Fixes T6870, logging in from a public object should land on that object.
Test Plan: Navigate to a maniphest task in a logged out state, login, landing page should be maniphest task.
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6870
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11289
Summary: Ref T6822.
Test Plan: Visual inspection. These methods are only called from within `PhabricatorController` subclasses.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6822
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11241
Summary: Ref T6822.
Test Plan: Visual inspection. This method is only called from within `PhabricatorOAuthAuthProvider` subclasses.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6822
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11246
Summary: This appears to be a typo, identified by `ArcanistXHPASTLinter::LINT_DUPLICATE_SWITCH_CASE` (see D11171).
Test Plan: `arc lint`
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11194
Summary:
Ref T4209. Ref T6240. Ref T6238. See D10401 for original discussion.
On OSX, `ssh-keygen` doesn't support PKCS8:
- When we hit an issue with this, raise a more tailored message about it.
- Allow the user to work around the problem with `auth cache-pkcs8 ...`, providing reasonable guidance / warnings.
In practice, this only really matters very much for one key, which I'm just going to make the services extension cache automatically. So it's sort of moot, but good to have around for weird cases and to make testing easier.
Test Plan: Hit error, cached key, got clean asymmetric auth.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4209, T6240, T6238
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11021
Summary: Fixes T6693.
Test Plan:
Made a bunch of comments on a diff with differential, being sure to leave inlines here and there. This reproduced the issue in T6693. With this patch this issue no longer reproduces!
Successfully "showed older changes" in Maniphest too.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6693
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10931
Summary: Updates header to use font-icons instead of images.
Test Plan: Test desktop and mobile layouts, Chrome, FF, Safari, IE.
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10930
Summary:
Ref T4712. Thus far, it seems that most "non-standard" things can be done pretty easily in the controller. Aside from deploying, this diff had to fix a few bugs / missing implementations of stuff.
(Notably, PhabricatorAuthProviderConfig, HeraldRule, PhabricatorSlowvotePoll, and AlmanacNetwork needed to implement PhabricatorApplicationTransactionInterface, PhabricatorAuthAuthProviderPHIDType had to be added, and a rendering bug in transactions of type PhabricatorOAuth2AuthProvider had to be fixed.)
Test Plan: Almanac - looked at binding, device, network, and service view controllers and verified timeline displayed properly. Herald - looked at a rule and verified timeline. Slowvote - looked at a vote and verified timeline. Auth - looked at an auth provider (Facebook) and verified proper display of transactions within timeline.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4712
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10921
Summary:
Ref T6240. Some discussion in that task. In instance/cluster environments, daemons need to make Conduit calls that bypass policy checks.
We can't just let anyone add SSH keys with this capability to the web directly, because then an adminstrator could just add a key they own and start signing requests with it, bypassing policy checks.
Add a `bin/almanac trust-key --id <x>` workflow for trusting keys. Only trusted keys can sign requests.
Test Plan:
- Generated a user key.
- Generated a device key.
- Trusted a device key.
- Untrusted a device key.
- Hit the various errors on trust/untrust.
- Tried to edit a trusted key.
{F236010}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T6240
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10878
Summary:
Ref T4209. Depends on D10402.
This updates Conduit to support authenticating calls from other servers by signing the request parameters with the sending server's private key and verifying it with the public key stored in the database.
Test Plan:
- Made like 500 bad calls using the stuff in D10402.
- Made a few valid calls using the stuff in D10402.
Reviewers: hach-que, btrahan, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: btrahan, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T6240, T4209
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10401
Summary:
Ref T5833. I want to add SSH keys to Almanac devices, but the edit workflows for them are currently bound tightly to users.
Instead, decouple key management from users and the settings panel.
Test Plan:
- Uploaded, generated, edited and deleted SSH keys.
- Hit missing name, missing key, bad key format, duplicate key errors.
- Edited/generated/deleted/etc keys for a bot user as an administrator.
- Got HiSec'd on everything.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10824
Summary:
Ref T5833. This fixes a few weird things with this table:
- A bunch of columns were nullable for no reason.
- We stored an MD5 hash of the key (unusual) but never used it and callers were responsible for manually populating it.
- We didn't perform known-key-text lookups by using an index.
Test Plan:
- Ran migrations.
- Faked duplicate keys, saw them clean up correctly.
- Added new keys.
- Generated new keys.
- Used `bin/auth-ssh` and `bin/auth-ssh-key`.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10805
Summary: Missed this in previous pass. Send these as links in HTML emails.
Test Plan: Register a new user that nees approval.
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10815
Summary: Ref T5833. Since these will no longer be bound specifically to users, bring them to a more central location.
Test Plan:
- Edited SSH keys.
- Ran `bin/ssh-auth` and `bin/ssh-auth-key`.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10791
Summary:
Ref T5833. Currently, SSH keys are associated only with users, and are a bit un-modern. I want to let Almanac Devices have SSH keys so devices in a cluster can identify to one another.
For example, with hosted installs, initialization will go something like this:
- A request comes in for `company.phacility.com`.
- A SiteSource (from D10787) makes a Conduit call to Almanac on the master install to check if `company` is a valid install and pull config if it is.
- This call can be signed with an SSH key which identifies a trusted Almanac Device.
In the cluster case, a web host can make an authenticated call to a repository host with similar key signing.
To move toward this, put a proper Query class on top of SSH key access (this diff). In following diffs, I'll:
- Rename `userPHID` to `objectPHID`.
- Move this to the `auth` database.
- Provide UI for device/key association.
An alternative approach would be to build some kind of special token layer in Conduit, but I think that would be a lot harder to manage in the hosting case. This gives us a more direct attack on trusting requests from machines and recognizing machines as first (well, sort of second-class) actors without needing things like fake user accounts.
Test Plan:
- Added and removed SSH keys.
- Added and removed SSH keys from a bot account.
- Tried to edit an unonwned SSH key (denied).
- Ran `bin/ssh-auth`, got sensible output.
- Ran `bin/ssh-auth-key`, got sensible output.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5833
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10790
Summary:
Ref T1191. Now that the whole database is covered, we don't need to do as much work to build expected schemata. Doing them database-by-database was helpful in converting, but is just reudndant work now.
Instead of requiring every application to build its Lisk objects, just build all Lisk objects.
I removed `harbormaster.lisk_counter` because it is unused.
It would be nice to autogenerate edge schemata, too, but that's a little trickier.
Test Plan: Database setup issues are all green.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley, hach-que
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10620
Summary:
Ref T1191.
- Adds definitions for missing keys and keys with wrong uniqueness. Generally, I defined these before fixing the key query to actually pull all keys and support uniqueness.
- Moves "key uniqueness" to note severity; this is fixable (probably?) and there are no remaining issues.
- Moves "Missing Key" to note severity; missing keys are fixable and all remaining missing keys are really missing (either missing edge keys, or missing PHID keys):
{F210089}
- Moves "Surplus Key" to note seveirty; surplus keys are fixable all remaining surplus keys are really surplus (duplicate key in Harbormaster, key on unused column in Worker):
{F210090}
Test Plan:
- Vetted missing/surplus/unique messages.
- 146 issues remaining.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10590
Summary:
Ref T1191. Some notes here:
- Drops the old LDAP and OAuth info tables. These were migrated to the ExternalAccount table a very long time ago.
- Separates surplus/missing keys from other types of surplus/missing things. In the long run, my plan is to have only two notice levels:
- Error: something we can't fix (missing database, table, or column; overlong key).
- Warning: something we can fix (surplus anything, missing key, bad column type, bad key columns, bad uniqueness, bad collation or charset).
- For now, retaining three levels is helpful in generating all the expected scheamta.
Test Plan:
- Saw ~200 issues resolve, leaving ~1,300.
- Grepped for removed tables.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10580
Summary:
Ref T1191. Notable:
- Allowed objects to remove default columns (some feed tables have no `id`).
- Added a "note" severity and moved all the charset stuff down to that to make progress more clear.
Test Plan:
Trying to make the whole thing blue...
{F205970}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10519
Summary: Ref T1191. This fills in some more features and gets audit and auth nearly generating reasonable expected schemata.
Test Plan: See screenshots.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T1191
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10500
Summary:
Fixes T5900. We have some very old code here which does not let you update your password if the `account.editable` flag is set.
This was approximately introduced in D890, and I think it was mostly copy/pasted at that point. I'm not sure this ever really made sense. The option is not documented as affecting this, for example. In the modern environment of auth providers, it definitely does not make sense.
Instead, always allow users to change passwords if the install has a password provider configured.
Test Plan:
- Set `account.editable` to false.
- Used a password reset link.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5900
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10331
Summary:
Via HackerOne. Chrome (at least) interprets backslashes like forward slashes, so a redirect to "/\evil.com" is the same as a redirect to "//evil.com".
- Reject local URIs with backslashes (we never generate these).
- Fully-qualify all "Location:" redirects.
- Require external redirects to be marked explicitly.
Test Plan:
- Expanded existing test coverage.
- Verified that neither Diffusion nor Phriction can generate URIs with backslashes (they are escaped in Diffusion, and removed by slugging in Phriction).
- Logged in with Facebook (OAuth2 submits a form to the external site, and isn't affected) and Twitter (OAuth1 redirects, and is affected).
- Went through some local redirects (login, save-an-object).
- Verified file still work.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10291
Summary:
Fixes T3347. We can't really do this one as a config thing since we don't know if the user wants to use LDAP.
Instead, just give them a better message than they otherwise get when they try to install/configure/use LDAP.
Test Plan: Faked it and got a reasonable message.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3347
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10260
Summary: Fixes T5579. Modern browsers aggressively autofill credentials, but at least Firefox still behaves slightly better with this flag. Hopefully other browsers will follow suit.
Test Plan: Browsed various interfaces, verifying that login interfaces allow autocomplete while non-login interfaces do not.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5579
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10253
Summary:
Ref T5861. Currently, mail tags are hard-coded; move them into applications. Each Editor defines its own tags.
This has zero impact on the UI or behavior.
Test Plan:
- Checked/unchecked some options, saved form.
- Swapped back to `master` and saw exactly the same values.
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5861
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10238
Summary: Ref T5861. Adds an option to opt out of all notification email. We'll still send you password resets, email verifications, etc.
Test Plan:
{F189484}
- Added unit tests.
- With preference set to different things, tried to send myself mail. Mail respected preferences.
- Sent password reset email, which got through the preference.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: rush898, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5861
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10237
Summary:
Via HackerOne. If a user adds an email address and typos it, entering `alinculne@gmailo.com`, and it happens to be a valid address which an evil user controls, the evil user can request a password reset and compromise the account.
This strains the imagination, but we can implement a better behavior cheaply.
- If an account has any verified addresses, only send to verified addresses.
- If an account has no verified addresses (e.g., is a new account), send to any address.
We've also received several reports about reset links not being destroyed as aggressively as researchers expect. While there's no specific scenario where this does any harm, revoke all outstanding reset tokens when a reset link is used to improve the signal/noise ratio of the reporting channel.
Test Plan:
- Tried to send a reset link to an unverified address on an account with a verified address (got new error).
- Tried to send a reset link to a verified adddress on an account with a verified address (got email).
- Tried to send a reset link to an invalid address (got old error).
- Tried to send a reset link to an unverified address on an account with only unverified addresses -- a new user (got email).
- Requested several reset links, used one, verified all the others were revoked.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10206
Summary:
CanCDN flag indicates that a file can be served + cached
via anonymous content distribution networks.
Once D10054 lands, any files that lack the CanCDN flag
will require a one-time-use token and headers will
prohibit cache to protect sensitive files from
unauthorized access.
This diff separates the CanCDN changes from the code that
enforces these restrictions in D10054 so that the changes
can be tested and refined independently.
Test Plan: Work in progress
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: rush898, qgil, epriestley, aklapper, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T5685
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10166
Summary: Fixes T5510. This purely reduces false positives from HackerOne: we currently rotate CSRF tokens, but do not bind them explicitly to specific sessions. Doing so has no real security benefit and may make some session rotation changes more difficult down the line, but researchers routinely report it. Just conform to expectations since the expected behavior isn't bad and this is less work for us than dealing with false positives.
Test Plan:
- With two browsers logged in under the same user, verified I was issued different CSRF tokens.
- Verified the token from one browser did not work in the other browser's session.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5510
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10136
Summary:
Fixes T5509. Currently, existing sessions live on even if you change your password.
Over the course of the program, we've recieved a lot of HackerOne reports that sessions do not terminate when users change their passwords. I hold that this isn't a security vulnerability: users can explicitly manage sessions, and this is more general and more powerful than tying session termination to password resets. In particular, many installs do not use a password provider at all (and no researcher has reported this in a general, application-aware way that discusses multiple authentication providers).
That said, dealing with these false positives is vaguely time consuming, and the "expected" behavior isn't bad for users, so just align behavior with researcher expectations: when passwords are changed, providers are removed, or multi-factor authentication is added to an account, terminate all other active login sessions.
Test Plan:
- Using two browsers, established multiple login sessions.
- In one browser, changed account password. Saw session terminate and logout in the second browser.
- In one browser, removed an authentication provider. Saw session terminate and logout in the second browser.
- In one browser, added MFA. Saw session terminate and logout in the second browser.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5509
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10135
Summary:
Fixes T5506. Depends on D10133. When users remove an email address or change their primary email address, invalidate any outstanding password reset links.
This is a very small security risk, but the current behavior is somewhat surprising, and an attacker could sit on a reset link for up to 24 hours and then use it to re-compromise an account.
Test Plan:
- Changed primary address and removed addreses.
- Verified these actions invalidated outstanding one-time login temporary tokens.
- Tried to use revoked reset links.
- Revoked normally from new UI panel.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5506
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10134
Summary:
Ref T5506. This makes it easier to understand and manage temporary tokens.
Eventually this could be more user-friendly, since it's relatively difficult to understand what this screen means. My short-term goal is just to make the next change easier to implement and test.
The next diff will close a small security weakness: if you change your email address, password reset links which were sent to the old address are still valid. Although an attacker would need substantial access to exploit this (essentially, it would just make it easier for them to re-compromise an already compromised account), it's a bit surprising. In the next diff, email address changes will invalidate outstanding password reset links.
Test Plan:
- Viewed outstanding tokens.
- Added tokens to the list by making "Forgot your password?" requests.
- Revoked tokens individually.
- Revoked all tokens.
- Tried to use a revoked token.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5506
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10133
Summary: Ref T4896. Instead of using custom stuff, use standard stuff.
Test Plan: Viewed a bunch of feed stories and published some over the Asana bridge.
Reviewers: joshuaspence, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4896
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10114
Summary: Ref T5655. Rename `PhabricatorPHIDType` subclasses for clarity (see discussion in D9839). I'm not too keen on some of the resulting class names, so feel free to suggest alternatives.
Test Plan: Ran unit tests.
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Maniphest Tasks: T5655
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9986
Summary: Provide an implementation for the `getName` method rather than automagically determining the application name.
Test Plan: Saw reasonable application names in the launcher.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10027
Summary: Ref T5655. Some discussion in D9839. Generally speaking, `Phabricator{$name}Application` is clearer than `PhabricatorApplication{$name}`.
Test Plan:
# Pinned and uninstalled some applications.
# Applied patch and performed migrations.
# Verified that the pinned applications were still pinned and that the uninstalled applications were still uninstalled.
# Performed a sanity check on the database contents.
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: hach-que, epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T5655
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9982
Summary: Instead of implementing the `getTypeConstant` method in all subclasses of `PhabricatorPHIDType`, provide a `final` implementation in the base class which uses reflection. See D9837 for a similar implementation.
Test Plan: Ran `arc unit`.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9985
Summary: Currently, the external accounts page can die in a fire if an OAuth2 link is bad. Instead of exploding, just fail the specific link.
Test Plan: Faked an error and got "invalid token" instead of an exception.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9937
Summary:
Fixes T3732. Ref T1205. Ref T3116.
External accounts (like emails used as identities, Facebook accounts, LDAP accounts, etc.) are stored in "ExternalAccount" objects.
Currently, we have a very restrictive `CAN_VIEW` policy for ExternalAccounts, to add an extra layer of protection to make sure users can't use them in unintended ways. For example, it would be bad if a user could link their Phabricator account to a Facebook account without proper authentication. All of the controllers which do sensitive things have checks anyway, but a restrictive CAN_VIEW provided an extra layer of protection. Se T3116 for some discussion.
However, this means that when grey/external users take actions (via email, or via applications like Legalpad) other users can't load the account handles and can't see anything about the actor (they just see "Restricted External Account" or similar).
Balancing these concerns is mostly about not making a huge mess while doing it. This seems like a reasonable approach:
- Add `CAN_EDIT` on these objects.
- Make that very restricted, but open up `CAN_VIEW`.
- Require `CAN_EDIT` any time we're going to do something authentication/identity related.
This is slightly easier to get wrong (forget CAN_EDIT) than other approaches, but pretty simple, and we always have extra checks in place anyway -- this is just a safety net.
I'm not quite sure how we should identify external accounts, so for now we're just rendering "Email User" or similar -- clearly not a bug, but not identifying. We can figure out what to render in the long term elsewhere.
Test Plan:
- Viewed external accounts.
- Linked an external account.
- Refreshed an external account.
- Edited profile picture.
- Viewed sessions panel.
- Published a bunch of stuff to Asana/JIRA.
- Legalpad signature page now shows external accounts.
{F171595}
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3732, T1205, T3116
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9767
Summary:
Ref T5096. Ref T4251. See D9202 for discussion.
- Twitter seems to accept either one (?!?!?!??).
- JIRA uses RSA-SHA1, which does not depend on the token secret.
- This change makes Bitbucket work.
Test Plan:
- OAuthed with Twitter.
- OAuthed with JIRA.
- OAuthed with some Bitbucket code I had partially laying around in a partial state, which works after this change.
Reviewers: csteipp, btrahan, 20after4
Reviewed By: 20after4
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4251, T5096
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9760
Summary: Applied some more linter fixes that I previously missed because my global `arc` install was out-of-date.
Test Plan: Will run `arc unit` on another host.
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9443
Summary: Ran `arc lint --apply-patches --everything` over rP, mainly to change double quotes to single quotes where appropriate. These changes also validate that the `ArcanistXHPASTLinter::LINT_DOUBLE_QUOTE` rule is working as expected.
Test Plan: Eyeballed it.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9431
Summary: Ref T5089. Adds a `security.require-multi-factor-auth` which forces all users to enroll in MFA before they can use their accounts.
Test Plan:
Config:
{F159750}
Roadblock:
{F159748}
After configuration:
{F159749}
- Required MFA, got roadblocked, added MFA, got unblocked.
- Removed MFA, got blocked again.
- Used `bin/auth strip` to strip MFA, got blocked.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5089
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9285
Summary: Both email verify and welcome links now verify email, centralize them and record them in the user activity log.
Test Plan:
- Followed a "verify email" link and got verified.
- Followed a "welcome" (verifying) link.
- Followed a "reset" (non-verifying) link.
- Looked in the activity log for the verifications.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9284
Summary:
This does some backend cleanup of the tile stuff, and some general cleanup of other application things:
- Users who haven't customized preferences get a small, specific set of pinned applications: Differential, Maniphest, Diffusion, Audit, Phriction, Projects (and, for administrators, Auth, Config and People).
- Old tile size methods are replaced with `isPinnnedByDefault()`.
- Shortened some short descriptions.
- `shouldAppearInLaunchView()` replaced by less ambiguous `isLaunchable()`.
- Added a marker for third-party / extension applications.
Test Plan: Faked away my preferences and viewed the home page, saw a smaller set of default pins.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9358
Summary:
This probably needs some tweaks, but the idea is to make it easier to browse and access applications without necessarily needing them to be on the homepage.
Open to feedback.
Test Plan:
(This screenshot merges "Organization", "Communication" and "Core" into a single "Core" group. We can't actually do this yet because it wrecks the homepage.)
{F160052}
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5176
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9297
Summary:
Ref T4398. This code hadn't been touched in a while and had a few crufty bits.
**One Time Resets**: Currently, password reset (and similar links) are valid for about 48 hours, but we always use one token to generate them (it's bound to the account). This isn't horrible, but it could be better, and it produces a lot of false positives on HackerOne.
Instead, use TemporaryTokens to make each link one-time only and good for no more than 24 hours.
**Coupling of Email Verification and One-Time Login**: Currently, one-time login links ("password reset links") are tightly bound to an email address, and using a link verifies that email address.
This is convenient for "Welcome" emails, so the user doesn't need to go through two rounds of checking email in order to login, then very their email, then actually get access to Phabricator.
However, for other types of these links (like those generated by `bin/auth recover`) there's no need to do any email verification.
Instead, make the email verification part optional, and use it on welcome links but not other types of links.
**Message Customization**: These links can come out of several workflows: welcome, password reset, username change, or `bin/auth recover`. Add a hint to the URI so the text on the page can be customized a bit to help users through the workflow.
**Reset Emails Going to Main Account Email**: Previously, we would send password reset email to the user's primary account email. However, since we verify email coming from reset links this isn't correct and could allow a user to verify an email without actually controlling it.
Since the user needs a real account in the first place this does not seem useful on its own, but might be a component in some other attack. The user might also no longer have access to their primary account, in which case this wouldn't be wrong, but would not be very useful.
Mitigate this in two ways:
- First, send to the actual email address the user entered, not the primary account email address.
- Second, don't let these links verify emails: they're just login links. This primarily makes it more difficult for an attacker to add someone else's email to their account, send them a reset link, get them to login and implicitly verify the email by not reading very carefully, and then figure out something interesting to do (there's currently no followup attack here, but allowing this does seem undesirable).
**Password Reset Without Old Password**: After a user logs in via email, we send them to the password settings panel (if passwords are enabled) with a code that lets them set a new password without knowing the old one.
Previously, this code was static and based on the email address. Instead, issue a one-time code.
**Jump Into Hisec**: Normally, when a user who has multi-factor auth on their account logs in, we prompt them for factors but don't put them in high security. You usually don't want to go do high-security stuff immediately after login, and it would be confusing and annoying if normal logins gave you a "YOU ARE IN HIGH SECURITY" alert bubble.
However, if we're taking you to the password reset screen, we //do// want to put the user in high security, since that screen requires high security. If we don't do this, the user gets two factor prompts in a row.
To accomplish this, we set a cookie when we know we're sending the user into a high security workflow. This cookie makes login finalization upgrade all the way from "partial" to "high security", instead of stopping halfway at "normal". This is safe because the user has just passed a factor check; the only reason we don't normally do this is to reduce annoyance.
**Some UI Cleanup**: Some of this was using really old UI. Modernize it a bit.
Test Plan:
- **One Time Resets**
- Used a reset link.
- Tried to reuse a reset link, got denied.
- Verified each link is different.
- **Coupling of Email Verification and One-Time Login**
- Verified that `bin/auth`, password reset, and username change links do not have an email verifying URI component.
- Tried to tack one on, got denied.
- Used the welcome email link to login + verify.
- Tried to mutate the URI to not verify, or verify something else: got denied.
- **Message Customization**
- Viewed messages on the different workflows. They seemed OK.
- **Reset Emails Going to Main Account Email**
- Sent password reset email to non-primary email.
- Received email at specified address.
- Verified it does not verify the address.
- **Password Reset Without Old Password**
- Reset password without knowledge of old one after email reset.
- Tried to do that without a key, got denied.
- Tried to reuse a key, got denied.
- **Jump Into Hisec**
- Logged in with MFA user, got factor'd, jumped directly into hisec.
- Logged in with non-MFA user, no factors, normal password reset.
- **Some UI Cleanup**
- Viewed new UI.
- **Misc**
- Created accounts, logged in with welcome link, got verified.
- Changed a username, used link to log back in.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9252
Summary:
Ref T4398. We have several auth-related systems which require (or are improved by) the ability to hand out one-time codes which expire after a short period of time.
In particular, these are:
- SMS multi-factor: we need to be able to hand out one-time codes for this in order to prove the user has the phone.
- Password reset emails: we use a time-based rotating token right now, but we could improve this with a one-time token, so once you reset your password the link is dead.
- TOTP auth: we don't need to verify/invalidate keys, but can improve security by doing so.
This adds a generic one-time code storage table, and strengthens the TOTP enrollment process by using it. Specifically, you can no longer edit the enrollment form (the one with a QR code) to force your own key as the TOTP key: only keys Phabricator generated are accepted. This has no practical security impact, but generally helps raise the barrier potential attackers face.
Followup changes will use this for reset emails, then implement SMS multi-factor.
Test Plan:
- Enrolled in TOTP multi-factor auth.
- Submitted an error in the form, saw the same key presented.
- Edited the form with web tools to provide a different key, saw it reject and the server generate an alternate.
- Change the expiration to 5 seconds instead of 1 hour, submitted the form over and over again, saw it cycle the key after 5 seconds.
- Looked at the database and saw the tokens I expected.
- Ran the GC and saw all the 5-second expiry tokens get cleaned up.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9217
Summary: This is useful when you're trying to onboard an entire office and you end up using the Google OAuth anyway.
Test Plan: tested locally. Maybe I should write some tests?
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9150
Summary: Did a more exhaustive grep on setIcon and found 99.9% of the icons.
Test Plan: I verified icon names on UIExamples, but unable to test some of the more complex flows visually. Mostly a read and replace.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9088
Summary: The removes the sprite sheet 'icons' and replaces it with FontAwesome fonts.
Test Plan:
- Grep for SPRITE_ICONS and replace
- Grep for sprite-icons and replace
- Grep for PhabricatorActionList and choose all new icons
- Grep for Crumbs and fix icons
- Test/Replace PHUIList Icon support
- Test/Replace ObjectList Icon support (foot, epoch, etc)
- Browse as many pages as I could get to
- Remove sprite-icons and move remarkup to own sheet
- Review this diff in Differential
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9052
Summary: Fixes T4728, first pass, Make real name optional on user accounts
Test Plan: Default real name config should be false (not required). Create new user, real name should not be required. Toggle config, real name should be required. Users with no real name should be always listed by their usernames.
Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T4728
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9027
Summary:
This plugin provides an OAuth authentication provider to authenticate users using WordPress.com Connect.
This diff corresponds to github pull request https://github.com/facebook/phabricator/pull/593/ and had its libphutil counterpart reviewed in D9004.
Test Plan: Configured WordPress.com as an authentication provider, saw it show up on the login screen, registered a new account, got expected defaults for my username/name/email/profile picture.
Reviewers: chad, #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9019
Summary: Ref T4398. Add some documentation and use `phutil_units()`.
Test Plan:
- Established a web session.
- Established a conduit session.
- Entered and exited hisec.
- Used "Sessions" panel to examine results.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8924
Summary: Ref T4398. I found a reasonable-ish LGPLv3 library for doing this, which isn't too huge or unwieldy.
Test Plan:
- Scanned QR code with Authy.
- Scanned QR code with Google Authenticator.
{F149317}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8923
Summary:
Ref T4398. This prompts users for multi-factor auth on login.
Roughly, this introduces the idea of "partial" sessions, which we haven't finished constructing yet. In practice, this means the session has made it through primary auth but not through multi-factor auth. Add a workflow for bringing a partial session up to a full one.
Test Plan:
- Used Conduit.
- Logged in as multi-factor user.
- Logged in as no-factor user.
- Tried to do non-login-things with a partial session.
- Reviewed account activity logs.
{F149295}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8922
Summary:
Ref T4843. This adds support to `javelin_tag()` for an `aural` attribute. When specified, `true` values mean "this content is aural-only", while `false` values mean "this content is not aural".
- I've attempted to find the best modern approaches for marking this content, but the `aural` attribute should let us change the mechanism later.
- Make the "beta" markers on application navigation visual only (see T4843). This information is of very low importance, the application navigation is accessed frequently, and the information is available on the application list.
- Partially convert the main navigation. This is mostly to test things, since I want to get more concrete feedback about approaches here.
- Add a `?__aural__=1` attribute, which renders the page with aural-only elements visible and visual-only elements colored.
Test Plan: {F146476}
Reviewers: btrahan, scp, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: aklapper, qgil, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4843
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8830
Summary: Ref T4398. Prevent users from brute forcing multi-factor auth by rate limiting attempts. This slightly refines the rate limiting to allow callers to check for a rate limit without adding points, and gives users credit for successfully completing an auth workflow.
Test Plan: Tried to enter hisec with bad credentials 11 times in a row, got rate limited.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8911
Summary:
Ref T4398. The major goals here is to let administrators strip auth factors in two cases:
- A user lost their phone and needs access restored to their account; or
- an install previously used an API-based factor like SMS, but want to stop supporting it (this isn't possible today).
Test Plan:
- Used `bin/auth list-factors` to show installed factors.
- Used `bin/auth strip` with various mixtures of flags to selectively choose and strip factors from accounts.
- Also ran `bin/auth refresh` to verify refreshing OAuth tokens works (small `OAuth` vs `OAuth2` tweak).
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8909
Summary:
Ref T4398. Allows auth factors to render and validate when prompted to take a hi-sec action.
This has a whole lot of rough edges still (see D8875) but does fundamentally work correctly.
Test Plan:
- Added two different TOTP factors to my account for EXTRA SECURITY.
- Took hisec actions with no auth factors, and with attached auth factors.
- Hit all the error/failure states of the hisec entry process.
- Verified hisec failures appear in activity logs.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8886
Summary:
Ref T4398. This is still pretty rough and isn't exposed in the UI yet, but basically works. Some missing features / areas for improvement:
- Rate limiting attempts (see TODO).
- Marking tokens used after they're used once (see TODO), maybe. I can't think of ways an attacker could capture a token without also capturing a session, offhand.
- Actually turning this on (see TODO).
- This workflow is pretty wordy. It would be nice to calm it down a bit.
- But also add more help/context to help users figure out what's going on here, I think it's not very obvious if you don't already know what "TOTP" is.
- Add admin tool to strip auth factors off an account ("Help, I lost my phone and can't log in!").
- Add admin tool to show users who don't have multi-factor auth? (so you can pester them)
- Generate QR codes to make the transfer process easier (they're fairly complicated).
- Make the "entering hi-sec" workflow actually check for auth factors and use them correctly.
- Turn this on so users can use it.
- Adding SMS as an option would be nice eventually.
- Adding "password" as an option, maybe? TOTP feels fairly good to me.
I'll post a couple of screens...
Test Plan:
- Added TOTP token with Google Authenticator.
- Added TOTP token with Authy.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8875
Summary:
Ref T4398. This adds a settings panel for account activity so users can review activity on their own account. Some goals are:
- Make it easier for us to develop and support auth and credential information, see T4398. This is the primary driver.
- Make it easier for users to understand and review auth and credential information (see T4842 for an example -- this isn't there yet, but builds toward it).
- Improve user confidence in security by making logging more apparent and accessible.
Minor corresponding changes:
- Entering and exiting hisec mode is now logged.
- This, sessions, and OAuth authorizations have moved to a new "Sessions and Logs" area, since "Authentication" was getting huge.
Test Plan:
- Viewed new panel.
- Viewed old UI.
- Entered/exited hisec and got prompted.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8871
Summary:
Ref T4398. This is roughly a "sudo" mode, like GitHub has for accessing SSH keys, or Facebook has for managing credit cards. GitHub actually calls theirs "sudo" mode, but I think that's too technical for big parts of our audience. I've gone with "high security mode".
This doesn't actually get exposed in the UI yet (and we don't have any meaningful auth factors to prompt the user for) but the workflow works overall. I'll go through it in a comment, since I need to arrange some screenshots.
Test Plan: See guided walkthrough.
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8851
Summary: Throwing this up for testing, swapped out all icons in timeline for their font equivelants. Used better icons where I could as well. We should feel free to use more / be fun with the icons when possible since there is no penalty anymore.
Test Plan: I browsed many, not all, timelines in my sandbox and in IE8. Some of these were just swagged, but I'm expecting we'll do more SB testing before landing.
Reviewers: btrahan, epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8827
Summary: Fixes T4755. This also includes putting in a note that Google might ToS you to use the Google+ API. Lots of code here as there was some repeated stuff between OAuth1 and OAuth2 so I made a base OAuth with less-base OAuth1 and OAuth2 inheriting from it. The JIRA provider remains an independent mess and didn't get the notes field thing.
Test Plan: looked at providers and read pretty instructions.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T4755
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8726
Summary: Fixes T3208. This forces us to bind+search even if there are no anonymous credentials.
Test Plan: Checked the box, saved the form. Unchecked the box, saved the form. LDAP??
Reviewers: Firehed
Reviewed By: Firehed
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3208
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8723
Summary: Fixes T4451. See also D8612.
Test Plan: Viewed panel and read text, saw it matched up with the new console.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4451
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8613
Summary:
- Dialog pages currently have no titles or crumbs, and look shoddy. Add titles and crumbs.
- Dialog titles aren't always great for crumbs, add an optional "short title" for crumbs.
- `AphrontDialogResponse` is pure boilerplate. Allow controllers to just return a `DialogView` instead and get the same effect.
- Building dialogs requires a bit of boilerplate, and we generally construct them with no explicit `"action"`, which has some issues with T4593. Provide a convenience method to set the viewer and get a reasonable, explict submit URI.
Test Plan:
- Viewed dialog on its own.
- Viewed dialog as a dialog.
{F132353}
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8577
Summary:
This is partly a good feature, and partly should reduce false positives on HackerOne reporting things vaguely related to this.
Allow a user to terminate login sessions from the settings panel.
Test Plan:
- Terminated a session.
- Terminated all sessions.
- Tried to terminate all sessions again.
- Logged in with two browsers, terminated the other browser's session, reloaded, got kicked out.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8556
Summary:
Fixes T3471. Specific issues:
- Add the ability to set a temporary cookie (expires when the browser closes).
- We overwrote 'phcid' on every page load. This creates some issues with browser extensions. Instead, only write it if isn't set. To counterbalance this, make it temporary.
- Make the 'next_uri' cookie temporary.
- Make the 'phreg' cookie temporary.
- Fix an issue where deleted cookies would persist after 302 (?) in some cases (this is/was 100% for me locally).
Test Plan:
- Closed my browser, reopned it, verified temporary cookies were gone.
- Logged in, authed, linked, logged out.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T3471
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8537
Summary:
See <https://github.com/facebook/phabricator/issues/541>.
- If a provider returns the email `""` or `"0"`, we currently don't let the user edit it and thus don't let them register.
- If a provider returns an invalid email like `"!!!"` (permitted by GitHub, e.g.), we show them a nonsense error message.
Instead:
- Pretend we didn't get an address if we get an invalid address.
- Test the address strictly against `null`.
Test Plan: Registered on Phabricator with my GitHub email set to `""` (empty string) and `"!!!"` (bang bang bang).
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: aran, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8528
Summary:
Via HackerOne. In regular expressions, "$" matches "end of input, or before terminating newline". This means that the expression `/^A$/` matches two strings: `"A"`, and `"A\n"`.
When we care about this, use `\z` instead, which matches "end of input" only.
This allowed registration of `"username\n"` and similar.
Test Plan:
- Grepped codebase for all calls to `preg_match()` / `preg_match_all()`.
- Fixed the ones where this seemed like it could have an impact.
- Added and executed unit tests.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: aran, epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8516
Summary:
Ref T4593. There are a variety of clever attacks against OAuth which involve changing the redirect URI to some other URI on the same domain which exhibits unexpected behavior in response to an OAuth request. The best approach to dealing with this is for providers to lock to a specific path and refuse to redirect elsewhere, but not all providers do this.
We haven't had any specific issues related to this, but the anchor issue in T4593 was only a step away.
To mitigate this in general, we can reject the OAuth2 `'code'` parameter on //every// page by default, and then whitelist it on the tiny number of controllers which should be able to receive it.
This is very coarse, kind of overkill, and has some fallout (we can't use `'code'` as a normal parameter in the application), but I think it's relatively well-contained and seems reasonable. A better approach might be to whitelist parameters on every controller (i.e., have each controller specify the parameters it can receive), but that would be a ton of work and probably cause a lot of false positives for a long time.
Since we don't use `'code'` normally anywhere (as far as I can tell), the coarseness of this approach seems reasonable.
Test Plan:
- Logged in with OAuth.
- Hit any other page with `?code=...` in the URL, got an exception.
- Grepped for `'code'` and `"code"`, and examined each use to see if it was impacted.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: aran, epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4593
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8499
Summary: Although the defaults don't require a verified email address, it's easy to lock yourself out by accident by configuring `auth.require-email-verification` or `auth.email-domains` before setting up email. Just force-verify the initial/setup account's address.
Test Plan: Went through setup on a fresh install, saw address verify.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8365
Summary: If an attacker somehow intercepts a verification URL for an email address, they can hypothetically CSRF the account owner into verifying it. What you'd do before (how do you get the link?) and after (why do you care that you tricked them into verifying) performing this attack is unclear, but in theory we should require a CSRF submission here; add one.
Test Plan: {F118691}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8351
Summary: If you copy the registration URL, then register, then load the URL again while logged out (i.e., attempt to reuse the registration URL), we try to show you a tailored error message. However, this call is not correct so we show you a not-so tailored exception instead.
Test Plan:
- Get to the registration screen.
- Save URL.
- Complete registration.
- Log out.
- Return to saved URL.
Previously, exception. Now, readable error.
{F117585}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8322
Summary:
OAuth1 doesn't have anything like the `state` parameter, and I overlooked that we need to shove one in there somewhere. Append it to the callback URI. This functions like `state` in OAuth2.
Without this, an attacker can trick a user into logging into Phabricator with an account the attacker controls.
Test Plan:
- Logged in with JIRA.
- Logged in with Twitter.
- Logged in with Facebook (an OAuth2 provider).
- Linked a Twitter account.
- Linked a Facebook account.
- Jiggered codes in URIs and verified that I got the exceptions I expected.
Reviewers: btrahan, arice
Reviewed By: arice
CC: arice, chad, aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8318
Summary:
Via HackerOne. An attacker can bypass `auth.email-domains` by registering with an email like:
aaaaa...aaaaa@evil.com@company.com
We'll validate the full string, then insert it into the database where it will be truncated, removing the `@company.com` part. Then we'll send an email to `@evil.com`.
Instead, reject email addresses which won't fit in the table.
`STRICT_ALL_TABLES` stops this attack, I'm going to add a setup warning encouraging it.
Test Plan:
- Set `auth.email-domains` to `@company.com`.
- Registered with `aaa...aaa@evil.com@company.com`. Previously this worked, now it is rejected.
- Did a valid registration.
- Tried to add `aaa...aaaa@evil.com@company.com` as an email address. Previously this worked, now it is rejected.
- Did a valid email add.
- Added and executed unit tests.
Reviewers: btrahan, arice
Reviewed By: arice
CC: aran, chad
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8308
Summary:
Ref T4443.
- Add a `password_hash()`-based bcrypt hasher if `password_hash()` is available.
- When a user logs in using a password, upgrade their password to the strongest available hash format.
- On the password settings page:
- Warn the user if their password uses any algorithm other than the strongest one.
- Show the algorithm the password uses.
- Show the best available algorithm.
Test Plan: As an md5 user, viewed password settings page and saw a warning. Logged out. Logged in, got upgraded, no more warning. Changed password, verified database rehash. Logged out, logged in.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4443
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8270
Summary:
Ref T4443. Make hashing algorithms pluggable and extensible so we can deal with the attendant complexities more easily.
This moves "Iterated MD5" to a modular implementation, and adds a tiny bit of hack-glue so we don't need to migrate the DB in this patch. I'll migrate in the next patch, then add bcrypt.
Test Plan:
- Verified that the same stuff gets stored in the DB (i.e., no functional changes):
- Logged into an old password account.
- Changed password.
- Registered a new account.
- Changed password.
- Switched back to master.
- Logged in / out, changed password.
- Switched back, logged in.
- Ran unit tests (they aren't super extensive, but cover some of the basics).
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran, kofalt
Maniphest Tasks: T4443
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8268
Summary: This uses the slightly smaller icons. Not sure about the logout icon, will play with it more in the morning.
Test Plan: tested new nav on desktop and mobile.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
CC: Korvin, epriestley, aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8119
Summary:
Ref T3623. This is like a pre-v0, in that it doesn't have a dropdown yet.
Clicking the button takes you to a page which can serve as a right click / mobile / edit target in the long run, but is obviously not great for desktop use. I'll add the dropdown in the next iteration.
Test Plan: {F105631}
Reviewers: chad, btrahan
Reviewed By: chad
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T3623
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8088
Summary:
Via HackerOne, there are two related low-severity issues with this workflow:
- We don't check if you're already logged in, so an attacker can trick a victim (whether they're logged in or not) into clicking a reset link for an account the attacker controls (maybe via an invisible iframe) and log the user in under a different account.
- We don't check CSRF tokens either, so after fixing the first thing, an attacker can still trick a //logged-out// victim in the same way.
It's not really clear that doing this opens up any significant attacks afterward, but both of these behaviors aren't good.
I'll probably land this for audit in a few hours if @btrahan doesn't have a chance to take a look at it since he's probably on a plane for most of the day, I'm pretty confident it doesn't break anything.
Test Plan:
- As a logged-in user, clicked another user's password reset link and was not logged in.
- As a logged-out user, clicked a password reset link and needed to submit a form to complete the workflow.
Reviewers: btrahan
CC: chad, btrahan, aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8079
Summary: Ref T4339. We didn't previously check `isFormPost()` on these, but now should.
Test Plan: Changed csrf token on login, got kicked out.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4339
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8051
Summary:
Fixes T3793. There's a lot of history here, see D4012, T2102. Basically, the problem is that things used to work like this:
- User is logged out and accesses `/xyz/`. After they login, we'd like to send them back to `/xyz/`, so we set a `next_uri` cookie.
- User's browser has a bunch of extensions and now makes a ton of requests for stuff that doesn't exist, like `humans.txt` and `apple-touch-icon.png`. We can't distinguish between these requests and normal requests in a general way, so we write `next_uri` cookies, overwriting the user's intent (`/xyz/`).
To fix this, we made the 404 page not set `next_uri`, in D4012. So if the browser requests `humans.txt`, we 404 with no cookie, and the `/xyz/` cookie is preserved. However, this is bad because an attacker can determine if objects exist and applications are installed, by visiting, e.g., `/T123` and seeing if they get a 404 page (resource really does not exist) or a login page (resource exists). We'd rather not leak this information.
The comment in the body text describes this in more detail.
This diff sort of tries to do the right thing most of the time: we write the cookie only if we haven't written it in the last 2 minutes. Generally, this should mean that the original request to `/xyz/` writes it, all the `humans.txt` requests don't write it, and things work like users expect. This may occasionally do the wrong thing, but it should be very rare, and we stop leaking information about applications and objects.
Test Plan: Logged out, clicked around / logged in, used Charles to verify that cookies were set in the expected way.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T3793
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8047
Summary: Fixes T4339. If you're anonymous, we use a digest of your session key to generate a CSRF token. Otherwise, everything works normally.
Test Plan: Logged out, logged in, tweaked CSRF in forms -- I'll add some inlines.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4339
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8046
Summary:
Ref T4339. Login providers use absolute URIs, but the ones that rely on local form submits should not, because we want to include CSRF tokens where applicable.
Instead, make the default be relative URIs and turn them into absolute ones for the callback proivders.
Test Plan: Clicked, like, every login button.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4339
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8045
Summary:
Ref T4339. Ref T4310. Currently, sessions look like `"afad85d675fda87a4fadd54"`, and are only issued for logged-in users. To support logged-out CSRF and (eventually) external user sessions, I made two small changes:
- First, sessions now have a "kind", which is indicated by a prefix, like `"A/ab987asdcas7dca"`. This mostly allows us to issue session queries more efficiently: we don't have to issue a query at all for anonymous sessions, and can join the correct table for user and external sessions and save a query. Generally, this gives us more debugging information and more opportunity to recover from issues in a user-friendly way, as with the "invalid session" error in this diff.
- Secondly, if you load a page and don't have a session, we give you an anonymous session. This is just a secret with no special significance.
This does not implement CSRF yet, but gives us a client secret we can use to implement it.
Test Plan:
- Logged in.
- Logged out.
- Browsed around.
- Logged in again.
- Went through link/register.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4310, T4339
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8043
Summary: Ref T4339. We have more magical cookie names than we should, move them all to a central location.
Test Plan: Registered, logged in, linked account, logged out. See inlines.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4339
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8041
Summary:
Fixes T4143. This mitigates the "use a botnet to slowly try to login to every user account using the passwords '1234', 'password', 'asdfasdf', ..." attack, like the one that hit GitHub.
(I also donated some money to Openwall as a thanks for compiling this wordlist.)
Test Plan:
- Tried to register with a weak password; registered with a strong password.
- Tried to set VCS password to a weak password; set VCS password to a strong password.
- Tried to change password to a weak password; changed password to a strong password.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran, chad
Maniphest Tasks: T4143
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D8048
Summary:
Ref T4310. Fixes T3720. This change:
- Removes concurrent session limits. Instead, unused sessions are GC'd after a while.
- Collapses all existing "web-1", "web-2", etc., sessions into "web" sessions.
- Dramatically simplifies the code for establishing a session (like omg).
Test Plan: Ran migration, checked Sessions panel and database for sanity. Used existing session. Logged out, logged in. Ran Conduit commands.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4310, T3720
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7978
Summary:
Ref T3720. Ref T4310. Currently, we limit the maximum number of concurrent sessions of each type. This is primarily because sessions predate garbage collection and we had no way to prevent the session table from growing fairly quickly and without bound unless we did this.
Now that we have GC (and it's modular!) we can just expire unused sessions after a while and throw them away:
- Add a `sessionExpires` column to the table, with a key.
- Add a GC for old sessions.
- When we establish a session, set `sessionExpires` to the current time plus the session TTL.
- When a user uses a session and has used up more than 20% of the time on it, extend the session.
In addition to this, we could also rotate sessions, but I think that provides very little value. If we do want to implement it, we should hold it until after T3720 / T4310.
Test Plan:
- Ran schema changes.
- Looked at database.
- Tested GC:
- Started GC.
- Set expires on one row to the past.
- Restarted GC.
- Verified GC nuked the session.
- Logged in.
- Logged out.
- Ran Conduit method.
- Tested refresh:
- Set threshold to 0.0001% instead of 20%.
- Loaded page.
- Saw a session extension ever few page loads.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4310, T3720
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7976
Summary:
Ref T4310. Ref T3720. Two major things are going on here:
- I'm making this table work more like a standard table, which, e.g., makes `delete()` simpler to implement.
- Currently, the primary key is `(userPHID, type)`. I want to get rid of this, issue unlimited sessions, and GC old sessions. This means we can't have a unique key on `(userPHID, type)` anymore. This removes it as the primary key and adds it as a normal key instead. There's no functional change -- the code to generate sessions guarantees that it will never write duplicate rows or write additional rows -- but allows us to drop the `-1`, `-2` qualifiers in the future.
- Also of note, our task is made far simpler here because MySQL will automatically assign values to new `AUTO_INCREMENT` columns, so we don't have to migrate to get real IDs.
Test Plan: Ran migrations, verified table looked sane. Logged out, logged in.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T3720, T4310
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7975
Summary: Adds "verified" and "secretKey" to Legalpad document signatures. For logged in users using an email address they own, things are verified right away. Otherwise, the email is sent a verification letter. When the user clicks the link the signature is marked verified.
Test Plan: signed the document with a bogus email address not logged in. verified the email that would be sent looked good from command line. followed link and successfully verified bogus email address
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
CC: Korvin, epriestley, aran, asherkin
Maniphest Tasks: T4283
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7930
Summary: Ref T4310. Ref T3720. We use bare strings to refer to session types in several places right now; use constants instead.
Test Plan: grep; logged out; logged in; ran Conduit commands.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4310, T3720
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7963
Summary: Ref T4310. Ref T3720. Session operations are currently part of PhabricatorUser. This is more tightly coupled than needbe, and makes it difficult to establish login sessions for non-users. Move all the session management code to a `SessionEngine`.
Test Plan:
- Viewed sessions.
- Regenerated Conduit certificate.
- Verified Conduit sessions were destroyed.
- Logged out.
- Logged in.
- Ran conduit commands.
- Viewed sessions again.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4310, T3720
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7962
Summary: Ref T4310. Ref T3720. Partly, this makes it easier for users to understand login sessions. Partly, it makes it easier for me to make changes to login sessions for T4310 / T3720 without messing anything up.
Test Plan: {F101512}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T3720, T4310
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7954
Summary:
Ref T4310. This is a small step toward separating out the session code so we can establish sessions for `ExternalAccount` and not just `User`.
Also fix an issue with strict MySQL and un-admin / un-disable from web UI.
Test Plan: Logged in, logged out, admined/de-admin'd user, added email address, checked user log for all those events.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4310
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7953
Summary: This removes the bulk of the "Form Errors" text, some variations likely exists. These are a bit redundant and space consuming. I'd also like to back ErrorView more into PHUIObjectBox.
Test Plan: Test out the forms, see errors without the text.
Reviewers: epriestley, btrahan
CC: Korvin, epriestley, aran, hach-que
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7924
Summary: Fixes T4290. At least one of the fields (`realname`) may have a list of items, and `strlen(array('first', 'last'))` produces the warning and stack trace in T4290.
Test Plan:
- Edited `realname` from an array value to an array value.
- Hit error.
- Applied patch.
- No more error.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4290
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7905
Summary: Ref T4289. Make it clear that this provider does not currently work with JIRA 5.
Test Plan: Viewed JIRA provider from `/auth/`, saw warnings.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4289
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7906
Summary:
Ref T2015. Not directly related to Drydock, but I've wanted to do this for a bit.
Introduce a common base class for all the workflows in the scripts in `bin/*`. This slightly reduces code duplication by moving `isExecutable()` to the base, but also provides `getViewer()`. This is a little nicer than `PhabricatorUser::getOmnipotentUser()` and gives us a layer of indirection if we ever want to introduce more general viewer mechanisms in scripts.
Test Plan: Lint; ran some of the scripts.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T2015
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7838
Summary: We currently have a lot of calls to `addCrumb(id(new PhabricatorCrumbView())->...)` which can be expressed much more simply with a convenience method. Nearly all crumbs are only textual.
Test Plan:
- This was mostly automated, then I cleaned up a few unusual sites manually.
- Bunch of grep / randomly clicking around.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: hach-que, aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7787
Summary: Fixes T4148. LDAPS works with "ldaps://", it just isn't documented or clear.
Test Plan: {F84893}
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4148
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7652
Summary:
Ref T4140. We could hit a redirect loop for a user with a verified primary email address but no "is verified" flag on their account. This shouldn't be possible since the migration should have set the flag, but we can deal with it more gracefully when it does happen (maybe because users forgot to run `storage/upgrade`, or because of ghosts).
In the controller, check the same flag we check before forcing the user to the controller.
When verifying, allow the verification if either the email or user flag isn't set.
Test Plan: Hit `/login/mustverify/`; verified an address.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4140
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7621
Summary: Ref T4140. Allow unapproved users to verify their email addresses. Currently, unapproved blocks email verification, but should not.
Test Plan: Clicked email verification link as an unapproved user, got email verified.
Reviewers: btrahan, chad
Reviewed By: chad
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4140
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7618
Summary:
Fixes T4132. If you run "bin/auth recover" before setting the base URI, it throws when trying to generate a production URI.
Instead, just show the path. We can't figure out the domain, and I think this is less confusing than showing "your.phabricator.example.com", etc.
Test Plan: Ran `bin/auth recover <user>` for valid and missing base-uri.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T4132
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7615
Summary:
A usable, Land to GitHub flow.
Still to do:
- Refactor all git/hg stratagies to a sane structure.
- Make the dialogs Workflow + explain why it's disabled.
- Show button and request Link Account if GH is enabled, but user is not linked.
- After refreshing token, user ends up in the settings stage.
Hacked something in LandController to be able to show an arbitrary dialog from a strategy.
It's not very nice, but I want to make some more refactoring to the controller/strategy/ies anyway.
Also made PhabricatorRepository::getRemoteURIObject() public, because it was very useful in getting
the domain and path for the repo.
Test Plan:
Went through these flows:
- load revision in hosted, github-backed, non-github backed repos to see button as needed.
- hit land with weak token - sent to refresh it with the extra scope.
- Land to repo I'm not allowed - got proper error message.
- Successfully landed; Failed to apply patch.
Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers
Reviewed By: epriestley
CC: Korvin, epriestley, aran
Maniphest Tasks: T182
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7555
Summary:
Fixes T3741. The flag is respected in terms of actually creating the account, but the UI is a bit unclear.
This can never occur naturally, but installs can register an event which locks it.
Test Plan:
Artificially locked it, verified I got more reasonable UI;
{F81282}
Reviewers: btrahan, datr
Reviewed By: datr
CC: aran
Maniphest Tasks: T3741
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7577
Summary:
- Add an option for the queue.
- By default, enable it.
- Dump new users into the queue.
- Send admins an email to approve them.
Test Plan:
- Registered new accounts with queue on and off.
- As an admin, approved accounts and disabled the queue from email.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
CC: aran
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7576
